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The CHAIRMAN. Have you a memorandum of that decision?
Mr. BROWNLOW. We can put it in the record.

Mr. CANNON. What is the pay of these municipal judges?
Mr. BROWNLOW. It was $2,400 a year. It is $3,000 now.

Mr. CANNON. And if they go out once in a while and hold this othr court, they want the extra pay, and the courts have sustained them in that position?

Mr. BROWNLOW. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like to see that decision.

Mr. BROWNLOW. We will put the decision in the record, Mr. Chairman.

(The decision is as follows:)

JUVENILE COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, SALARY OF ACTING JUDGE,

[Callan v. District of Columbia, Appeal Cases 43, p. 338.]

The court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:

This appeal is from a judgment in the Supreme Court of the District sustaining the demurrer of the appellee, the District of Columbia, to appellant's declaration. The action is to recover compensation for services rendered by the appellant, Thomas H. Callan, while he was one of the judges of the municipal court of the District, as acting judge of the juvenile court during the years 1911, 1912, and 1913, as based upon section 3 of the act of March 19. 1906 (34 Stat. L., 73, ch. 960), establishing a juvenile court, and providing that "in cases of sickness, absence, disability, expiration of term of service, or death of the judge of the juvenile court, any one of the justices of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia may designate one of the justices of the peace of said District to discharge the duties of said judge of the juvenile court * * ** and said acting judge shall receive $5 per day in addition to his salary as justice of the peace, for the term that he shall serve, to be paid in the same manner as the salary of the judge of the juvenile court." The contention of the appellee is that this provision by implication was repealed by the provisions of the act of February 17, 1909 (35 Stat. L., 623, ch. 134). entitled "An act to change the name and jurisdiction of the inferior court of justice of the peace in the District of Columbia." That act provided that the justice of the peace court should remain as then constituted, but should thereafter be known as the municipal court of the District of Columbia, and should consist of the then justices of the peace, who should serve as judges for the unexpired terms of their then existing commissions. The act further provided that in case of sickness, absence, disability, expiration of term of service of, or death of either of the judges of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia might designate one of the judges of the municipal court to discharge the duties of said judge until such disability be removed, or vancancy filled. It is the contention of the appellee that the provisions of this act are so repugnant to the provisions of section 3 of the act of 1906 as to constitute a repeal thereof, although there is nowhere in said act of 1909 any express repeal."

Mr. Justice Robb delivered the opinion of the court:

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It is a well-settled rule that repeals by implication are not favored, and that when two statutes cover in whole or in part the same matter, it is the duty of the court to give effect to both unless they are irreconcilable; in other words, unless it is clear that the later act was intended to displace the provisions of the former. (Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wall., 652, 20 L. ed., 235, etc.) In the present case, the later act is not necessarily irreconcilable with the former. The name of the justice of the peace court having been changed, Congress, as a matter of caution, and to save any question being raised as to the right of a judge of the newly constituted court to act as a judge of the juvenile court, specifically provided that he might do so. But it did not provide that he should so serve without extra compensation. It had expressly declared that the old court should remain as then constituted, but should thereafter be known by a different name, and later on it provided that "the said court (that is, the newly constituted municipal court) and each member thereof shall exercise the same jurisdiction as was vested in them as justice

of the peace immediately before the passage of this act, and no more, and shall be governed by the laws then in force, except as said laws and said jurisdiction are expressly changed or enlarged hereby." The provision in the juvenile court act providing for extra compensation concededly was not expressly repealed. We are unable to find any necessary implication of repeal, since there is nothing in the later act which destroys this provision in the former. That being so, both may be permitted to stand. This view is strengthened by a reference to the deficiency appropriation bills of March 4, 1909, June 25, 1910, and March 4, 1911, directing payment for services rendered by acting judge of said juvenile court, as authorized by section 3 of the act of March 19, 1906, creating said court." While these appropriation acts, of course, are not controlling they are proper to be considered because they indicate the contemporaneous construction placed upon the act of 1909 by Congress.

It appearing that the compensation of the judges of the municipal court was not increased by the act of 1909, that there was no express repeal of the provision in the former act allowing extra compensation, that the later act expressly provided that the municipal court should "be governed by the laws then in force" unless expressly changed, that Congress for three years thereafter recognized the extra-compensation provision of the earlier act as still in force, we rule that it was not repealed by the later act. The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded.

Reversed.

Mr. CANNON. When you submit that, submit also, for the information of the committee, the provision you want to amend this law? Mr. BROWNLOW. Yes.

MUNICIPAL COURT-CONTINGENT EXPENSES.

The next item is for contingent expenses of the municipal court, $150. Not all of the bills are in yet, and we have not got the exact amount. We know that the items of ice, laundry, electric light, and ashes amount to $89.13; and there are some items, for which the bills are not in yet, on account of the cost of coal and court dockets, but it will be within the $150 asked for.

WASHINGTON ASYLUM AND JAIL-PAYMENTS TO DESTITUTE WOMEN.

For payments to destitute women and children the exact amount of this deficiency is $375.50 instead of $500. This is an ascertained. deficiency.

REFUNDING TAXES-AUTO LIVERY CO. AND FEDERAL TAXICAB CO.

The next item is for refunding taxes, the language reading: Authority is granted to pay out of the above-named appropriation the sum of $69.58 to the Auto Livery Co. and the sum of $44.64 to the Federal Taxicab Co. for overpaid personal taxes by said companies.

The property of these two companies was valued by the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia. The Public Utilities Commission found the value as of June 30, 1914, found the value new, and then subtracted the depreciation on account of the age of the vehicles. These two companies, in making their returns to the assessor, inadvertently took the price of the machines as if they were new and not the price as depreciated, so that they paid taxes upon a greater value on their vehicles than had been found to be the value of those vehicles by the Public Utilities Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. Why should we object to that if they want to do it?

