Reports of Civil and Criminal Cases Decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1785-1951, Volume 40; Volume 147
Kentucky. Court of Appeals, James Hughes, Achilles Sneed, Martin D. Hardin, George Minos Bibb, Alexander Keith Marshall, William Littell, Thomas Bell Monroe, John James Marshall, James Greene Dana, Benjamin Monroe, James P. Metcalfe, Alvin Duvall, William Pope Duvall Bush, John Rodman, Edward Warren Hines, Charles Cyrus Turner, Thomas Lewis Edelen, Thomas Robert McBeath, Robert G. Higdon, T. M. Jones, Amos Hall Eblen
J. Bradford, 1912
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acres action adverse possession affirmed agent agreed agreement alleged amended amount answer appellant appellant's appellee authority bank bond brought cause charged Circuit Court claim Commonwealth condition consideration contract corporation cost damages Decided deed defendant direct duty effect entered entitled evidence executed fact failed filed follows further give given ground held hold indictment injury instruction interest issue JUDGE judgment jury Kentucky land lease lien Louisville March matter meaning ment necessary negligence notice operate opinion owner paid parties person petition plaintiff pleading possession presented proof purchase question railroad reason received record recover reversed rule sold statute street sufficient suit sustained taken testified tion track tract train trial trust wife witnesses
Page 152 - But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of coritract.
Page 152 - Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, ie, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.
Page 313 - Under this Act an action may be brought in a circuit court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States...
Page 651 - A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed to be an indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity.
Page 276 - The reply pleads that the plaintiffs have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether or not said Helen A.
Page 529 - ... nor shall any carrier charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for such transportation of passengers or property, or for any service In connection therewith, between the points named In such tariffs than the rates, fares, and charges which are specified In the tariff filed and in effect at the time...
Page 222 - But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.
Page 2 - The test to determine whether one who renders service to another does so as a contractor or not is to ascertain whether he renders the service in the course of an independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished.
Page 448 - All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends are objects of taxation ; but those over which it does not extend are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from taxation.