Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign PolicyBrookings Institution Press, 2002 M12 31 - 340 pages The first edition of Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy is one of the most successful Brookings titles of all time. Government agencies, departments, and individuals all have certain interests to preserve and promote. Those priorities, and the conflicts they sometimes spark, heavily influence the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. A decision that looks like an orchestrated attempt to influence another country may in fact represent a shaky compromise between rival elements within the U.S. government. The authors provide numerous examples of bureaucratic maneuvering and reveal how they have influenced our international relations. |
Contents
The ABM Puzzle An Introduction to Politics inside Government | 1 |
National Security Interests | 11 |
Clues to National Security Interests | 16 |
Organizational Interests | 26 |
Organizational Essence | 28 |
Roles and Missions | 40 |
Autonomy | 51 |
Organizational Morale | 54 |
Why Information Is Leaked | 176 |
Going Outside the Executive Branch | 181 |
Presidential Speeches | 189 |
Implications for Decisions | 192 |
Involving the President | 196 |
Getting to the President | 198 |
Securing a Presidential Decision | 207 |
Influence and Decisions | 219 |
Budgets | 56 |
Organizational Stands | 58 |
Presidential Interests | 63 |
Presidential Stands | 76 |
Interests Faces and Stands | 84 |
Career Officials | 85 |
InandOuters | 89 |
Involvement and Effectiveness | 90 |
Future Elective Office | 93 |
Official Position | 94 |
Initiative and Rules | 99 |
Pressing for Decisions | 101 |
Rules of the Game | 104 |
Planning a Decisional Strategy | 116 |
Who Is Involved? | 119 |
Who Plans? | 131 |
The Limits of Planning | 133 |
Information and Arguments | 135 |
Purposes of Arguments | 136 |
Constraints on Information and Arguments | 139 |
Challenging Shared Images | 155 |
Maneuvers To Affect Information | 158 |
Presidential Efforts To Expand Information | 168 |
Uses of the Press | 173 |
Willingness To Assume Responsibility | 222 |
The Threat of Resignation | 225 |
Staff Skill | 228 |
Ability To Mobilize Outside Support | 230 |
The Elusiveness of Decisions | 232 |
Decisions and Implementation | 235 |
Limits on Faithful Implementation | 238 |
Resistance | 245 |
The Struggle over Implementation | 248 |
Actions in the Field | 261 |
Evading Instructions | 268 |
Actions in the Absence of Decision | 276 |
Presidential Control | 279 |
Presidential Strategies To Gain Compliance | 280 |
Degrees of Control | 289 |
Back to ABM Some Tentative Answers | 297 |
Something for Everyone | 302 |
Pressures for Expansion | 304 |
Decisions and Change | 306 |
A Complicated Reality | 311 |
| 317 | |
| 331 | |
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Common terms and phrases
ABM deployment ABM system action administration advisers agencies Air Force ambassador American argued arguments Army Bay of Pigs believe budget bureaucracy career officials Chiefs of Staff China Clark Clifford concerned Congress congressional Cuba Cuban missile crisis Dean Acheson Dean Rusk dent Department deploy develop domestic political Dulles effective effort Eisenhower essence example fact favor foreign policy Foreign Service officers Henry Kissinger implementation influence intelligence involved issue Johnson Joint Chiefs Kissinger leaks Lilienthal maneuvers McGeorge Bundy McNamara ment military missile missions national interest National Security Council Navy Nixon North Vietnam operations options organization organizational particular planning position President Kennedy President Truman presidential decision pressure proposal relations responsibility role Rusk Russian Secretary of Defense seek senior officials senior participants shared images Soviet Union strategic technique Theodore Sorensen tion United Vietnam Washington White House White House staff York