monarch on the conduct of Lautrec, who had permitted Federigo da Bozzolo, one of his stipendiaries, to enter into the service of the duke. He also complained to the emperor elect, Maximilian, and to the young monarch of Spain, that their troops had been engaged in opposition to the cause of the church, which he strongly insinuated would not have been done without their privity and assent. Not satisfied, however, with these remonstrances, he resorted to his pontifical authority, and issued his briefs, requiring the assistance of all the princes of Christendom against a rebel and a traitor, who had not only opposed himself in open arms against his paramount lord, but had thrown off all reverence to the holy see.* These representations were not without their effect. The friendship of a pontiff, who by his talents and vigilance, no less than by his high office, had obtained so considerable an influence in the affairs of Europe, was, without long hesitation, preferred to the disinterested task of vindicating the rights of a petty sovereign, whose conduct had on several occasions undoubtedly given just cause for reprehension. The Spanish king not only exculpated himself from all share in the transaction, but immediately admonished his subjects to quit the service of the duke of Urbino. He also directed the count of Potenza to proceed from Naples with four hundred lances to the aid of the pope, and as a proof of the sincerity of his intentions, he deprived the duke of Urbino of the ducal territory of Sora, which had been purchased by his father within the kingdom of Naples. Francis I., although justly suspicious of the intentions of the pontiff, sent also to his assistance a body of three hundred lances; but this reinforcement was accompanied by many complaints of the non-observance by the pope of the treaty concluded between him and the king of Bologna. The unjustifiable severity exercised by Leo against the exiled duke of Urbino, and particularly his cruelty, in depriving both the dowager duchess and the wife of the reigning duke of the revenues appointed for their support, had also been warmly animadverted on by the duchess of Angoulême, mother of the French

* On this occasion Leo wrote to Henry VIII., representing the church as in a situation of great difficulty and danger, and entreating his immediate and effectual assistance. Rymeri Fad. IV. p. 1, p. 135.

monarch, who possessed great influence with her son, and resented with commendable spirit the injury done to those of her own sex. Leo, being privately informed of this circum. stance, and conscious that he had given just occasion for complaint, hesitated whether it would be prudent to accept the assistance offered to him by the king. These difficulties were not, however, of long continuance. In complying with the request of the pope, by giving to his cause the credit of his name, and the assistance of his arms, Francis proposed that a new confederation should be entered into between them, by which they should reciprocally bind themselves to the defence of each other's dominions, and to the advance, for that purpose, if it should appear necessary, of a monthly sum of twelve thousand ducats. The Florentines were also included as auxiliaries in the league, and Lorenzo de' Medici was expressly recognised as duke of Urbino.2 The king further consented to assist the pope, whenever he was required, against the vassals and feudatories of the church; but the pontiff engaged by a separate brief not to require the aid of the French monarch against the duke of Ferrara. On this occasion Francis again insisted with great earnestness on the restitution of Modena and Reggio to the duke of Ferrara ; but the pope sought to evade the discussion, under the pretext that it was not a proper time to make such a request, when he was engaged in a dangerous contest with another of the vassals of the church. Such, however, was the perseverance of the king, that Leo at length consented, by a written engagement, to restore those places to the duke at the expiration of the term of seven months; a promise which there is too much reason to believe he never intended to perform, although conceded to the importunity of the king; relying on the change of circumstances which might arise within that period for a sufficient reason to justify him in the breach of it.*

During this negotiation, Leo had used his utmost efforts to increase the forces under the command of his nephew, Lorenzo; which soon amounted to one thousand men at arms, fifteen hundred light horse, and eighteen thousand infantry, composed of an heterogeneous assemblage of Gascons, Germans, Swiss,

Muratori, An. x. 132.

Spaniards, and Italians,* the immediate command of which, under the direction of Lorenzo, was intrusted to Renzo da Ceri. Of this force a considerable part was concentrated at Pesaro ; but at the time when hostilities were expected to commence, a herald arrived at Pesaro, to demand a safe-conduct for two persons who were authorised by the duke of Urbino to impart a message to Lorenzo de' Medici. The necessary credentials were accordingly given, when Suares di Lione, a Spanish officer, and Oratio Florida, secretary to the duke, were introduced in a public audience; but instead of announcing any proposition of submission or accommodation, as was probably expected from ther, the secretary read aloud a challenge from the duke, addressed to Lorenzo; by which he proposed, that in order to prevent the effusion of blood and the calamities of a protracted warfare, the contending parties should terminate the contest by an equal number of soldiers on each side, such number to be at the choice of Lorenzo; from four, to four thousand; concluding with an offer to Lorenzo, in case he preferred it, to meet him at a time and place to be appointed for that purpose, and to decide their differences by single combat.†

