ferved, that the ftory of the maffacre feems to have been taken out of Witichindus, and applied to the Britons, where the fame things are spoken verbatim of the Saxons and Thuringians.' But this is an unreasonable cenfure. The fame piece of history is in Nennius: and therefore Witichindus † was not the original author; nor Geoffrey the perverter of it. For Nennius wrote about the year 6zo; and the monk of Corbey, above three hundred years afterwards, an. 950.

Though Geoffrey of Monmouth and Giraldus Cambrenfis have related the ftory with the fame ridiculous circumstances, yet it does not appear, that the latter has copied the former. Their expreffions on this occafion are very different. We may therefore confider Giraldus as a collateral evidence in favour of Geoffrey more efpecially as he was his contemporary, and not in the least inclined to adopt his affertion ‡.

Every reader, without doubt, muft at once explode the fable of the giants; but from the concurrent teftimonies of fo many early writers, and others which might be added, we may reasonably conclude, that the ftory of the maffacre is not without fome foundation. Nennius relates it circumftantially; telling us, that three hundred Britons were put to death: Omnes feniores.ccc. Guortigerni regis funt jugulati.' This is the best authority we have; as Nennius is fuppofed to have lived within a hundred and twenty years after the fact. There is nothing this kind, for obvious reasons, in the Saxon annals.

As to the structure being the fepulchre of the British nobles, Ambrofius, and others, we can only fay, that it is not improbable; and that the teftimony of the British history is, in fome degree, corroborated by the name of Ambrefbury: quafi Ambrofii vicus. We may add, that the probability is increased by the agreement of Geofrey of Monmouth, Giraldus, and others, and by our not having the leaft authority, on the other hand, for fuppofing it to have been a druidical temple, much lefs a Roman fabric.

Camden fays, Certè offa humana hic fæpiùs effoffa fuerunt. Perhaps fome opulent antiquary may hereafter undertake to examine the ground more effectually; and we can only wish, that the mattock and the fpade may procure him that fatisfaction, which the British hiftorians cannot give.

Witichindi Annales, lib. i. p. 1. Inter Rer. Germ. Script. à Meibomio editos. tom. iii. p. 158.

Vid. Giraldi Camb. Desc. cap. 7.

I be

The Conftitution of England, or an Account of the English Government; in which it is compared with the Republican Form of Government, and occafionally with the other Monarchies in Europe. By J. L. de Loime, Advocate, Citizen of Geneva. The Third Edition. 800. 6s. boards. Robinfon.

THE

'HE merit of this work is already fo well known to the public, that we shall decline any farther recommendation of it in our Review; where it has, on former occafions, been twice the subject of our approbation. The work is now enlarged by the addition of four chapters; two of which relate to the law in respect of civil matters, and to the courts of equity; one contains thoughts on the attempts that may at particular times be made to abridge the power of the crown, and on fome of the dangers by which fuch attempts may be attended. The fourth additional chapter comprifes farther thoughts on the right of taxation, lodged in the hands of the reprefentatives of the people; with an account of the danger to which this right may be expofed.

Mr. De Lolme gives, we think, a more just and precise account of the nature of the courts of equity than is to be found in any other writer on the English conftitution.

The generality of people, fays he, mifled by this word equity, have conceived falfe notions of the office of the courts we mention; and it feems to be generally thought that the judges. who fit in them, are only to follow the rules of natural equity; by which people appear to understand, that in a court of equity, the judge may follow the dictates of his private feelings, and ground his decifions on the peculiar circumftances and fituation of thofe perfons who make their appearance before him. Nay, Dr. Johnson, in his abridged Dictionary, gives the following definition of the power of the Court of Chancery confidered as a court of equity: "The chancellor hath power to moderate and temper the written law, and fubjecteth himfelf only to the law of nature and confcience :" for which definition dean Swift, and Cowell, who was a lawyer, are quoted as authorities. Other inftances might be produced of lawyers who have been inaccurate in their definitions of the true office of the judges of equity. And the above named doctor himself is on no fubject a despicable authority.

Certainly the power of the judges of equity cannot be to alter, by their own private power, the written law, that is, acts of parliament, and thus to control the legiflature. Their of fice only confifts, as will be proved in the fequel, in providing remedies for thofe cafes, for which the public good requires that remedies fhould be provided, and in regard to which the courts of common law, fhackled by their original forms and institu

tions,

tions, cannot procure any;-or in other words-the courts of equity have a power to adminifter juftice to individuals, unreftrained, not by the law, but by the profeffional law difficulties which lawyers have from time to time contrived in the courts of common law, and to which the judges of those courts have given their fanction.*

Mr. De Lolme has formerly fhewn, it is to the indivisibility of the governing authority in England, that the community of interest which takes place among all orders of men, and confequently the fuperior liberty the people enjoy, are owing; and refpecting the truth of this obfervation, he produces many convincing arguments, in the chapter on the attempts towards abridging the power of the crown.

We fhall present our readers with the following paffage from the chapter on taxation.

