herent-also genera. inherent." 9. Also accident. universal problems. Again, we must look to genera dividing according to species, as far as to individuals, as we observed before, for whether a thing appears present with every, or with none, (the opponent) must be required by him, who has adduced many things, That is, "it to acknowledge* universally, or to bring an objection, in what thing it is not so. Besides, in what things it is possible to define accident, whether in species or in number, it must be considered, if + If we wish to no one of these is present, as† that time is not moved, and that neither is it motion, having enumerated how many species of motion there are, since if not one of these is present with time, it is evidently not ↑ Metap. lib. moved, neither is it motion.‡1 Likewise also, (if x.; Physic, lib. we wish to show) that the soul is not number, (we i. 5, 6. must prove) by division, every number is either odd or even, as, if the soul is neither odd nor even, it is clearly not number. § 2 prove. § De Anim. i. 4, et seq.; Metap. xii. For accident then we must argue through such (places) as these, and in such a manner. It would exceed our limits to give a satisfactory digest, of the commentary of Simplicius, upon the question of the affinity of time to motion; therefore we can only refer the reader to that author himself, and to the no less careful exposition by Taylor, of the Aristotelian philosophy. The places in the Metaph. and Phys. bearing on the point, are alluded to meanwhile I may remark, that in the opinion of Aristotle, time is not motion, unless so far as motion has number; an indication of which is, that we judge of the more and the less, by number, but of a greater and less motion, by time. Since, again, number is two-fold, (for we call both the numbered, and that which is numerable, number, and also that by which we number,) time is that which is numbered, and not that by which we number. 2 Vide Ritter, Cousin, Plato's Timæus, et Leg. The observation of Lucretius (i. 113) may be taken as a fair compendium of the innumerable dogmas, incident to the general ignorance of the nature of the soul, by philosophers: "Ignoratur enim, quæ sit natura animai Nata sit an, contra, nascentibus insinuetur, The observation in the previous note, applies equally to the Pythagorean and Platonist theory of the soul; and the commentaries referred to, will be found to comprehend every thing valuable upon the point. BOOK IV. CHAP. I.-Of Topics relative to Genus. 1st Top. Genus deceptively asplies not to every thing, in cies with that, of which it is sumed, if it ap the same spe predicated. OUR attention must now be directed to what appertains to genus, and property, and these are the elements of such as belong to definitions, but about them there is seldom a consideration by disputants. If then it should be laid down that there is a genus of any certain thing, we must first have respect to all things allied to what is spoken,1 whether it is not predicated of something, as is the case with accident, as if good is assumed as the genus of pleasure, (we must see) whether a certain pleasure is not good; for if this happens, it is clear that good is not the genus of pleasure, since genus is predicated of all things under the same species.* Next, whether it is not predicated in answer to the question, what a thing is; but as accident, as whiteness, of snow, or what is moved by itself, of the soul; for neither is snow, the same thing as whiteness, wherefore whiteness, is not the genus of snow, nor is the soul, the same as what is moved, but it is accidental to it, to be moved, as also it frequently happens to an animal, to walk and to be walking. Moreover, the being moved, is not a certain thing, but appears to signify something active, or passive; likewise also whiteness, for it does not discover what snow is, but what kind of thing it is; hence neither of these, is predicated in reply to the question what a thing is. So Waitz and all the species contained under it" (eidav), Taylor and Bekker. "Of Buhle. 2nd. The defi garded. Notwithstanding, we must especially have regard to the definition of accident, if it concurs with nition of accithe stated genus, as also in what has just now dent to be rebeen mentioned, for the same thing may possibly move, and not move itself, likewise also may be white, and not white, so that neither of these is genus, but accident, since we denominate that accident, which possibly may, and may not be present, with a certain thing. 1 h. e. ου ἀποδέδοται τὸ γένος Waitz 3rd. Also whether the genus and the species are in the same category. Further, whether the genus and the species, be not in the same division, but the one, essence, and the other, quality, or the one, relative, but the other, quality, for instance, snow is essence, also a swan, yet whiteness is not essence, but quality, so that whiteness is neither the genus of snow, nor of a swan. Again, science is of the number of relatives, but good, and beautiful, are each a quality, hence neither the good, nor the beautiful, is the genus of science, since the genera of relatives, must necessarily themselves also, be relatives, as in the instance of the double, for the multiple being the genus of the double, is itself of the number of relatives. To speak universally, genus must be under the same division with species, for if the species be essence, the genus also is, and if the species be a quality, the genus also is some quality, as if whiteness is a certain quality so also is colour, and likewise in other cases. 