this kind, must be altogether avoided by dialecticians, viz. arguing against a name, unless any one should be otherwise incapable of discussing the proposition. 2. Argument against a nanie to be avoided. 4. This disco very useful to form syllogisms of the same and the different. Notwithstanding, it is useful to discover differences, in order to (construct) syllogisms of the same, and of the different, and also to the knowledge of what each thing is. That it is useful for syllogisms about the same, and the different, is clear; for when we have discovered the difference of the things proposed, of whatever kind it may be, we shall have shown that they are not the same, (and it is useful) for the knowledge of what a thing is, because we are accustomed to separate the proper definition of the essence of each thing, by the peculiar differences of each. *Cf. Rhet. iii. 10; Eth. vi. 3. lar useful for ceeding. On the other hand, speculation upon the similar, is useful for inductive reasons,*† and for hypo- 5. Speculation thetical syllogisms, and for the statement of de- upon the simifinitions. For inductive reasons then, because by inductive and the induction of similar particulars, we deem it hypothetical syllogisms. proper to infer the universal, since it is not easy Method of proto form induction, when we are ignorant of simi- fi.e. to frame lars. (It is useful also) for hypothetical syllo- inductions. gisms, because it is probable that as a thing subsists in one of those which are similar, so also it does in the rest, so that in order that we may discuss any of them sufficiently, we should previously acknowledge, that as a thing is in these, so also is its condition in the subject proposed; but when we have demonstrated that, we shall also have proved the proposition by hypothesis, for we have framed a demonstration, upon the supposition that as a thing is in these, so it is also, in the case of what is proposed. Again, for the statement of definitions (it is useful), since being able to comprehend what in each. thing is identical, we shall not be in doubt as to what genus the thing proposed ought to be referred, in definition; for of those which are common, what is especially predicated in (the question) what a thing is, will be the genus; in like manner in those which are vastly different from each other, the contemplation of the similar is useful for definitions, as that tranquillity in the sea, is the same thing as serenity in the air, (for each of them is quiet,) and that a point in a line (is 3. We define appropriately by assigning a identical) with unity in number, for each is a principle. Wherefore by assigning the common genus in all things, we shall appear not to define in a manner foreign (from the subject), and indeed almost those who define, are accustomed thus to explain, for they say that unity is the principle of number, and that a point is the principle of a line; it is evident then that they refer the genus of both to what is common. common genus. 4. The instruconstruction ments for the of syllogism are four, viz. the assumption of propositions; the distinction of the equivocal; the discovery of differ ence; and the consideration of the similar. The instruments therefore by which syllogisms are constructed, are these; but the places, for which what we have said, is useful, are those (which follow). BOOK II. CHAP. I. Of the Division of Problems: of the Conversion of the Accidental: and of Problematical Errors. 1. Problems sal or particular: things common to both. Or problems, some are universal but others partieither univer- cular, the universal then, as that all pleasure is good, and that no pleasure is good, but the particular, as that a certain pleasure is good, and a certain pleasure is not good. To both genera, however, of problems, those things are common which universally construct and subvert, for having shown that a thing is present with every, we shall also have proved that it is present with a certain individual, and in like manner, if we have shown that it is present with no individual, we shall also have proved it not present with every. We must first speak, then, of those which are universally subversive, both because such are common to universal and particular (problems), and because men rather introduce theses in the affirmative than in the negative, 3. The problem but the disputants subvert them. Nevertheless, pertaining to it is most difficult to convert an appropriate 2. Of the universally subversive. accident differ ent, and its peculiar difficulty. Cf. Waitz, vol. ii. p. 455. appellation (derived) from accident,* for (to be inherent) partly, and not universally, is possible to accidents only, since it is necessary to convert from definition, property, and genus, as if it is present with a certain thing to be an animal, pedestrian, biped, it will be true for the person who has converted it, to say, that it is an animal, pedestrian, biped. Likewise from genus, for if it is incident to a thing to be an animal, it is an animal; and it is the same with property, for if it is present with any to be capable of grammar, it will be capable of grammar, since nothing of these can be partly present or not present, but simply present or not present. Yet there is nothing to prevent accidents from being partly present, for instance, whiteness or justice,' so that it is not enough to show that whiteness or justice is inherent, in order to show that a man is white or just, since it is doubtful, because he may be partially white or just, so that conversion is unnecessary in accidents. Again, we must determine the errors occurrent in problems, that they are two, either from false occurrent in assertion, or a departure from the established mode of speaking. For both false assertors err, from saying that what is not present, is present with a certain thing, and those who call things by foreign names, as a plane tree a man, transgress the established nomenclature. 4. Two errors problems. CHAP. II. Of the "Places," belonging to Problems of Accident. 