as hath been cleared, but only with reference to that precedent promife of God, which is the very ground of his inftitution: if that appear not in fome tolerable fort, how can we affirm fuch a matrimony to be the fame which God inftituted? in fuch an accident it will beft behoove our foberness to follow rather what moral Sinai prescribes equal to our ftrength, than fondly to think within our ftrength all that loft Paradife relates. CHAP. XII. The third fhift of them who esteem it a mere judicial law. Proved again to be a law of moral equity. ANOTHER while it fhall fuffice them, that it was not a moral but a judicial law, and fo was abrogated: nay rather not abrogated becaufe judicial; which law the miniftry of Chrift came not to deal with. And who put it in man's power to exempt, where Christ speaks in general of not abrogating the least jot or tittle,' and in fpecial not that of divorce, because it follows among those laws which he promised exprefsly not to abrogate, but to vindicate from abufive traditions? which is moft evidently to be seen in the xvi of Luke, where this caution of not abrogating is inferted immediately, and not otherwife than purpofely, when no other point of the law is touched but that of divorce. And if we mark the 31ft verfe of Mat. v, he there cites not the law of Mofes, but the licentious glofs which traduced the law; that therefore which he cited, that he abrogated, and not only abrogated, but difallowed and flatly condemned; which could not be the law of Mofes, for that had been foully to the rebuke of his great fervant. To abrogate a law made with God's allowance, had been to tell us only that fuch a law was now to ceafe: but to refute it with an ignominious note of civilizing adultery, cafts the reproof, which was meant only to the Pharifees, even upon him that made the law. But yet if that be judicial, which belongs to a civil court, this law is lefs judicial than nine of the ten commandments: for antiquaries affirm, that divorces divorces proceeded among the Jews without knowledge of the magiftrate, only with hands and feals under the testimony of fome rabbies to be then prefent. Perkins, in a Treatife of Confcience,' grants, that what in the judicial law is of common equity binds alfo the Christian: and how to judge of this, prefcribes two ways: if wife nations have enacted the like decree: or if it maintain the good of family, church, or commonwealth. This therefore is a pure moral œconomical law, too haftily imputed of tolerating fin; being rather fo clear in nature and reason, that it was left to a man's own arbitrement to be determined between God and his own confcience; not only among the Jews, but in every wife nation: the reftraint whereof, who is not too thick-fighted, may fee how hurtful and distractive it is to the house, the church, and commonwealth. And that power which Chrift never took from the master of a family, but rectified only to a right and wary ufe at home; that power the undifcerning canonift hath improperly ufurped in his courtleet, and befcribbled with a thoufand trifling impertinences, which yet have filled the life of man with ferious trouble and calamity. Yet grant it were of old a judicial law, it need not be the lefs moral for that, being converfant as it is about virtue or vice. And our Saviour difputes not here the judicature, for that was not his office, but the morality of divorce, whether it be adultery or no; if therefore he touch the law of Mofes at all, he touches the moral part thereof, which is abfurd to imagine, that the covenant of grace fhould reform the exact and perfect law of works, eternal and immutable; or if he touch not the law at all, then is not the allowance thereof difallowed to us. CHAP. XIII. The ridiculous opinion, that divorce was permitted from the cuftom in Egypt. That Mofes gave not this law unwillingly. Perkins confeffes this law was not abrogated. OTHERS are fo ridiculous as to allege, that this licence of divorcing was given them because they were fo accustomed accustomed in Egypt. As if an ill custom were to be kept to all pofterity; for the difpenfation is both univerfal and of time unlimited, and fo indeed no difpenfation at all: for the overdated difpenfation of a thing unlawful, ferves for nothing but to increase hardness of heart, and makes men but wax more incorrigible; which were a great reproach to be faid of any law or allowance that God fhould give us. In thefe opinions it would be more religion to advife well, left we make ourselves jufter than God, by cenfuring rafhly that for fin, which his unfpotted law without rebuke allows, and his people without being confcious of difpleafing him have ufed: and if we can think fo of Mofes, as that the Jewish obftinancy could compel him to write fuch impure permiffions againft the word of God and his own judgment; doubtlefs it was his part to have protested publicly what straits he was driven to, and to have declared his confcience, when he gave any law againft his mind: for the law is the touchstone of fin and of conscience, and must not be intermixed with corrupt indulgences; for then it lofes the greatest praife it has of being certain, and infallible, not leading into errour as the Jews were led by this connivance of Mofes, if it were a connivance. But ftill they fly back to