but he often states them very clearly and in such a way that we readily admit that he found them in the old books which he used. Eutropius, the Auctor de Viris Illustribus, Diodorus, and Dion Cassius, supply a little matter, some of which appears nowhere else. We are accordingly compelled to trust Appian as our chief authority, with the certainty that he too has only made an indifferent abridgment, and has omitted a good deal that would have been worth knowing. We must hope that what he has given us is correctly taken from his authorities. As far as he could understand them, I am inclined to think that he used them honestly, that he has only omitted and sometimes misunderstood; and though omission and misunderstanding are grave defects in an historian, I do not think that he invented, for he is entirely devoid of the faculty of imagination.

A story made out of such materials as I have described is not easy work for the writer, and not very inviting to a reader. But those who will study the history of any particular period ought to know what the evidence is worth, and they ought not to be deceived by taking as true all that they find written. There is however sufficient agreement in all the authorities for the war to enable us to form a pretty good notion of its character, and of the daring and talent of the Lusitanian shepherd, who so long resisted the armies of Rome. After all, in history we must be satisfied with general results and with a series of great events established by sufficient evidence. As to the minute facts with which history is decorated both by antient and modern writers, every man of sense knows that nothing is ever reported with perfect accuracy, and that the abundance of evidence is not a guarantee of the truth of particulars. I know only one Greek historian, Thucydides, whose particular narrative I am ready to accept as the nearest thing to truth that one man's pains and honesty could produce; and there is only one Roman writer, Caesar, whose story will stand the test of the strictest critical examination.

So many reverses in Spain made some signal example necessary. Plautius was selected for punishment, though he was not so bad as some of his predecessors. It is said that

he was impeached before the people on the vague charge of having damaged the public interests by his misconduct in the war, and he was obliged to leave Rome. That particular offence which the Romans named Crimen minutae majestatis or simply Majestas, the impairing of the majesty, which means the magnitude of the Roman empire, was not yet made into a special crime by legislative forms. But the practical good sense of the people required a commander to be punished, who had mismanaged the public interests; for a Roman general in Spain had not the excuse, which many modern commanders have had, that he was directed and controlled by orders from home. Such orders, even if they come from men who are acquainted with the art of war, come from those who are not on the spot, and cannot know what is best to be done; and modern history shows that such orders from home generally come from men who know nothing of war. The Roman senate always contained many men who had learned the art of war by experience, but still it was not the practice of the Senate to direct the operations of a general, who was at the head of an army. A Roman general, as a rule, conducted a war as he pleased; and he deserved to be punished, if he lost his army. I find nothing therefore to blame in the punishment of Plautius, except that he was the only commander in Spain who was punished, and that others as guilty as himself escaped.

CHAPTER IV.

VIRIATHUS.

B.C. 145-140.

There

THE war with Carthage, the Achaean war and the last Macedonian had exhausted the strength of the Romans. Men were wanting more than the means of war. were indeed the veterans of the African, Achaean and Macedonian campaigns, but it was not thought prudent to call out again the old soldiers who required rest. Fabius raised the usual consular army of two legions, all young men who had never seen service, and this was all the force that he took from Italy. On landing in the south of Spain he demanded men from the allies, and he mustered his troops, in all fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse, at the strong position of Orso or Urso, a city which is identified with Osuna, east of Sevilla. Osuna stands on a hill, from which there is an extensive view over the plains. The prudent Roman would not risk a battle before he had trained his men. This could be done by his officers, and Fabius availed himself of his leisure to cross over to the island on which Gades or Cadiz stands to sacrifice in the temple of Hercules in this antient Phoenician town, for the Fabia gens worshipped Hercules, who was the progenitor of their race. In the absence of Fabius Viriathus fell on some of the Roman soldiers who had gone out to get wood and killed many of them. When Fabius returned, Viriathus gave him opportunities for fighting, but the cautious general would not risk a battle with soldiers whom he was still drilling. He only engaged them in skirmishes, he protected them in their forages, and while