Mr. BROWNLOW. They applied for a refund and it was not an erroneous collection under the law, so that the only relief that can come to these men who paid more personal taxes than the value of their property as ascertained by the authority charged with that duty is through an act of Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. May they not have differed with the Utilities Commission as to the value of these vehicles?

Mr. BROWNLOW. They submitted their cases to the Utilities Commission, and while they made a higher claim for some other property they did not in the case of the vehicles, and when the valuation was determined they did not appeal the case, but accepted the judgment of the commission.

JUDGMENTS AGAINST THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

The CHAIRMAN. For judgments against the District of Columbia, $10,476.85.

Mr. BROWNLOW. The first one is a $9,000 judgment to Laura May Burke, administratrix of the estate of Walter L. Burke, deceased, with interest from May 26, 1916. Burke was killed by falling from an automobile running along Twelfth Street NE. He was sitting upon the tool box in the car, with his feet hanging over the side, and was jolted off by the machine running over a shallow trench, falling on his head and sustaining a circular fracture of the skull. In the first trial Judge Barnard directed a verdict for the defendant, but this action was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and on a second trial the jury awarded the plaintiff $9,000, which was affirmed on appeal. This is a final judgment. The judgment is $9,000 and the costs amounts to $140.70. The next is a judgment for $50 for certain material in a porch owned by the plaintiff which was removed by the contractor who cleared the buildings from Willow Tree Alley under instructions from the District of Columbia and without notice to or permission from the owner. The next case is a judgment obtained by Mary A. Sullivan for $1,250 for personal injury. In this case the plaintiff was injured by stepping into a hole in the sidewalk on Florida Avenue near Seventh Street NW. This is also a final judgment.

MONDAY, July 16, 1917.

WAR DEPARTMENT.

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN C. SCOFIELD, ASSISTANT AND CHIEF CLERK.

TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES.

The CHAIRMAN. A request has been submitted for $3,726,432 for additional employees in addition to the $900,000 already given? Mr. SCOFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this based upon estimates submitted by the various bureaus?

Mr. SCOFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did those estimates disclose how many promotions were contemplated?

Mr. SCOFIELD. It did not disclose any.

The CHAIRMAN. But a great many were contemplated?

Mr. SCOFIELD. That I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. We have just ascertained that in the Inspector General's Office their estimate contemplates the promotion of every regular employee in the office.

Mr. SCOFIELD. I do not see how that could be.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so, just the same.

Mr. SCOFIELD. That would not be allowed under the rule which the Secretary has adopted.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not so sure about that. The estimates that were submitted did not show what particular employees were to be increased in compensation?

Mr. SCOFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How can we get that information?

Mr. SCOFIELD. By asking them.

The CHAIRMAN. By asking the chiefs of the bureaus?

Mr. SCOFIELD. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHERLEY. The estimate does show the number of new places and the salaries at which they are to be filled?

Mr. SCOFIELD. Yes, sir. So many people were required. For instance, The Adjutant General estimated that he would want 550 additional employees, at a cost of $575,000.

Mr. SHERLEY. Did he detail that more than
Mr. SCOFIELD. I think not.

your statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Then nobody in the department has checked up or passed upon the estimates of the heads of the different bureaus? Mr. SCOFIELD. Except that they have taken the estimates which the bureaus submitted.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES.

The CHAIRMAN. The first office is the Secretary's office. What additional employees are requested there?

Mr. SCOFIELD. One hundred and ten additional employees at $133.000.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you the details?

Mr. SCOFIELD. I have not them here. That is practically at $1,000 each.

The CHAIRMAN. That will not help us.

Mr. SCOFIELD. You want the details?

The CHAIRMAN. Unless we simply do what the department asks. Mr. SCOFIELD. I can send you the details.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but we should like to ask some questions. Mr. SCOFIELD. I will send you a list.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless we simply appropriate what the department asks, we need some information. If your statements are prepared, we want them. Mr. Scofield, will you prepare a statement showing by bureaus and offices the number and grade of employees, and the rate of pay under the $900,000 emergency appropriation, and also under this new proposal?

Mr. SCOFIELD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And we will also put into the record this order of the Secretary.

(The paper referred to follows:)

The increase of the clerical force creates a need for a larger number of supervisory positions. It is manifestly in the interest of good administration to fill such positions by the appointment of employees experienced in the work of the department and qualified to train new appointees appointed through the civil service rather than to bring in from the outside persons entirely unfamiliar with departmental methods and the work of the bureau or office to which they are assigned. It appears from the opinion of the Acting Judge Advocate General that there are no legal objections to making appointments as proposed with consequent promotion. Accordingly, I authorize the appointment on the emergency roll by transfer from the regular roll or from other departments at an increase not to exceed $200 per annum and not in excess of 10 per cent of the number of additional employees of the several classes appointed on the emergency roll in the bureau or office concerned: Provided further, That no such appointments with a consequent promotion shall be made except in eases where such appointment involves the performance of duties of a higher grade or essentially different duties from those heretofore performed, and no transfer from the Field Service of the War Department or from another executive department involving an increase of salary shall be be made except upon certification of the bureau chief that the position can not be adequately filled by promotion in his own office. All such transfers will, of course, be subject to the law providing that lump-sum appropriations shall not be available for the payment of personal services at a rate of compensation in excess of that paid for the same or similar services during the preceding fiscal year; and such transfers and appointments shall aslo be subject to any other restrictions of law applicable to the case.

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