The Origins of the War of 1914: The epilogue of the crisis of July 1914. The declarations of war and of neutrality

Front Cover
Oxford University Press, 1952

Contents

THE PROCLAMATION OF THE KRIEGSGEFAHRZUSTAND IN GERMANY THE GERMAN ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA I 1 The Chancellor and ...
1
Bethmann confesses to his Cabinet colleagues that he has lost control of events
3
his promise to the Generals p
14
Sazonovs formula for mediation received in Berlin the Kaisers perplexities on the afternoon of 30 July p
18
Haeftens revelations and what they amount to p
24
How King George Vs telegram to the Kaiser was communicated to Vienna p
27
News of the Russian general mobilization becomes known in Berlin p
31
The Kaisers wrathful outbursts his ignorance of the real situation and his ground less optimism at the last moment p
34
Italy England and the Triple Alliance p 343
343
Italys treachery disproved by the documents p 350
350
The Italian ruling classes and the Vatican in the crisis of July 1914 p 357
357
LAST ENGLISH EFFORTS FOR NEUTRALITY AND FIRST
364
English warning to Germany against the violation of Belgium Grey refuses
386
Paul Cambons despair on the afternoon of 1 August his request for at least
392
The Cabinet decides that the violation of Belgium would oblige England to inter
409
Moltke make bellicose speeches to King Albert p 437
437

Proclamation of the Kriegsgefahrzustand and the German ultimatums to Russia and to France p
38
The Kaisers telegram to Francis Joseph and Moltkes startling proposals to Conrad p
45
Bethmanns renewed approach to London Greys last urgent appeal to Berlin p
50
A telegram from the Tsar to Wilhelm Sazonovs successive states of mind p
55
Pourtalès hands Sazonov the German ultimatum with a twelvehour time limit p
61
GENERAL MOBILIZATION IN FRANCE 66 1 French anxiety Poincarés letter to King George V Joffre presses for frontier couverture p
66
Kriegsgefahrzustand p
70
Schoens démarche to ascertain French intentions Vivianis evasive reply p
73
Vivianis telegram to Paléologue of 31 July and the circumstances which gave rise to it p
76
The reasons for French acquiescence in the Russian general mobilization p
80
The assassination of Jaurès on 31 July and the atmosphere in which it took place p
85
Berties inquiry as to the French attitude on Belgium Paléologues telegram con firming Russian general mobilization p
88
Joffre on the evening of 31 July asks for French mobilization p
91
The Szécsen incident and the Quai dOrsays manœuvres p
92
The French Cabinet decides to order general mobilization p
99
Vivianis manifesto and the thesis that mobilization is not war p 105
105
The last conversation between Schoen and Viviani on 1 August Vivianis tactics and two revealing telegrams from Izvolsky p 108
108
Austria accused of having been the first to mobilize in the Tsars reply to the supreme
125
Buchanans belated telegram to London about the Russian general mobilization
135
First doubts in France and first reactions the truth revealed in documents brought
141
The exchange of letters between the President of the Ligue des Droits de lHomme
151
fications in the Yellow Book p 157
157
THE GERMAN DECLARATIONS OF WAR ON RUSSIA
166
The order to abstain from occupying Luxemburg confusion reigns at Berlin
175
Pourtalès delivers the declaration of war to Sazonov Izvolsky asks France for
181
Draft of a declaration of war on France breakdown of the political leadership
193
The incidents on the FrancoGerman frontier on 2 and 3 August p 204
204
The Chancellors speech in the Reichstag on 4 August p 219
219
Poincarés message and Vivianis speech to the French parliament p 225
225
Moltke opposed to the violation of Dutch neutrality modifications of the Schlieffen
238
ITALYS ATTITUDE AFTER THE FIUGGI CONVERSATION
254
How Italy supported the prolongation of the ultimatum to Serbia and the holding
264
Berchtold desirous of postponing the discussion of compensation to Italy Merey
271
Italian silence on the demand for the Trentino Tschirschkys views and activities
279
The concession of compensation to Italy in the formula of 28 July p 286
286
Compensation conceded in the TschirschkyBerchtold formula of 31 July
292
San Giuliano on 29 July allows the possibility of Italian intervention on the side
299
The Austrian Emperor and the Kaiser appeal to Victor Emmanuel the Italian
310
San Giulianos letter of 3 August to Avarna and Bollati p 321
321
Victor Emmanuels telegram to Francis Joseph San Giuliano drops a hint about
331
The gravity of the Italian decision and the part played in it by Salandra p 337
337
The behaviour of the German Minister at Brussels the content of the German
448
BRITAIN AT
476
Greys speech in the House of Commons on the afternoon of 3 August p 484
484
The delivery of the ultimatum p 495
495
English reluctance to send troops to the Continent p 502
502
The Council of War on 5 August decides to send the Expeditionary Force to France
508
Greys ideas on the Belgian question and English intervention p 517
517
Greys share of responsibility for the war p 523
523
France and England declare war on AustriaHungary p 542
526
ROUMANIAN NEUTRALITY
546
The equivocal Roumanian first reaction to the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia
555
Bratianus final manœuvre the German promise of Bessarabia p 564
564
The Roumanian Crown Council of 3 August decides on neutrality p 572
572
BULGARIA BETWEEN TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE
582
p 600
600
Germany at first refuses to ally with Turkey p 610
610
Turkey does not go to war she declares neutrality and makes a feint of negotiating
617
THE NEUTRALITY OF GREECE
624
MONTENEGRO MAKES COMMON CAUSE WITH SERBIA 646 1 Russian distrust of Cetinje King Nicholass feelers for an agreement with Austria ...
646
King Nicholass proAustrian attitude after the Sarajevo outrage p 650
650
Berchtolds anxious telegrams to influence Montenegros decision p 653
653
King Nicholass telegram to Prince Alexander Montenegro mobilizes p 655
655
Berchtolds final appeal the Montenegrin Skupština decides on intervention on the side of Serbia the King dragged into the war p 658
658
THE ATTITUDE OF THE OTHER STATES 662 1 Swedish hostility to Russia and tendencies towards alliance with Germany p 662
662
English Ministers p 666
666
The Swedish declaration of neutrality p 669
669
Norways sympathies for the Entente the Anglophil character of Norwegian neu trality p 672
672
Danish fear of Germany and declaration of neutrality p 673
673
The Dutch Governments firm stand towards Germany p 676
676
German assurances at The Hague Dutch neutrality p 678
678
The German invasion of Luxemburg p 681
681
The neutrality of Switzerland p 685
685
The ancient ties of alliance between England and Portugal Lisbons solidarity with London p 690
690
The neutrality of Spain p 691
691
Japan intervenes on the side of the Entente p 693
693
The United States and Wilsons last effort to save peace p 699
699
BIBLIOGRAPHY
703
Ministère des Affaires Étrangères Lalliance francorusse Origines
704
Barnes Harry Elmer The Genesis of the World War An introduction
710
MAP ILLUSTRATING SCHLIEFFEN AND MOLTKE PLANS following
730
INDEX
731

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