Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary PolicyCambridge University Press, 1984 - 280 pages This is the first book to describe and analyze the relationships between the Federal Reserve and the president, Congress, bankers, and economists. Far from being politically independent, the Federal Reserve is shown to be sensitive to a wide range of political influences. |
Contents
The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy Introduction and Overview | 1 |
What is at stake? | 3 |
Relationships with external actors | 10 |
A framework for examining issues and relationships in monetary politics | 15 |
The political position of the Federal Reserve | 22 |
Conclusion and overview | 27 |
A Capsule History of the Federal Reserve System | 30 |
Defining the role of government in financial matters | 31 |
The President and the Federal Reserve | 108 |
Presidential relations with the Federal Reserve | 109 |
Conflicts | 119 |
Elections | 125 |
Conclusion | 129 |
Congress and the Federal Reserve | 131 |
capabilities and incentives | 132 |
The banking committees | 133 |
proximate sources | 35 |
The conception of the role of the Federal Reserve | 39 |
Resolving the question of the location of power over monetary policy | 41 |
Conclusion | 46 |
Recruitment and Selection of Federal Reserve Personnel | 48 |
Recruitment processes | 49 |
Occupational backgrounds of successful candidates | 55 |
Background and behavior | 61 |
Movement out of the System | 64 |
Conclusion | 67 |
Bankers and the Federal Reserve | 69 |
Bankers interests | 71 |
Bankers political resources | 74 |
What have the bankers received? | 80 |
Conclusion | 85 |
Economists and the Federal Reserve | 88 |
Monetarists and the issues in monetary politics | 90 |
Mainstream economists and control of the Federal Reserve | 96 |
The monetarist counterthrust | 99 |
Economists conflicts and Federal Reserve behavior | 101 |
Conclusion | 105 |
Patterns of interaction with the Federal Reserve | 138 |
The congressional challenge of 1975 | 144 |
Conclusion | 152 |
Making Monetary Policy in a Political Environment The Election of 1972 | 154 |
The plausibility of the charge of electionyear misbehavior | 155 |
Burns versus the White House 19701971 | 157 |
the pressure of controls | 158 |
Inside the FOMC in 1972 | 161 |
1972 in retrospect | 168 |
Conclusion | 179 |
Monetary Politics A Summary | 181 |
Political economy approaches | 185 |
Patterns of mobilization and monetary politics | 190 |
A Note on Data Sources | 195 |
Legislation Included in Table 71 | 203 |
Academic Backgrounds and Career Experiences of Notable Monetarists | 208 |
Notes | 211 |
Bibliographic Note | 271 |
| 275 | |
Other editions - View all
Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy John T. Woolley No preview available - 1984 |
Common terms and phrases
actors administration American analysis appointment argue Arthur Burns Arthur Okun bankers behavior board members Brimmer Burns's central bank chairman Chapter clear conflict Cong congressional critics currency debate decisions discount rate discussion district bank presidents economic policy economists election employment eral Reserve example February federal funds rate Federal Reserve Bank Federal Reserve Board Federal Reserve officials Federal Reserve System fiscal policy FOMC FOMC Minutes Gardner Ackley growth hearings House Banking Committee important independence industry inflation influence institutions interest rates interview issues Johnson LBJ Library legislation Maisel meeting members of Congress Memo ment monetarists monetary aggregates monetary policy money supply Nixon nomic Open Market oversight percent period policy makers Political Economy presidential pressure prior problems Proxmire reforms regulatory relationship Report Reserve's role sector staff targets technical tion Treasury voting Wall Street Journal Washington WHCF White House York