little doubt in their minds as to the identity of his person ? So upon the same principles Mr. Wilkes was well warranted in rejecting the proclamation; and that being out of the way, I think it will then be so clear that Mr. Wilkes would have done right in committing the assailant upon the printer, if he had not given bail, as not to admit of an argument.

I have two observations to make upon the late attempt of enforcing the order of the House of Commons by the royal proclamation. First, that the calling in the aid of the King upon that occasion was weakening the authority and dignity of the House, and tends to make the execution of the orders of that House dependent upon the pleasure of the King; and in the next place such an interposition on the part of the King carries this appearance with it to the public, that it is not the independence or the just liberties and privileges of the Commons of England that are thus anxiously sought to be preserved, but the gratification of the spleen and resentment (to say no worse of it) of the administration. I shall conclude this letter by saying, and thinking till I am better informed, that the late proclamation was an unwarrantable exertion of power, tending to mislead all judges and justices throughout England, and to put them upon imprisoning an English subject contrary to law, and the rules of evidence, which make part of the law of this kingdom; and therefore I, for one, applaud the conduct of Mr. Wilkes in this instance. In another letter I shall deliver my sentiments as to the proceedings of your Lordship, Mr. Alderman Oliver, and Mr. Alderman Wilkes, when the messenger of the House of Commons was brought before you. I have forborne to take this business up on the same grounds that Mr. Morris has done, as it would only be a repetition of what he has very judiciously before transmitted to the public*. It is sufficient

*Robert Morris, Esq., was a member of, and secretary to, the Bill of Rights Society. At their meeting in order to discuss the question of the arrest of the printers, he thus addressed the chairman; and it is to this speech the writer of the above letter refers :

"Mr. Chairman,―The proclamation issued for apprehending the printers is, on all hands, I think, allowed to be illegal. I do not believe that there is in the whole kingdom a lawyer's clerk who does not know it to be equally repugnant to the spirit and letter of the law and the constitution. The law, though not so well known, is as clear against commitments by the House of Commons. They have nothing to support their pretensions but their own

for me to say that I think he has sufficiently demonstrated the illegality of the order of the House of Commons; I only meant to give additional strength to his observations; and if any man will coolly consider the whole case, argument will continually crowd upon his mind to evince the illegality and injustice of the order and royal proclamation.

I am,

ΤΟ THE LORD MAYOR, MR. ALDERMAN OLIVER, AND MR. ALDERMAN WILKES.

MY LORD AND GENTLEMEN,

In my first letter I submitted my reasons why Mr. Wilkes could not, in his judicial capacity, take notice of the order of the House of Commons, merely under the sanction of the royal proclamation. If I was right in that, it was totally immaterial whether the order of the House of Commons as to the printers was legal or illegal, for in either case Mr. Wilkes's conduct was agreeable to law. And in either case, the ex

vote, which certainly is not binding on any but themselves; an act of three branches of the legislature being the only authority that is, besides the common law, acknowledged by England as valid. Matters being thus circumstanced, I am sorry to find that such magistrates of London as belong to this Society do not afford protection to the printers, and rescue them from lawless violence. My concern for this neglect, this fear, or this tergiversation, is the greater, that if the officers of the House of Commons, or any other person but a minister of this city properly authorized, takes these obnoxious men into custody, the rights of the city are violated; it being legally impossible for King, Lords, and Commons, to seize any citizen of London without the consent of its own magistrates. Were they even to make an act for that purpose it could not have any force, because the act made in favour of the city in the reign of William and Mary ought to be considered as a constitution, and as irreversible as Magna Charta-for indeed it is the Magna Charta of the sity."

punging of the proceedings taken before him, be it by what order it may, was a flagrant violation of the law, and a very dangerous obstruction to the execution of criminal justice. I will next consider the subsequent proceedings as to the messenger of the House of Commons, who was brought before you, as magistrates of the City of London, and charged upon oath with having committed a breach of the peace, in assaulting and imprisoning one of your citizens. The messenger justified the fact under a warrant signed by the Speaker of the House of Commons, which I shall state more particularly hereafter, but at present it is not necessary.

