events, than they could possibly be; and none but the most contemptible enthusiasts could be now ignorant, that his hypocrisy was unceasing, his influence with the army unbounded, and his views ambitious.

The only possible mode, therefore, of controlling his conduct, or favourably influencing his designs, was the summoning of a regular parliament, which might attract the respect of every man of principle in the army and in the kingdom.

It is true, that even this measure might not have answered to the views of the Republicans, but it was their only chance.

To remain as they were, the last remnant that military violence had spared, and therefore respected by no party; to remain, ready to be overthrown at the first difference that arose between themselves and the army, was certain destruction.

In this state, however, the parliament did remain during the first year of their administration-1648.

In 1649, Cromwell and the army were employed in Ireland; in 1650, against the Scotch Presbyterians, who had made a very injudicious attempt to restore royalty, or rather the covenant and royalty; and had persuaded the young king (afterwards Charles II.) to commit himself, very thoughtlessly, to the disposal of their intolerance and fanaticism. In both these campaigns Cromwell and the army were victorious. In 1651, the young king was defeated at Worcester. This defeat of his enemy was what Cromwell declared to be the last crowning mercy of the Lord; that is, it was the finishing step to his own power, and the cause of the Republicans was now more than ever hopeless.

They seem to have had an opportunity in 1649, when Cromwell was in Ireland, to have made some effort for the establishment of their civil authority, but they lost it. In the meantime, petitions with respect to the settlement of the nation were continually presented to them; instead of attending, however, to the public expectations, and the duties of

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their situation, they contented themselves with returning, like other unwise governments, sometimes menaces, punishments, and statutes of high treason, sometimes plausible answers to gain time, and occasionally debating the question of their dissolution, and of a new representation; but on the whole, coming to no decision on the subject, while it was their best policy to do so. When at last it did come to a vote, in November, 1651, after the power of Cromwell was finally established, their resolution only was, "that they would dissolve themselves three years afterwards, in 1654 ;” a resolution that could satisfy no one, but much the contrary.

They had, therefore, not chosen to make a common cause with the public, and being thus without support from within and from without, Cromwell took a few soldiers with him, expelled them from the house, and locked up the doors of it, as soon as he found them an incumbrance to his ambition. He first, indeed, acquainted them, "That the Lord had done with them."

The public, who never favour those who have no visible merits to produce, still less those who have seemed attentive chiefly to their own selfish interests, saw this new act of military violence with indifference, and probably with plea

sure.

Certainly these Republicans, after a trial of three years, had entirely failed as politicians, and had established no republic.

But they had great merits in endeavouring to introduce improvements into the law. The laudable efforts of the Long Parliament on this subject have never been properly acknowledged. The state of all the real landed property of this kingdom is, at this moment, materially influenced by the happy effect of their legislative provisions; and those men of property who inquire will find, that their estates have been as much indebted as themselves, to these parliamentary leaders, for any freedom that belongs to them; both the one and the other were emancipated from feudal manacles,

Cromwell now alone remained, supreme and unresisted ; and thus at length terminated, in the usurpation of a military chief, the original struggle between the king and parliament.

And this, as I have already announced at the beginning of this lecture, has been always considered as the necessary issue of any successful appeal to arms on the part of the people; a position to which I do not indiscriminately assent, and on which I shall therefore offer some observations in my next lecture.

LECTURE XVII.

CROMWELL. MONK. REGICIDES.

TOWARDS the conclusion of my last lecture, we had arrived at the usurpation of Cromwell; and this usurpation of a military chief, I then observed, has been always considered as the natural issue of any successful appeal to arms on the part of the people.

This position, it appears to me, has been always laid down too broadly and indiscriminately. The question seems to

admit of a distinction, and it is this :—

If a people have been long subject to all the evils of an arbitrary government, and at last break out into insurrection, it is to be expected, no doubt, that the last favourite of the army, who survives the contest, will gradually procure for himself the power which the former sovereigns had abused and lost. There is no material shock here given to those habits of thinking and feeling, which, notwithstanding all the intermediate troubles, must still form the genuine character of the great body of the nation; but the case is materially altered, if we suppose a people, before possessed of constitutional rights, and endeavouring to defend or enlarge them, in opposition to those who would limit or destroy them. Here the event, if the popular party succeed, seems more naturally to be, the ultimate strengthening and enlarging of the prior constitutional privileges, under some form of government similar to the former one.

In this case an usurpation is neither not attempted, as in the instances of Switzerland and Holland, and, in our own times, of America, or, if attempted, the usurper finds himself impeded with such political difficulties at every movement

which he makes, that the continuance of his power is always a matter of uncertainty; and the original and irremediable disposition of the people, the result of their former better government, is sure at last to prevail, either over himself, or over his successors.

In illustration of this general reasoning may be cited the difficulties which Cromwell had to overcome, while he was endeavouring to seize the power of the state, and still more while he was labouring to retain it.

I will give a general representation of them. Together they form a strong testimony to the permanent nature of the English mixed constitution, particularly of the monarchical part of it; and they go far to prove that the usurpation of Cromwell was not, as has been generally supposed, a successful one.

These are the principal topics of reflection to which I would at present wish to excite your attention. Hume and Millar, and the regular historians and writers, will supply you with many others.

Cromwell had to subdue not only the Royalists, but the Presbyterians; and this, not merely by force, but by the most extraordinary performances of cant and hypocrisy that human nature ever yet exhibited.

But why? Because these descriptions of men bore fresh upon their minds the impression of the constitution of England, and were only solicitous, according to the best of their judgment, to support or improve that constitution.

By the same arts and means were the Independents, the Republicans, to be overpowered by the usurper, and for the same reason. They too were impressed with the original. stamp which had been received from the popular part of this constitution; and they had only deviated from it, because they thought that the monarchical part had been found, from trial, incompatible with the interests of the country.

That a military usurper, that any single person should rule,