1st Topic; to prove that has been assigned as accident, which is pre sent in some other mode. ONE place then is, to consider whether he (the respondent) has given as an accident, that which is inherent, according to some other mode; which error, indeed, especially obtains about genera, as if some one should say, that it was accidental to whiteness to be a colour, since it is not accidental to whiteness to be a colour, but colour is its genus. Therefore, it is possible that he who lays down a thesis, may define according to denomination (the genus as an accident), e. g. that it is accidental to justice to be a virtue; frequently, however, without definition, it is evident that he has given the genus as an accident, as if any one should have said, that whiteness is coloured, or that walking is moved, for the predication of species is paronymously* asserted from no genus, but all genera are predicated of Cf. Whately, Log. book ili. sec. 8. Wallis's Log. As an Ethiopian has white teeth, but is not absolutely white, or as Phalaris acted justly, when he cast Perillus into the brazen bull, yet was not absolutely just. species synonymously, since species receive the name and definition, of genera. Whoever, therefore, says that whiteness is coloured, has neither explained it as genus, since he has spoken paronymously, nor as property, nor as definition, since definition and property are present with nothing else, while many other things are coloured, as wood, stone, man, horse; wherefore he evidently gives it as accident. 2nd Top. To examine the subjects of predication. 1 Another (topic) is, to regard those with which, either all or none, a thing is said to be present, and to consider according to species and not in infinites, (individuals,) for the investigation (will be) more in the way and in fewer things. Still we must consider and begin from first things, and then (proceed) as far as individuals, for instance, if a man said that there is the same science of opposites, we must consider if there is the same science of relatives, of contraries, and of those which are enunciated according to privation and habit, and according to contradiction, and if it should not yet be evident in these, we must divide them again as far as individuals, as whether (there is the same science) of the just and the unjust, or of the double and the half, or of blindness and sight, or of entity and nonentity. For if it should be proved that there is not the same in respect of a certain thing, we shall have subverted the problem, likewise also if it should be present with Now this place converts to confirmation and refutation, for if, when they have introduced division, it should appear (present) with all, or with many, things, it must be required to admit it universally, or to object some (instance) wherein it is not so, and if (the opponent) does neither of these, he will appear absurd from not conceding it. * i. e. if the problem be E, it is confuted if I be proved. 3rd Top. To define both, accident (the predicate and its subject). + Because the problem is not defined, but the attribute and subject separately. none. * Another (topic) is, to make definitions, both of accident and of that to which it is accidental, either of both severally, or of one of them,† then to consider whether any thing has been assumed as true, which is not true, in the definitions; thus if the (problem) is, that we can injure God, (we must consider) what it is, to injure, for if it be, to hurt voluntarily, it is evident that God cannot 1 Because species are fewer than individuals, and, in short, things superior, are fewer than things inferior. possibly be injured, since it is impossible that God can be hurt. Again, if the worthy man is envious, who is the envious, and what is envy, (must be considered,) for if envy be pain at the apparent success of some worthy person, it is evident that a worthy man is not envious, for if so, he would be depraved, and if the man prone to indignation be envious, (we must explain) who each of these is, for thus it will be evident whether what is said is true or false, e. g. if he is envious who is grieved at the success of the good, but he is prone to indignation who is grieved at the success of the bad, it is clear that the envious will not be the indignant man. We must also assume definitions, instead of the names in definitions, and not desist until we arrive at what is known; since often the question is not yet clear, when, indeed, the whole definition has been given, but it becomes evident, if the definition is given, instead of some name placed in the definition. Moreover, the problem must be changed into a proposition and then objected to, for the objection* will be an argument against the thesis: this place, indeed, is almost the same as seeing, with what, either all or none, a thing is said to be present, but it differs in the mode.' 4th Top. To * ἔνστασις. Table 5 and Supplement; also Julius Pacius on An. Prior ii. 28, and An. Post. i. 12, sec. 11.) examine what vulgar denom sec. 1 and 2, 5th Top. To Further, we must define what kind of things we ought, and what we ought not, to denominate as the multitude do, for this is useful both for confirmation and subversion, as that things are to be called by the same names as the multitude use, but that we are no longer to attend to the multitude, as to the quality of things, whether they be such or such. For instance, that is to be called salubrious, which is productive of health, as the multitude say, but whether the thing proposed be productive of health or not, is no longer to be decided by what the multitude, but by what the physician declares. ination we ought to admit, and what to reject. It is almost the same, because the objection is taken from the species of the attribute or subject, as was explained in Anal. Prior ii. ch. 26. but it differs in the mode, because in the other a division is made into species first, which species are afterwards severally considered, to discover a false problem in any; but in this mode, there is no division, but an objection to the universal thesis is sought. |