-

works upon the will, who imparts to it its first motion, in order to incline us to return as lost sheep "unto the Shepherd and Bishop of

(our) souls." For "no man (said Christ) can "come unto me, except the Father, who hath "sent me draw him."3 And the reason is obvious: he is destitute of the will to return, and is ignorant of the necessity of coming unto him.** God therefore worketh in him, first, to will, and

* When a man is thus represented as unable to do any thing good, it must be understood in a qualified sense; not that of an absolute incapacity, but of moral aversion, and consequent impotence: so that, left to himself, he would never renounce sin, or desire salvation. And that this is not a distinction without a difference, may be plainly illustrated. Suppose the case of two servants, who knew it was their master's will that they should each perform an allotted work. The one is idle, and neglects it; the other meets with an accident, and is utterly disabled from attempting it. Surely the causes are widely different; and were punishment the consequence of - omission, these two circumstances would, doubtless, be taken into consi deration.So again. A lame man tells you, that he cannot help limping; a drunkard, that he cannot help drinking to excess. Both plead the want of power: but it is a natural power that is wanting in the first casehe must limp, whether he will or not ;—a moral power only, in the second; for the knowledge of their being poison in the cup, would turn inclination to aversion, and the man would immediately refuse to drink. Such a power, therefore, which resides in a rectified will, is consequently weakened by every act of sin; till, in the last stages of depraved habit, it may be conceived to be wholly lost. But this state of moral inability, is a man's erime, and not his apology! And is not such a diminution of power, precisely, as the increasing strength of vicious inclination?

This is further evident, from the illustrations given us in Scripture, Thus in Luke xi. 7, 8. where the person applies to his friend at midnight for a few loaves: his excuse is "I cannot rise and give thee." This our Lord interprets, by will not: "I say unto you, though he will not rise," &c. The young man, also, (Matt. xix. 21.) that was commanded to sell

2 1 Pet. ii. 25.

3 John vi. 44.

4 John v. 40.

then to do." Accordingly, our Church expressly declares, that "the condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and good works, to faith, and calling upon God." The preparation, therefore, of the heart, must come from God-it must "be given him from heaven."7 Man cannot turn-he is" without strength;"-he cannot believe, nor call truly upon the Lord, till

his property, and give to the poor, with the promise of treasure in heaven, had it as much in his power to comply in a natural sense, as the man in the preceding parable. Both, however, wanted inclination and will, (or moral inability); and neither could, properly, plead any other excuse for noncompliance, than was owing to this cause. On the other hand, when the Apostle observes, (1 John iii. 9.) that "whosoever is born of God, "cannot commit sin, because he is born of God," none will dispute, and all will perceive, that such a person has it as much in his power to sin, as to natural ability, as ever: but his inclination and will, are now against sin; and it is the love of holiness that morally disables him from habitual sinning; and renders him, so to speak, unable to take pleasure in the company of wicked persons, or to choose a wicked life.- -In fine, that it is a moral impotence, and not properly natural, that sinners are not dead, in the same sense as stocks and stones,-appears from the moral Remedies applied to remove this inability; such as commands, promises, entreaties, arguments, warnings, &c. which would be useless to apply to natural impotence, that is to make the blind see, or the dead arise. It must be concluded, therefore, (says the excellent Dr. Watts,) “that man has a natural ability, that is, natural powers, to do what God requires; but, at the same time, such a native aversion of the Will, that he will never do it without divine Grace. Thus, there is a fair way laid for the necessity of spiritual assistanee, and at the same time a just foundation laid for the condemnation of impenitent sinners.” - See Watts on Christian Liberty, and hsi Sermon at Berry-street Lecture.—Williams on the Catechism.-Colliber's Inquiry.—Grove on Human Liberty.—Scott's Essays and Sermon on Election.

5 Phil. ii. 13. 6 Art. X.

7 John iii. 27.

8 Rom. v. 6.

God has first touched his heart with a conviction of sin, and made him willing to receive the blessing of forgiveness. For nor by might, not by

power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord of " hosts." And "this (said Jesus) is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath "sent."2*

*"The opposers of the doctrine of divine grace, (says M‘Lean,) if they admit any divine influence at all as necessary to the conversion of sinners, or to their believing in Christ, and perseverance in faith and holiness, strenuously deny that it is efficacious and infallible in producing the desired effect. They seem to be exceedingly jealous lest the supernatural influence of divine grace should interfere with the sovereign self-determination of the human will, and lay it under a moral necessity of complying with the will of God.It is indeed essential to the will of man, to be free and voluntary in its actings; and all compulsion or co-action is inconsistent with the liberty of the will. But surely God has not, out of respect to the will of man, deprived himself of the liberty of working all things, either in providence or grace, after the counsel of his will. Eph.i.11. As God is the supreme Governor of the moral world, so the free volitions and actions of intelligent agents must necessarily be under his determining providence, and ordered by him, either in the way of positive efficiency or permission. The will of man cannot possibly have a higher degree of liberty, than when it is determined or influenced by some prevailing motive or other for then it acts freely from its own choice or inclination; and the stronger and more agreeable the motive appears, the greater freedom the will has in complying with it. This is the only liberty of will which a rational moral agent can possess.—But the freedom of will which they plead for, is quite different. It is a freedom which is supposed to depend upon, and arise from a state of perfect indifference, in which the will has no inclination to one thing more than another; and so is at liberty to determine its own choice, independently of any cause, motive, or influence-without itself, or without any reason or ground of its choice, but its own sovereign selfdetermination. Such a freedom of will as this, involves in it the grossest absurdities, and never yet existed in a rational creature. It supposes a man to be for a time deprived of all discernment of the different qualities