he was trying the enemy's strength, he was giving his own. men confidence, following the example of his illustrious father, whom he had accompanied in his Macedonian campaign. Fabius thus avoided the double mistake of despising his enemy and trusting to raw soldiers. In this year (B.c. 145) C. Laelius Sapiens was praetor, and we shall see (Chap. v.) that he was at Rome at least some time in this year. Yet Cicero says that Laelius in his praetorship broke the power of Viriathus and made the war an easy matter for his successors. I find no other evidence of Laelius having served in the war against Viriathus, and it is certainly not true that the campaign of B.c. 145 reduced Viriathus so much as to make his final defeat easy.

In B.C. 144 Ser. Sulpicius Galba and L. Aurelius Cotta were consuls. Galba, who had escaped well-merited punishment for the massacre of the Lusitani, was rewarded with the consulship. The two consuls were disputing for the honour of conducting the war against Viriathus, but the influence of Scipio, the brother of Fabius, prevented either of them from receiving this commission. Scipio is reported to have said curtly and truly that neither of the consuls ought to go to Spain, for one of them had nothing, and the other could never have enough; by which words he alluded to the poverty of Cotta and the danger of his trying to make a fortune by dishonourable means, and to the greediness of Galba which was well known. Fabius' command was extended for another year. He took two cities from Viriathus, one of which he burnt, and he plundered the other. He also pursued the Lusitanian to a place named Baecor, probably some hill fortress. Fabius wintered in Corduba, now the head quarters of the Romans in those parts.

These reverses taught Viriathus more caution, and he made a diversion by inducing the Arevaci, Belli and Titthi to rise against the Romans. This was the real beginning of the long Numantine war. Q. Caecilius Metellus one of the consuls of the year B.C. 143 was sent against the Celtiberi. He fell on the Arevaci when they were busy with their harvest, but he failed in an attempt on the strong town of Numantia,

Q. Fabius was succeeded by a commander whom Appian names Quintius. Quintius or properly Quinctius was an antient Roman gentile name, but this Quintius is unknown. Pighius, followed by Drumann, supposes, that he is Q. Pompeius, the consul of B.C. 141, who served in Spain as we shall see (Chap. vi.). The grounds of this assumption are Appian's carelessness about Roman names, for sometimes he gives only the praenomen, says Drumann, and even that incorrectly. There may be sufficient reasons for doubting about the correctness of the name Quintius; but Drumann assumes that the Quintius of Appian was Q. Pompeius, that he came to Further Spain after his praetorship in B.c. 144; and he assigns to him all the ill luck of this year, and then says that he was busy at Rome in B.C. 142 canvassing for the consulship which he obtained. It may be true that Q. Pompeius was in Spain in B.C. 143 and that after disgracing himself by his incapacity and cowardice he was elected consul, but we want more evidence of all this than the bare fact that Appian names the commander of 143 Quintius. Whoever this Quintius may have been, he defeated Viriathus in the open field, and put him to flight. But the flight or retreat was followed as usual by a sudden attack on the Romans, who lost some standards and were driven back to their camp. Viriathus also dislodged a Roman garrison at Itucce, and wasted the territory of the Bastitani. The name Itucce is the same as Ituce or Utica in Africa, and the place was probably originally a Phoenician settlement. Itucce was afterwards a Roman colony named Julia Virtus in the Conventus of Hispalis (Sevilla). Quintius sought refuge in Corduba, though the season for the campaign was not over, and he sent against Viriathus one C. Marcius a Spaniard of Italica, as Appian calls him, though he had a Roman name. He have been a descendant of some man among the veterans whom Africanus settled at Italica.

may

We read of so many incompetent generals, some rash and ignorant, others lazy and cowardly, that it seems wonderful that the Romans accomplished the subjugation of the world. But there was a power in Rome which no other country possessed, an ever enduring body of men, not elected by the popular vote, but composed of those who had been elected by the