the primitive inftitution, and would have us reenter Paradife against the fword that guards it. Whom I again thus reply to, that the place in Genefis contains the defcription of a fit and perfect marriage, with an interdict of ever divorcing fuch a union: but where nature is difcovered to have never joined indeed, but vehemently feeks to part, it cannot be there conceived that God forbids it; nay, he commands it both in the law and in the prophet Malachi, which is to be our rule. And Perkins upon this chapter of Matthew deals plainly, that our Saviour here confutes not Mofes's law, but the falfe gloffes that depraved the law; which being.true, Perkins must needs grant, that fomething then is left to that law which Christ found no fault with; and what can that be but the confcionable ufe of fuch liberty, as the plain words import? fo that by his own inference. Chrift did not abfolutely intend to restrain all divorces to the only caufe of adultery. This therefore is the true fcope of our Saviour's viour's will, that he who looks upon the law concerning divorce, should also look back upon the inftitution, that he may endeavour what is perfecteft: and he that looks upon the inftitution fhall not refufe as finful and unlawful thofe allowances, which God affords him in his following law, left he make himself purer than his maker, and prefuming above ftrength, flip into temptations irrecoverably. For this is wonderful, that in all thofe decrees concerning marriage, God fhould never once mention the prime inftitution to diffuade them from divorcing, and that he fhould forbid smaller fins as oppofite to the hardness of their hearts, and let this adulterous matter of divorce pafs ever unreproved. This is alfo to be marvelled, that feeing Chrift did not condemn whatever it was that Mofes fuffered, and that thereupon the Chriftian magiftrate permits ufury and open stews, and here with us adultery to be fo flightly punished, which was punished by death to thefe hardhearted Jews; why we fhould ftrain thus at the matter of divorce, which may ftand fo much with charity to permit, and make no fcruple to allow ufury efteemd to be fo much against charity? But this it is to embroil ourfelves against the righteous and all-wife judgments and ftatutes of God; which are not variable and contrarious as we would make them, one while permitting, and another while forbidding, but are moft conftant and most harmonious each to other. For how can the uncorrupt and majestic law of God, bearing in her hand the wages of life and death, harbour fuch a repugnance within herself, as to require an unexempted and impartial obedience to all her decrees, either from us or from our Mediator, and yet debafe herself to faulter fo many ages with circumcifed adulteries by unclean and flubbering permiffions? CHAP. XIV. That Beza's opinion of regulating fin by apoftolic law cannot be found. YET Beza's opinion is, that a politic law, (but what politic law, I know not, unlefs one of Machiavel's)may VOL. II. D regulate regulate fin; may bear indeed, I grant, with imperfection for a time, as thofe canons of the apostles did in ceremonial things: but as for fin, the effence of it cannot confift with rule; and if the law fail to regulate fin, and not to take it utterly away, it neceffarily confirms and establishes fin. To make a regularity of fin by law, either the law muft firaighten fin into no fin, or fin muft crook the law into no law. The judicial law can ferve to no other end than to be the protector and champion of religion and honeft civility, as is fet down plainly Rom. xiii, and is but the arm of moral law, which can no more be separate from juftice, than justice from virtue. Their office alfo, in a different manner, fteers the fame courfe; the one teaches what is good by precept, the other unteaches what is bad by punishment. But if we give way to politic difpenfations of lewd uncleannefs, the firft good confequence of fuch a relax will be the juftifying of papal ftews, joined with a toleration of epidemic whoredom. Juftice muft revolt from the end of her authority, and become the patron of that whereof fhe was created the punisher. The example of ufury, which is commonly alleged, makes against the allegation which it brings, as I touched before. Befides that ufury, fo much as is permitted by the magiftrate, and demanded with common equity, is neither against the word of God, nor the rule of charity; as hath been often difcuffed by men of eminent learning and judgment. There muft be therefore fome other example found out to fhew us wherein civil policy may with warrant from God fettle wickedness by law, and make that lawful which is lawless. Although I doubt not but upon deeper confideration, that which is true in phyfic will be found as true in policy, that as of bad pulfes thofe that beat most in order, are much worse than thofe that keep the most inordinate circuit; fo of popular vices thofe that may be committed legally will be more pernicious, than thofe that are left to their own courfe at peril, not under a ftinted privilege to fin orderly and regularly, which is an implicit contradiction, but under due and fearlefs execution of punishment. The political law, fince it cannot regulate vice, is to refrain it by using all means to root it out. But if it fuffer |