tion, and the Authority shall thereupon assign such application for hearing at a place convenient to the applicant's place of residence or employment: Provided, That the Authority may, in its discretion, prohibit or restrict the issuance of airman certificates to aliens, or may make such issuance dependent on the terms of reciprocal agreements entered into with foreign governments."

Section 609 of title VI of the act provides:

"The Authority may, from time to time, reinspect any aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, air navigation. facility or air agency, may reexamine any airman, and, after investigation, and upon notice and hearing, may alter, amend, modify, or suspend, in whole or in part, any type certificate, production certificate, airworthiness certificate, airman certificate, air-carrier operating certificate, air navigation facility certificate, or air-agency certificate if the interest of the public so requires, or may revoke, in whole or in part, any such certificate for any cause which, at the time of revocation, would justify the Authority in refusing to issue to the holder of such certificate a like certificate. * ** *""

Section 201 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act provides for the appointment in the Authority of an Administrator. Section 7 of Reorganization Plan No. III (54 Stat. 1231), which became effective June 30, 1940 (Public Res. No. 75, approved June 4, 1940, c. 231, 54 Stat. 230, 231), changes the title of the Administrator to Administrator of Civil Aeronautics and provides:

"Functions of the Administrator transferred.-The functions vested in the Civil Aeronautics Authority by the Civilian Pilot Training Act of 1939; the functions of aircraft registration and of safety regulation described in titles V and VI of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, except the functions of prescribing safety standards, rules, and regulations and of suspending and revoking certificates after hearing; the function provided for by section 1101 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938; and the functions of appointing such officers and employees and of authorizing such expenditures and travel as may be necessary for the performance of all functions vested in the Administrator, are transferred from the Civil Aeronautics Authority to and shall be exer

cised by the Administrator, who shall hereafter be known as the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics."

By section 7. (a) of Reorganization Plan IV (54 Stat. 1234) effective June 30, 1940 (Public Res. No. 75, supra), the name of the Civil Aeronautics Authority was changed to Civil Aeronautics Board.

It will be noted that the duty of holding denial hearings, provided for in section 602 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act, is not expressly referred to in section 7 of Reorganization Plan No. III, which vests in the Administrator the function of "safety regulation" and in the Board the function of "suspending and revoking certificates after hearing."

In the interpretation of statutes the cardinal rule is to give effect to the intention of the Congress. As stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534, 542:

66* * * There is no invariable rule for the discovery of that intention. To take a few words from their context and with them thus isolated to attempt to determine their meaning, certainly would not contribute greatly to the discovery of the purpose of the draftsmen of a statute, particularly in a law drawn to meet many needs of a major occupation.

"There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.' * * *99

Also, as stated by the Court in United States v. Dickerson,

310 U. S. 554, 562, "the meaning to be ascribed to an act of Congress can only be derived from a considered weighing of every relevant aid to construction."

The purpose and policy of the provisions of Reorganization Plan No. III relating to the Civil Aeronautics Authority are clearly stated by the President in his message transmitting the Plan to the Congress:

66* * * I have found that such reorganization is necessary to accomplish one or more of the purposes of section 1 (a) of the act [Reorganization Act of 1939, approved April 3, 1939, c. 36, 53 Stat. 561].

"1. To reduce expenditures;

"2. To increase efficiency;

"3. To consolidate agencies according to major purposes; "4. To reduce the number of agencies by consolidating those having similar functions and by abolishing such as may not be necessary; and

"5. To eliminate overlapping and duplication of effort.

"I propose to clarify the relations of the Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Authority and the five-member Board of the Civil Aeronautics Authority. The Administrator is made the chief administrative officer of the Authority with respect to all functions other than those relating to economic regulations and certain other activities primarily of a rule-making and adjudicative character which are entrusted to the Board. This will eliminate the confusion of responsibilities existing under the Civil Aeronautics Act and provide a more clear-cut and effective plan of organization for the agency." [Italics supplied.]

It is clear from reading the Reorganization Plan and the President's message that, in vesting in the Administrator the function of "safety regulation" it was intended to entrust him with such safety regulation activities as are of an administrative character. To this end the Administrator is made the "chief administrative officer of the Authority." It is also clear that under the Plan the Civil Aeronautics Board is charged with the duty of suspending and revoking certificates after hearing. This is unquestionably an adjudicative activity. In such a hearing relating to an airman cer

tificate the issue to be determined is whether the airman. possesses proper qualifications for and is physically able to perform the duties pertaining to the position for which the airman certificate is sought or was granted. It appears that precisely the same issues are presented where a hearing is granted upon a petition for reconsideration after the denial of an application for the issuance or renewal of an airman certificate. In the latter case, as in the former, the functions of conducting the hearing, studying the record and making the determination, are "adjudicative" rather than administrative. Under the administrative practice the question whether to hold a denial hearing or a revocation hearing depends in many cases not upon any real difference between the two proceedings but upon the time interval between the date of violation and the date of expiration of the airman's certificate. If at the time the airman has committed some violation of the Civil Air Regulations or the act for which a suspension or revocation of the certificate might be the appropriate penalty, and the certificate will expire within a short time, suspension or revocation proceedings are not initiated. In such case, when the airman thereafter applies for the renewal of a certificate the application is denied and he is advised of his right to a rehearing under section 602 (b). On the other hand, if the certificate had two or three months to run at the time of the violation, proceedings would immediately be initiated to revoke the certificate. It thus appears that the denial hearings are integrated with suspension and revocation hearings and that control over the latter requires in part control over the former. In their essential characteristics denial hearings are akin to and in actual administration of the statute become in substance a part of the function entrusted to the Board of suspending and revoking certificates after hearing. In view as well of the adjudicative character of the hearings the intention not to vest them in the Administrator seems clear.

It appears also from the documents submitted that a contrary ruling would result in overlapping and duplication of effort, and would continue the confusion of responsibilities which the Reorganization Plan was designed to eliminate. Such result would be at variance with the policy of the Plan

as a whole. I find nothing in the provisions of the Plan or in its history requiring a construction having that result.

It is my opinion, therefore, that the provisions of section 7 of Reorganization Plan No. III vest in the Civil Aeronautics Board the function of holding a hearing under section 602 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 upon a petition for reconsideration of the denial of an application for the issuance or renewal of an airman certificate.

Respectfully,

ROBERT H. JACKSON.

MINERAL LEASING ACT

The rule against resorting to evidence of legislative intent when language is plain "is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists."

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is another axiom of experience, properly to be considered when applicable but not necessarily controlling.

The conclusion reached in 34 Op. A. G. 171 that the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, has peculiar application to the public domain is approved.

The statute does not authorize leases with respect to lands acquired by the War Department in the course of its rivers and harbors improvement program.

The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

JANUARY 3, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Acting Secretary Burlew, in his letter of November 26, requested my opinion "whether the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat. 437), as amended [U. S. C., title 30, sec. 181], authorizes the Department of the Interior to lease deposits of petroleum and natural gas on lands acquired or public lands reserved by the United States for a specific purpose, where such lands are under the jurisdiction of another agency of the Government."

This is, in effect, a request for a reconsideration of an opinion of Attorney General Stone of May 12, 1924 (34 Op. 171). I am glad to comply with the request, and have been hopeful that some way could be found to deal with the