This justification necessarily brought the validity of the Speaker's warrant collaterally in question before you. Some people, who have in general applauded your conduct in this business, have said that you went too far in signing a warrant of commitment of the messenger, and in obliging him to give bail. As you deemed the Speaker's warrant illegal, you could not do otherwise; it was the necessary consequence and judgment upon the complaint before you. You would have been guilty of a breach of duty, as magistrates, if you had adjudged the messenger guilty of a breach of peace, and not have committed him, or bound him over to answer the offence in a due course of law. One of the greatest privileges assumed by either House of Parliament is that of having their privileges (as they call them) examined and inquired into in their own Houses only. And if this can be established as the law of England, any subject may be deprived of his life, liberty, and property, by an arbitrary vote of either House, under the name of privilege of parliament. It will be said that this is a foreign presumption, and that we cannot suppose that those respectable characters in the Houses of Parliament would invade the liberties of the people. I must own I think, from some late exertions, there is no room left for presumptions; but be that as it may, I think the liberties of England ought to stand upon a more solid basis than presumptions, or the arbitrary voice of one branch of the legislature only.

The cases to prove that the assumed privileges of either House of Parliament are not examinable elsewhere than in their own Houses, are Lord Shaftsbury's case, 29 Car. 2. in B. R.; the Queen v. Paty & alias, 3 Ann. in B. R.; and the

Hon. Alexander Murray's case, 24 Geo. 2. in B. R. In all cases adjudged upon constitutional points, regard should be had to the temper of the times when they happened, and the characters, connections, and dependencies of the judges. If these circumstances be attended to in Lord Shaftsbury's case, I am very sure it will be found to be a precedent of no weight or authority. Lord Shaftsbury was a man exceedingly obnoxious to King Charles the Second, having in the House of Lords violently opposed that arbitrary prince, and his attempts to introduce popery into this kingdom. The King's designs were no secret; and the independent members in the House of Commons had meditated means to prevent the execution of them. The King, to frustrate this, prorogued the parliament for fifteen months, within a few days, being the longest prorogation which had been then known. The King had also found means, by pensioning many of the members of the Lower House, to gain a considerable influence in it; and the dissolution of parliament was then (as it is now) a thing earnestly to be sought for. Upon the meeting of the parliament after this long prorogation, a question was propounded in the House of Lords by the country party, whether it was not actually dissolved. Lord Shaftsbury, and others of that party, argued and maintained upon an old statute of King Edward the Third, then in force, which directed that the King should call a parliament once a year, or oftener if need should be, that the parliament was actually dissolved; but the court party strenuously opposed this, knowing that the eyes of the people were opened, and that a new parliament would not be favourable to the King's designs.

This question had made a great noise in the kingdom, and by way of silencing the people, the King's party in the House of Lords voted Lord Shaftsbury, Lord Salisbury, and Lord Wharton, who had maintained that the parliament was dissolved, guilty of a contempt of that House, and sent them to the Tower that they were sent to the Tower to gratify the King's vengeance is apparent from the words of the warrant of commitment, for it directs them to be kept in safe custody during his Majesty's pleasure and the pleasure of the House, for their high contempt committed against that House. Lord Salisbury and Lord Wharton submitted to the House, and

were discharged; Lord Shaftsbury at first refused it, and sued out his Habeas Corpus, and was brought before the King's Bench with the warrant of his commitment.

The warrant was glaringly illegal and unconstitutional, and seems to be admitted by all judges in that case to be so, particularly Mr. Justice Wylde, who said the return no doubt was illegal. This was a critical case; in fact, it was the King's cause, and the judges to determine it at that time held their offices during the pleasure of the crown, so that they were reduced to an awkward dilemma; however, they found means to extricate themselves from it by determining that though the commitment was illegal they could not examine into it, and so Lord Shaftsbury was remanded; and the three puisne judges on the case of the Queen v. Paty & alias, as also the judges in Mr. Murray's case, seem implicitly to have followed the determination in Lord Shaftsbury's case, and therefore if that determination be overthrown, the other two must sink of course. In the case of the Queen v. Paty & alias, 3 Ann. the defendants having been committed to Newgate by a warrant of the Speaker of the House of Commons, signed Robert Harley, Speaker (a fatal name to liberty), were brought by Habeas Corpus into the Queen's Bench, and prayed to be discharged upon the illegality of the commitment. The three puisne judges refused to interfere upon the authority of Lord Shaftsbury's case, and the prisoners were remanded, contrary to the opinion of Lord Chief Justice Holt, one of the ablest judges that ever presided in that court. He was of opinion that what the House had called a breach of privilege was not a breach of privilege, nor could their judgment make it so, nor conclude that court from determining contrary; and he says, 'When the House of Commons exceed their legal bounds and authority, their acts are wrongful and cannot be justified more than the acts of private men: that there was no question but their authority is from the law, and as it is circumscribed, so it may be exceeded. To say they are judges of their own privilege and their own authority, and nobody else, is to make their privileges to be as they would have them. If there be a wrongful imprisonment by the House of Commons, what court shall deliver the party? Shall we say there is no redress, and that we are not able to execute those laws upon which the liberty of the Queen's people subsists? To con