Page images
PDF
EPUB

danger; to persevere in this upright manly conduct, is indeed a merit of another sort, and reserved for other virtues *.

Your correspondent confesses that Mr. Grenville is still respectable; yet he warns the friends of that gentleman not to provoke him, lest he should tell them what they may not like to hear. These are but words. He means as little when he threatens as when he condescends to applaud. Let us meet upon the fair ground of truth, and if he finds one vulnerable part in Mr. Grenville's character, let him fix his poisoned arrow there.

* The following letter from Mr. G. Grenville to Mr. Knox, formerly undersecretary of state to Lord Hillsborough, is extracted from the second volume of a small work published by Mr. Knox, entitled "Extra Official State Papers," and is here copied to give the reader an idea of the political sentiments entertained by Mr. Grenville with respect to America, as developed by himself in his private correspondence with this gentleman :—

"DEAR SIR,

"Wotton, August 28, 1768. "The account which you gave to me in your letter of the 23rd of this month, of the late transactions at Boston, seems so natural a consequence of the mea. sures taken in Great Britain, and the state and temper of the government here, that whatever degree of concern it may give me, I cannot feel the least surprise at it. If the eyes of those who are most interested in this most unhappy situation had been sooner opened to the most obvious truths, many mischiefs might have been prevented; if the authentic proofs which they have now received of what has happened is not sufficient to convince them, I will venture to foretell without a spirit of prophecy, greater calamities will, when it is too late, rouse them and the whole kingdom from the lethargy, as to all public measures, into which they have been plunged. I have long feared that the conduct holden in Great Britain would encourage and delude the subjects of America, till they would come to extremities of one kind, which would too probably end in extremities on the other side. I may appeal to you, as a private man and as a member of parliament, to my public declarations, that my opinions upon this subject have ever been uniformly the same. They will still continue to be so until I see much better reasons for changing them than any which I have yet heard. What prospect there can now be that they will be attended with success, I cannot pretend to answer; but if there is no plan formed upon the sound principles of this constitution, supported both by firmness and temper, I can answer that no good success, in the present difficult situation, can arise from one desultory measure after another. The respect and affection of its subjects is the basis on which every wise government must be founded; but if that foundation has been once overturned, it is not the work of a day to temper the materials so as to unite and rebuild them, especially if the workmen shall be daily changed, and each work by a different rule and line from that of his predecessor,

"I am, &c.,

"GEO. GRENVILLE."

LETTER XXXII.

TO THE PRINTER OF THE PUBLIC ADVERTISER.

SIR, August 10, 1768. YOUR new correspondent Virginius might have saved himself the trouble of dating his letter from the Carolina coffeehouse. We are a little better acquainted than he imagines with the style of the secretary of state's office, as well as with the facts respecting Sir Jeffery Amherst's dismission. When he calls Lord Boutetort the best of men, I suppose he means the best of courtiers. If bowing low and carrying the sword of state constitute merit and services, I confess there are few men to whom government is more indebted than to his Lordship. As to those insinuations which Virginius calls malevolent, it would have answered his purpose a little better if he could have proved them false. Why does he not? Because they are not only true, but notoriously true. What say you to the copper mines, Virginius? I fancy his Lordship would not have been so fond of residing in Virginia, if he could have continued to reside here either with safety or convenience. Reflections on characters merely private, ought, I own, to be discouraged. But let it be remembered that this courtier might have lived and died in obscurity, if he had not forced himself into public notice by robbing another man of an appointment, expressly given him in reward for the most honourable national services. The discontent of the province of Virginia at being governed by a lieutenant-governor instead of a governor, is a mere fiction trumped up by Lord Hillsborough and his secretary to serve this dirty purpose; it was never heard of before, and if Sir Jeffery Amherst was really desired to repair to his government, it was not only a most scandalous breach of conditions with him, but a most impudent mockery. Lord Hillsborough knew it was impossible he could return to America to be under the command of General Gage, and that therefore he might put the alternative to him with safety. By this farce Lord Hillsborough thought he could throw a colour upon the matter, and that the nation would be misled by it. What a poor contemptible artifice! Thus it usually happens with bunglers. They cannot even

be mischievous with dexterity, nor do a public injury without insulting the public understanding.

LETTER XXXIII.

LUCIUS.

TO THE PRINTER OF THE PUBLIC ADVERTISER.

SIR, August 19, 1768. THE greatest part of my property having been invested in the funds, I could not help paying some attention to rumours or events by which my fortune might be affected; yet I never lay in wait to take advantage of a sudden fluctuation, much less would I make myself a bubble to bulls and bears, or a dupe to the pernicious arts practised in the alley. I thought a prudent man, who had anything to lose, and really meant to do the best for himself and his family, ought to consider of the state of things at large, of the prospect before him, and the probability of particular events. A letter which appeared some days ago in the Public Advertiser revived many serious reflections of this sort in my mind, because it seemed to be written with candour and judgment. The effect of those reflections was, that I did not hesitate to alter the situation of my property. I owe my thanks to that writer that I am safely landed* from a troubled ocean of fear and anxiety,

* The frequent use of this term by the late Dr. Chalmers was reckoned among his literary peculiarities, but Atticus appears to have preceded him. Since the first volume of Letters was published, a correspondent has suggested a mode for detecting Junius from the intimations in the communication of Atticus.

