OR LOGICAL TREATISES OF ARISTOTLE WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF PORPHYRY LITERALLY TRANSLATED, WITH NOTES, SYLLOGISTIC EXAMPLES BY OCTAVIUS FREIRE OWEN, M.A. IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. II. LONDON GEORGE BELL AND SONS 08-15-274.K 8.143 Soth. THE TOPICS. BOOK I. CHAP. I.Of the Argument of this Treatise of Syllogism and its kinds. THE purpose of this treatise is to discover a 1. The design method by which we shall be able to syllogize of this treatise about every proposed problem from probabilities, set forth. 1 It will contribute to the general elucidation of this treatise, if we remark, first, upon its scope and purpose, and secondly, upon the import of its title. As to the first, then, Aristotle here discusses the probable or dialectic syllogism, in order that he who disputes (ò diaλɛywv) may be able to syllogize concerning any problem upon each part, and to defend each, not from true, but probable assertions only, which are the appropriate province of this art. In a general sense indeed, diaλektin is not quite synonymous with what we understand by logic, but was rather the faculty of conversational disputation, of which logic was a species, and this is proved by the subject matter of each; that of logic being the uniform and absolute that of dialectic being the merely probable syllogism. Still, though the term dialectic was greatly modified by previous philosophers, its meaning was limited by Aristotle, who enumerates four kinds of reasoning, conveyed under the colloquial form, viz. Xλóyoi didaokadikoi, diaλεκτικοί, πειραστικοί, and ἐριστικοί: upon the distinction between these, and upon the Aristotelian dialectic and its diversity from that of Plato, the reader is referred to Mansel's Introduction, Whately's Logic, and Ritter, vol. ii. It is merely necessary for our present purpose, to state that, with Aristotle, dialectic constituted "the art of disputing by question and answer, of attacking and defending a given thesis from principles of mere probability, such as the opinions of men in general, or of the majority, or of certain eminent authorities, and for this purpose, he collected root, or general principles of probability, from which the premises of the disputants were to be drawn." As Mansel observes, “Each asked his opponent to grant certain premises, which ought primâ facie to be sufficiently probable to gain the assent of the other: these being granted, he endeavoured to deduce from them his own conclusion, or to involve his antagonist in contradictions resulting from such concession. For the constitution of the probable syllogism itself, the reader can profitably consult Crakanthorpe, or that portion extracted from lib. v. of his work, appended to Dr. Hessey's Schema Rhetorica. Cf. also Rhetoric b. ii. ch. 25. Concerning the position the consideration of dialectic occupies here, |