The only reply which Lorenzo made to this message, which he affected to consider as a personal affront, was to commit the bearers of it to prison." 24 In a few days, however, he liberated the Spaniard; but he sent the secretary of the duke to Rome, for the purpose of being examined respecting the measures and intentions of his master, and particularly as to the persons who had stimulated and abetted him in the prosecution of the war. To the indelible reproach of the pope and his advisers, the use of torture was resorted to, for the purpose of obtaining information from a person who had relied on the express sanction of a safe-conduct; but the result of this atrocious act is said to have served only to confirm the pope in the suspicions which he already entertained of the hostile disposition of the French monarch.25

The opposing armies now took the field, that of the duxe being inferior in number to that of his adversaries. After

* Leoni, lib. ii. Guicciardini states the amount at 1000 men at arms, 1000 Eght-horse, and 15,000 infantry.

This singular document is preserved by Leoni, in his Life of Fr. Maria Juke of Urbino.

VOL. II.

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several movements and partial contests on the banks of the river Metro, in the vicinity of Fossombrone, in which the celebrated commander, Giovanni de' Medici, then very young, gave an earnest of those military talents which he afterwards more fully displayed, the armies arrived within a mile of each other near Monte Baroccio. A decisive conflict now seemed inevitable, but Lorenzo lost a favourable opportunity of bringing his adversaries to an engagement, and suffered them to withdraw from a situation of acknowledged danger, into a place where they might either accept or decline the combat. Instead of appealing to arins, the duke of Urbino had recourse to a stratagem for creating dissensions among his adversaries, and particularly for detaching the Gascons from the service of Lorenzo. To this end he transmitted to their commanders certain letters, said to have been found in the apartments of the secretary of Lorenzo at Saltara, which place had been occupied by the duke immediately after the departure of the papal troops. By these letters it appeared that the pope had complained of the extravagant expense of supporting his auxiliaries, and had expressed his wishes that they would return to France. Hence a considerable ferment arose in the army, which, combining with the disadvantages of their situation, the difficulty of obtaining provisions, and perhaps the reluctance of the commanders to hazard an engagement, induced them to change their position, and to retire, in the presence of an inferior force, into the Vicariato. After attacking the castle of S. Costanza, which was carried by storm, and delivered up to be plundered by the Gascons, the papal troops encamped before Mondolfo, the strongest fortress in that district. Here an event occurred which had nearly proved fatal to one of the leaders. On planting the artillery for the attack of the place, it appeared that the engineers of the papal army, either through ignorance or negligence, had chosen such a station as exposed the soldiery to the fire of the garrison, in consequence of which one of the captains and several other men were killed. Exasperated at this misconduct, Lorenzo hastened to the spot, contrary to the earnest remonstrances of his officers; where, after having with great labour and perseverance provided for the defence of his followers, he was, when retiring, struck by a ball from the garrison, which wounded him on the back part of his head, and not only ren

dered him incapable for some time of further exertion, but greatly endangered his life.27

On the arrival of this information at Rome, Leo instantly despatched the cardinal Giulio de' Medici to take upon him the chief command of the papal army. On his arrival he found it in a state of the utmost disorder. The private disputes and personal quarrels of the soldiers of different nations had been espoused by their respective commanders, and the Germans, Spaniards, and Italians, instead of opposing the enemy, had armed against each other; in consequence of which several affrays had taken place, in which some of the parties had lost their lives. The first measure adopted by the papal legate, was to divide the troops of each nation from those of the others, and to order them into separate cantonments. This task, although highly proper, was not carried into effect without considerable personal danger to the cardinal, and gave such dissatisfaction, that several considerable bodies of troops quitted the service of the pontiff, and repaired to the standard of the duke of Urbino. If, at this juncture, the duke had hastened to the attack of his adversaries, he would in all probability have obtained an easy and decisive victory; but, if we may judge of the intention of the commanders from a general view of the contest, it seems to have been equally the policy of both these rivals to decline an engagement, and rather to circumvent each other by deceit, than to trust to the open decision of arms. Instead of opposing his enemies in the field, the duke of Urbino marched towards Perugia, leaving his own territories exposed to the ravages of his adversaries. Having obtained the surrender of this place through the treachery or cowardice of Gian-Paolo Baglioni, the Florentine commandant, he began to threaten the states of Tuscany; but on receiving information of the progress of the papal troops in Urbino, he changed his purpose, and hastened to the defence of his capital. After an unsuccessful attack on the fortress of Pesaro, he again returned towards the Florentine state, and attempted to carry by storm the citadel of Anghiari; but being repulsed by the courage of the garrison rather than by the strength of the place, he withdrew his troops under the Apennines between Borgo and Castello, uncertain what course he should next pursue, and exhausted with the expense of a contest, which by one