"It has occurred to me," says he, "that it is worth while searching the list of transferences of stock between the date of the letter alluded to by Atticus and the date of his own. Assuming that Junius was the writer, the insight it would give into his affairs is important."

But the Junius fixed upon in the Essay is not likely to be found signalized by any such weighty transfers of stock as would lead to his identification. Secondly, it is improbable that Atticus was Junius, first, because the shafts of Junius were directed more at persons than things-disquisitions on fluctuations in the funds, commerce, and the decline of the empire, the favourite themes of Atticus, were not those of Junius. A third objection is that suggested by the Athenæum, namely, that an Atticus, either the present or some other, was a frequent writer in the Public Advertiser long before and after Junius was known to be a contributor. Finally, it may be added that the test suggested has been applied, and no evidence has been found in the Bank books to unmask Junius.-ED.

on which I think I never will venture my fortune and my happiness again. Perhaps it may not be useless to individuals to see the motives on which I have acted.

In the first place, I consider this country as in a situation the like of which it never experienced before, but which the greatest empires have experienced in their turn. The successes of the late war had placed us at the highest pinnacle of military glory. Every external circumstance seemed to contribute to our prosperity; the most formidable of our enemies were reduced, and commerce had promised to increase with the extent of our dominion. But at this point I fear we met with our ne plus ultra. The greatness of a kingdom cannot long be stationary. That of Great Britain carried in itself an interior principle of weakness and decay. While the war continued, our superiority at sea gave us an exclusive commerce with the richest quarters of the world, and supplied us with wealth to support such efforts as no nation ever made before. But when the conclusion of peace had restored our rivals to the enjoyment of their former trade, the very efforts which had maintained the war rendered it impossible for us to meet those rivals upon equal terms in foreign markets. The national debt had risen to a point so far beyond the reach of economical speculations that the diminution of the principal almost ceased to be a question, and the ministry found difficulty enough in providing funds for payment of the interest. Here then we find an interior principle of decay, the operation of which is not less certain than fatal. The increase of your debt requires a proportionate increase of trade, at the same time that it not only prevents that increase, but operates in the contrary direction. A newspaper will not undertake to demon

admit of such a deduction, or I would strate, that all the profitable part of our foreign trade is lost, and that in what remains the balance is considerably against us. But the fact is notorious. The situation of our EastIndia trade is so far altered for the better, that we do not send such quantities of bullion as heretofore to China, and indeed we have it not to send. Yet the resources of this trade are at the best but precarious; nor is the balance of it even now clearly in our favour. A single defeat in India (an event not quite out of the limits of possibility) would go near to annihilate the 30mpany. But it was in the colonies that our best and surest

hopes were founded. Their exclusive commerce would have supported our home manufactures when other markets failed, and rewarded us in some measure for that security and extent of dominion which the blood and treasure of this country had purchased for them. Here too our most reasonable expectations are disappointed. Not only the merchant who gives credit on the security of personal good faith is ruined by it, but, in a public view, the sum of the debts of individuals is held out in terrorem, to awe us into a compliance with pretensions which shake the foundation of our political existence. We shall be woefully deceived if we form our calculations of the real state of trade on the large commissions, long credit, or extensive enterprises of particular merchants. The commercial prosperity of a nation depends upon the certainty of the return, not on the magnitude of the venture. As things are now managed in the city, the greatest house falls first, and draws with it the ruin of a multitude of little ones. Next to the parties immediately concerned, the public creditors will be the first to feel the consequences of this ruinous system. The funds allotted for their security depend chiefly upon the produce of the customs; these depend upon your trade, and it requires no prophet to foretell, that a false and ruinous system of trade cannot long be maintained. It begins with private beggary, and ends in public ruin. I do not pretend to say that the landholder will be quite at his ease, when public credit is shaken. But his at least is a solid security; the other a mere bubble, which the first rude breath of ill fortune or of danger may reduce to nothing.

I wish it could be proved that any one circumstance in this representation is false or exaggerated. On the other hand, if it be true, the concealment of a moment more or less signifies nothing. It is agreed on all hands that we are in no condition to meet a war. Our enemies know and presume upon it. The experience of many centuries sufficiently proves that their natural restlessness will not long permit them to observe the conditions of any peace. At present they have other additional motives to draw them into action. The articles of the last peace dishonoured them in the eyes of Europe. Necessity alone compelled them to submit to it. As long as the necessity subsists the peace will be maintained. In the mean time, they hazard such strokes as would be a just

« PreviousContinue »