• But here a most important obfervation is to be made; and I entreat the reader's attention to the fubject. This right of granting fubfidies to the crown, can only be effectual when it is exercifed by one affembly alone. When feveral diftinct affemblies have it equally in their power to fupply the wants of the prince, the cafe becomes totally altered. The competition which fo eafily takes place between thofe different bodies, and even the bare consciousness which each entertains of its inability to hinder the measures of the fovereign, render it impoffible for them to make any effectual conftitutional ufe of their privilege. "Those different parliaments or eftates (to repeat the obfervation introduced in the former part of this work) having no means of recommending themfelves to their fovereign, but their fuperior readiness in complying with his demands, vie with each other in granting what it would not only be fruitlefs. but even dangerous to refufe. And the king, on the other hand, foon comes to demand as a tribute, a gift which he is confident to obtain." In fhort, it may be laid down as a maxim, that when a fovereign is made to depend, in regard to his fupplies, on more affemblies than one, he, in fact, depends upon none. And indeed the king of France is not independent on his people for his neceffary fupplies, any otherwife than by drawing the fame from feveral different affemblies of their reprefentatives; the latter have in appearance a right to refufe all his demands; and as the Engli call the grants they make to their kings, aids or fubfidies, fo do the eftates of the French provinces call their's, dons gratuits, or free gifts.

What is it, therefore, that conftitutes the difference between the political fituation of the French and English nations, fince their rights thus feem to be the fame? The difference lies in this, that there has never been in England more than one affembly hat could fupply the wants of the fovereign. This has always

kept

kept him in a state, not of a feeming, but of a real dependence on the representatives of the people for his neceffary fupplies; and how low foever the liberty of the fubject may, at particular times, have funk, they have always found themselves poffeffed of a most effectual means of restoring it, whenever they have thought proper fo to do. Under Henry the Eighth, for instance, we find the defpotifm of the crown to have been carried to an astonishing height; it was even enacted that the proclamations of the king fhould have the force of law; a thing which even in France, never was fo exprefsly declared: yet no fooner did the nation recover from its long ftate of fupinenefs, than the exorbitant power of the crown was reduced within its conftitutional bounds.

To no other caufe than the disadvantage of their fituation, are we to afcribe the low condition in which the deputies of the people in the affembly called the general estates of France, were always forced to remain.

Surrounded as they were by the particular eftates of those provinces inro which the kingdom had been formerly divided, they never were able to ftipulate conditions with their fovereign; and instead of making their right of granting fubfidies to the crown ferve to gain them in the end a fhare in legiflation, they ever remained confined to the naked privilege of "humble fupplication and remonftrance."

Thofe eftates, however, as all the great lords in France were admitted into them, began at length to appear dangerous; and as the king could in the mean time do without their affiftance, they were fet afide. But feveral of the particular eftates of the provinces are preferved to this day: fome, which for temporary reafons had been abolished, have been restored: nay, fo manageable have popular affemblies been found by the crown, when it has to do with many, that the kind of government we mention is that which it has been found most convenient to affign to Corfica; and Corfica has been made un pays d'etats.

That the crown in England fhould, on a fudden, render itfelf independent on the commons for its fupplies, that is, fhould on a fudden fuccefsfully affume to itself a right to lay taxes on the fubjects, by its own authority, is not certainly an event in any degree likely to take place, nor indeed that should raise any kind of political fear. But it is not equally impracticable, that the right of the representatives of the people might become invalidated, by being divided in the manner that has just been defcribed.

• Such a divifion of the right of the people might be effected feveral different ways. National calamities for instance, unfortunate foreign wars, attended with lofs of public credit, might fuggeft methods for raifing the neceffary fupplies, different from thofe which have hitherto been ufed. Dividing the kingdom into a certain number of parts, which fhould feverally vote fubfidies to the crown, or even diftinct affeffments made by the dif ferent

4

ferent counties into which England is now divided, might, in the circumstances we fuppofe, be looked upon as advifeable expe dients; and thefe, being once introduced, might be continued afterwards.

• Another divifion of the right of the people, much more likely to take place than thofe juft mentioned, might be fuch as might arife from acquifitions of foreign dominions, the inhabitants of which should in time claim and obtain a right to treat directly with the crown, and grant fupplies to it, without the interference of the British legiflature.

Should any colonies acquire the right we mention---fhould, for inftance, the American colonies have acquired it, as they claimed it, it is not to be doubted that the confequences that have refulted from a divifion like that we mention in most of the kingdoms of Europe, would also have taken place in the British dominions, and that that fpirit of competition which has been above defcribed, would in time have manifested itself between the dif ferent colonies. This defire of ingratiating themfelves with the crown, by means of the privilege of granting fupplies to it, has even been openly confefled by an agent of the American colonies, when, on his being examined by the house of commons, in the year 1766, he faid, "the granting aids to the crown, is the only means the Americans have of recommending themselves to their fovereign." And the events that have of late years taken place in America, render it evident that the colonies would not have fcrupled going any lengths to obtain favourable conditions at the expence of Britain and the British le giflature.

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That a fimilar fpirit of competition might be raised in Ireland, is alfo fufficiently plain from certain late events. And should the American colonies have obtained their demands, and at the fame time fhould Ireland and America have increased in wealth to a certain degree, the time might have come, at which the crown might have governed England with the fupplies of Ireland and America---Ireland with the fupplies of England and of the American colonies---and the American colonies with the mo ney of each other, and of England and Ireland.'

ment;

It may be obferved, in general, of this fenfible writer, that he has investigated the English conftitution with great difcernthat his obfervations are drawn from a knowlege of human nature, confirmed by the evidence of hiftorv; and that his political fpeculations, at the fame time that they are ingenious, are intimately connected with the fundamental principles of government.

Vol. LII. Oa. 1781.

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Illuf