91 Sam. x. 26.

1 Zech. iv. 6.

2 John vi. 29.

Believers, answer! Is it your justification? Surely not. For all who are justified, are "justified

66

freely by his grace through the redemption that

of things, consequently, of all preference of one thing to another, so that their being good or bad, lovely or hateful, beneficial or hurtful, must be all alike to him. This, indeed, would free him from the influence of motives; but was there ever a rational creature in such a state of indifference? Further, if the will determines its own choice, without being influenced by any motive, then it can have no reason or ground of that choice.-It is a choice without judgment, reason, inducement, or end, and so altogether unaccountable. Such a liberty of will would render all inducements or persuasives perfectly useless; no counsels, exhortations, warnings, commands, promises, threatenings, &c. could be of any use in moving the will, if it determined itself without them. But they imagine, that if the will is under any kind of necessity whatever, in its determination or choice, it is deprived of that liberty which is essential to moral agency, virtue or vice, praise or blame. Yet it appears from what has already been noticed, that the very reverse is the truth; for though it is essential to an action's being morally good or evil, that it proceed from the will or choice of the agent; yet there is no choice, however voluntary in itself, free from every kind of necessity; and necessity securing the choice, does not hinder any voluntary action from being morally good or evil, praiseworthy or blameable. Thus, with regard to holiness, God himself is necessarily holy, just, and good, and cannot do evil: but this necessity does not derogate from his moral character, nor render him less worthy of praise; but the contrary. Jesus Christ, in his human nature, was, throughout his whole life in this world, perfectly holy, and without the least stain of sin or moral evil; and he was necessarily so, it being as impossible that he should be otherwise, as it was that the purpose of God and the whole plan of redemption should fail; but this necessity was perfectly consistent with the perfection of his merits and moral worth. The saints in heaven are secured from sinning any more; are they, therefore, no longer moral agents, or capable of the exercise of holiness? Again, with respect to the necessity of sin, Christ was foreordained to save his people from their sins; yet this supposes the necessity of the entrance of sin from which they were to be saved: but this necessity does not alter the nature of sin, nor excuse the sinner. God foreknew this event with absolute certainty; and though his foreknowing it was not the cause of it, yet it proves that the future existence of the event was necessary or infallible, and could not possibly fail. The death

"is in Christ Jesus." What works of yours could ever constitute the ground of acceptance with God, or tend, in the least degree, to justify

of Christ was necessary, as being fixed by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, and that the Scriptures might be fulfilled; yet his murderers, who acted voluntarily in putting him to death, were not the less guilty, or worthy of blame. Those who are judicially hardened and given up of God to their own lusts and errors, necessarily do evil, that is, they are under a moral necessity, from the energy of error, and their own vicious inclinations to do so; but they are not therefore without fault or blame in so doing. Surely Pharaoh, the blinded Jews, and the votaries of the man of sin, were all guilty and justly punishable. From the whole it is evident, that though the will is necessarily determined by the prevailing motive; or that which, on the whole, appears most eligible or agreeable, and cannot incline otherwise; yet this is perfectly consistent with moral agency, and with the nature of virtue or vice, consequently, with praise or blame.

Now with respect to the influence of divine grace in the conversion of a sinner, if, as they affirm, that only produces some good motions and impressions tending that way, but still leaves the will at full liberty either to comply or resist, according to its own self-determination, then it is plain that no real conversion is effected by divine grace; so that if ever any should happen to be converted, it must be of him that willeth and runneth, and not of God that showeth mercy. But those who hold this sentiment must have a very defective and superficial view, both of human depravity and of the nature of conversion, as well as of the greatness of that power that is necessary to effect it; otherwise they could never imagine that any of the fallen race of Adam, if left to the determination of their own will, would ever turn to God. Conversion is represented to be the effect of that divine power that raised Christ from the dead. Eph. i. 19, 20. Col. ii. 12, 13. And this divine power is represented as exerted not only in illuminating the understanding, but also in determining the will. Psl. cx. 3. Phil. ii. 13. Ezek. xxxvi. 26. xi. 19. Jer. xxxi. 33. xxxii. 39. These passages clearly show, that God removes the natural aversion of the will, and gives it a prevailing inclination to comply with what he requires; and to suppose, that, after all, it remains in a state of indifference, and at full liberty to resist, is a perfect contradiction."M'Lean's Works, vol. iv. p. 112–116.