enacting the Submerged Lands Act are as applicable to them as they are to any other lands covered by the act. The legal theory that permeates the act is as applicable to them as it is to the other lands covered by the act. The proposed distinction between man-made islands and naturally-made islands is not only irrelevant to any purpose or legal theory found in the statute but it would give rise to years of expensive litigation. Bearing in mind the character of this legislation it is not inconsistent with the rule of strict construction to give effect to the manifest intent of Congress as applied to a specific, included although unmentioned, instance well within a normal meaning of the statutory words. Accordingly, it is my opinion that the Submerged Lands Act releases any former title of the United States to the lands naturally-made as islands which formerly were lands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 2(a) of the Submerged Lands Act. The Wallis ruling, so far as inconsistent with this conclusion, should be disapproved. Sincerely, ARCHIBALD COX, Approved: ROBERT F. KENNEDY. MACKINAC ISLAND STATE PARK, MICHIGAN-POSSIBLE REVERSION OF PARKLANDS TO UNITED STATES IF PART IS USED FOR AIRPORT PURPOSES The contemplated airport improvements in the Mackinac Island State Park would not conflict with a provision in the conveyance of the park to the State of Michigan by the United States to the effect that the parklands will revert to the United States if used for other than State park purposes. Although airports generally may not constitute land uses within the purposes of the average public park, where it appears that a park is in an isolated location, that the transportation to be provided through the proposed airport improvement would be chiefly for visitors to the park and persons serving their needs, that an unimproved airport has long existed in the park, and that the airport would still be relatively small and would serve recreational as well as transportation functions, airport within park held not to be a land use inconsistent with State park purposes. THE PRESIDENT. JUNE 12, 1964. MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to present my opinion upon the question referred to in the memorandum dated April 28, 1964, addressed to me by your Deputy Special Counsel, enclosing certain correspondence from the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency. The question presented by the Administrator is whether "property which has been conveyed by the United States to a State 'for use as a State Park, and for no other purpose' [may] be used, in part, for airport purposes without making such property subject to the reversionary clause contained in the instrument of transfer." This question arises in connection with a proposal pending before the Administrator to develop an improved airport with Federal financial assistance under the Federal Airport Act (May 13, 1946, c. 251, 60 Stat. 170), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1101-1119, at the Mackinac Island State Park, Michigan. Attached to the correspondence are certain materials pertinent to this question, including an opinion of the Administrator's General Counsel that the proposed airport development would not violate the terms of the Federal grant so as to cause reversion of the State Park to Federal ownership, and an opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Michigan which reaches an opposite conclusion on that issue. In my opinion, the proposed airport development at the Mackinac Island State Park would not lead to the reversion of the land to the Federal Government. Such airport development would not be a violation of the restriction in the transfer to the State of Michigan that the land be used "as a State park, and for no other purpose" (act of March 2, 1895, c. 189, 28 Stat. 910 at 946). This conclusion is based on the particular facts presented, and does not reflect a view on my part that airports as such necessarily involve only land uses that fall within the general concept of "park" purposes. The conveyance which controls the use of the land in question was made pursuant to the following provision, which is included in a lengthy appropriations act approved March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 910 at 946: "MILITARY RESERVATION ON MACKINAC ISLAND, MICHIGAN: The Secretary of War is hereby authorized, on the application of the governor of Michigan, to turn over to the State of Michigan, for use as a State park, and for no other purpose, the military reservation and buildings and the lands of the national park on Mackinac Island, Michigan: Provided, That whenever the State ceases to use the land for the purpose aforesaid it shall revert to the United States." The statute containing the foregoing provision is devoid of any definition or other explanation as to what particular land uses Congress intended to include within "State park" purposes. In these circumstances it is reasonable to assume that Congress used these words in their ordinary sense, especially since public parks, their nature and purposes, are subjects which courts and legislatures in this country have frequently had occasion to consider and explain. States and local interpretations of the concept of park purposes are clearly pertinent to the present question as indicating the ordinary and accepted meaning of these terms in legal usage, although the proper construction of the legislation here involved is ultimately a question of Federal rather than State law. The meaning of "public park" as derived from numerous decisions is summarized in 10 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, § 28.50 (3rd ed., 1950) as "an open or enclosed tract of land adapted for, set apart, maintained at public expense and devoted to the purposes of pleasure, recreation, ornament and light and air for the inhabitants of the town or city near or in which it is located." Other statements referred to therein make it clear that a park is a predominantly open or outdoor area, with or without landscaping, buildings, or other man-made facilities, the purpose of which is to serve and promote the pleasure, recreation, amusement, health, welfare and enjoyment of the public. Whether a particular category of building or facility would be a land use consistent with public park purposes may sometimes be clear from its very nature. However, the consistency with park purposes of some categories of facilities may not be immediately apparent and may depend upon the relationship between the particular facility and the particular park. One such kind of facility, considered by two of my predecessors, is a water supply system reservoir.1 Roads and transit stations are other examples. Since parks fail to realize their potential public benefits unless the public can readily go to them, transportation facilities designed to give the public access to and movement within parks, as opposed to facilities for unrelated or through transportation, have been recognized as properly includable within park purposes.2 1 Water storage facilities constituting a component of a system of water supply for human consumption have been considered to fall both outside and Inside the scope of park purposes, depending on the circumstances. In an opinion of July 8, 1897, to the Secretary of War, Attorney General Joseph McKenna concluded that the water department of the District of Columbia could not be authorized to construct a reservoir for the use of the District within Rock Creek Park, which had been established under Federal legislation as a public park for the benefit of the people of the United States. 21 Op. A.G. 566. But when confronted with the question of water supply facilities Intended not for general municipal use but to support park activities, Attorney General John G. Sargent, in an opinion of April 23, 1927, to the Secretary of the Interior, concluded that the Secretary could allow the operators of public hotels within the Grand Canyon National Park to install facilities for storing and transporting water to provide a water supply and electricity needed for proper hotel service to the public using the park. 35 Op. A.G. 208. See American Steel House Co. v. Willcom, 38 Misc. 571, 77 N.Y.S. 1010 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1902), refusing to enjoin park authorities from authorizing a public stage (bus) route with stations and waiting rooms within Central Park and Riverside Drive in Manhattan. The court said, “The point of distinction |