4th. Whether the definition of species is predicated of genus. Further, (we must examine) whether it is necessary or contingent that genus partake of that which was laid down in genus, and the definition of partaking, is to receive the definition of what is participated. Now it is evident that species partake of genera, but not genera of species, since the species accepts the definition of genus, but not genus that of the species. Wherefore we must observe, whether the proposed genus partakes, or can partake, of species, as if some one should declare that there is a certain genus of "being," or of "the one," for the genus will happen to partake of the species, since "being" and "the one" are predicated of all entities, so that their definition is (predicated) also. 5th. If the ge Besides, whether the assigned species is truly nus is not pre- predicated of a certain thing, but not the genus, dicated of what as if "being" or the object of science is laid down the species is. as the genus of what is the object of opinion, for the object of opinion will be predicated of non-entity, since many non-entities are the objects of opinion. Still that being, or the object of science, is not predicated of nonentity, is evident, wherefore neither "being nor the object of science, is the genus of the object of opinion, as of what species is predicated, genus must also of necessity be predicated. 6th. If what is contained in subject to no the genus is *Taylor and Again, whether what is placed in the genus can possibly partake of no species, since it is impossible that what partakes of no species, should partake of genus, unless it should be one of those species. species according to the first division, for these alone partake of genus. If, then, motion be assumed as the genus of pleasure, we must see whether pleasure be not production,* nor alteration, nor any one of the other assigned motions, for it is palpable, that it partakes of no species, wherefore neither of the genus, since it is necessary that the participant of the genus, should also be participant of some species, so that pleasure can neither be a species of motion, nor an individual, (neither among those which are under a species of motion). For individuals partake, also, of genus and species, as a certain man, participates both of man, and of animal. cf. Rhetoric i. and 11; and 6 Eth. x. ch. 1, et seq. 7th. If what is placed in genus is of wider exten sion than, or equal to, the Log. ii. 5.) Besides, whether what is placed in genus, is of wider extension than the genus, as the subject of opinion, than entity, since both entity, and nonentity, are objects of opinion, wherefore, the object of opinion, will not be a species of entity, as the genus is always more widely extended than the species. Again, whether the species and the genus are predicated of an equal number of things, as if amongst those which are consequent to all, one should be placed as species, but the other as genus, as "being," and "the one;" for "being," and "the one," (are consequent) to every thing, so that neither is the genus of the other, since they are predicated of an equal number. Likewise also, if the first and the principal, be placed, one upon the other, since the principal is what is first, and what is first is principal, so that either both stated are the same, or neither is the genus of the other. Still the element relative to all such is, 1 One of the arguments of Aristotle against pleasure being motion, was that all motions are imperfect, consequently all generation, which is a species of motion, is imperfect, but "good" is perfect: if, therefore, pleasure is a xivno, it is not a good. Cf. Ethics x. 3; De Anim. Proem. p. 179, books i. ii. in; Physics, "de motu," passim. Metap. vi. 7; Magn. Mor. ii. 7, et Eudem. vi. 14; Plato's Philebus. * Vide Whate- 8th. If what are in the same in the genus. that the genus is of wider extension than the species and the difference, for difference, also, is predicated of fewer things than genus.* Also, examine whether what has been mentioned be not, or appear not to be, the genus of some one species are not of those things which do not differ in species, the supporter of the argument, however, (will see) whether it is (the genus) of one of these, for there is the same genus of all things not different in species. If, then, it be shown to be the (genus) of one, it is evidently that of all, and if not of one, evidently not of any, as if some one admitting that there are indivisible lines, should say that their genus is indivisible, for what has been stated is not the genus of lines, admitting division, as they are not specifically different, for all straight lines do not specifically differ from each other. 1st Top. is another same thing. CHAP. II.-Of Topics relative to Genus, Species, and Difference.1 CONSIDER, also, whether there is any other genus Whether there of the assigned species, which neither comprehends the assigned genus, nor is under it, as if some one should assert science to be the genus of justice, since virtue also is genus, and neither of these genera comprehends the other, so that science would not be the genus of justice, for apparently, when one species is under nevertheless, is done is comprehended under the other. This, seems both virtue and sful in me cases, for to some, prudence be comprehended under the oeth and neither of the genera to all, that prudence is science; if, cefr, yet it is not admitted by statement to be true, yet it will at the then, any one admitted the of the same thing, should be either hatpear necessary that genera the same genus,2 just as it happens i subaltern, or both under both are under the same genus, since et virtue and science, for and disposition. We must see, therefois each of them is habit them is present with the assigned gener re, whether neither of obs, for if they are ier S rea. 1 Cf. Isag. ii. 8, 21; Abelard. De Gen. et Ost ed. Cousin. |