 | 1873 - 962 pages
...is that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the Statute are in themselves precise...unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound these words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such case best declare... | |
 | Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords - 1845 - 814 pages
...according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are of themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can...their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do, in such case, best declare the intention of the Legislature. — Sussex Peerage Case, p. 85. 2.... | |
 | Herbert Broom - 1845 - 544 pages
...is, that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise...unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare... | |
 | 1848 - 558 pages
...according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the act. If the words of the statute are of themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can...their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do, in such a case, best declare the intention of the Legislature (x). The following seem to be the... | |
 | Edward William Cox - 1851 - 552 pages
...that they should be constructed according to the intent of the Parliament" which passed the act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise...case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver." And in The Mayor, fyc. of Salford v. Ackers (16 Mee. & Wels. 85), Rolfo, B., in his judgment (p. 93),... | |
 | Bengal (India). Sadr Nizāmat 'Adālat, J. Carrau - 1853 - 1020 pages
...chief justice, delivering the opinion of the judges, at page 439 of Broom's Legal Maxims : — ' If the words of the statute are in themselves • precise...unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than " to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense. , . • The words themselves alone do, in such case,... | |
 | Samuel Warren - 1853 - 520 pages
...be construed according to the intent of the parliament which passed the act. If the words of the act are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves, do, in such a case, best declare... | |
 | Indiana. Supreme Court, Horace E. Carter, Albert Gallatin Porter, Gordon Tanner, Benjamin Harrison, Michael Crawford Kerr, James Buckley Black, Augustus Newton Martin, Francis Marion Dice, John Worth Kern, John Lewis Griffiths, Sidney Romelee Moon, Charles Frederick Remy - 1856 - 798 pages
...construction. The very authority quoted by counsel aptly enforces this construction. " If the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense. In such case, the words themselves do best declare the... | |
 | 1857 - 356 pages
...doctrine is laid down by the authority of the 10 ci. and r., House of Lords : — " If the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound these words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do in such a case best declare... | |
 | Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords, Charles Clark, William Finnelly - 1863 - 820 pages
...to be, that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed them. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise...unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to exjKiund those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do in such case... | |
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If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver. 
