to just and equitable decision. And there will be no danger, ordinarily speaking, of its being disregarded.

If there be nothing more in the Instruction, some one may ask, what is the use of it? Has the American Church gained any substantial good by the change? Had I to answer in the affirmative, I might fail to convince some of those who gratuitously thrust themselves forward as first and sole interpreters of the document. For, very likely, they are now groaning under their disappointment. They have found out, it is to be feared, that in their case the wish was father to the thought; and that in those wild outbursts of rapture with which they saluted the Instruction, they were only blindly worshipping the figments of their own disordered imagination. Nor let my clerical friends blame me if, addressing a wider circle, I repeat in stronger terms what I more than once said to them in conversation. Those who prefer cool reflection to hasty argument, the more calmly they study out the true meaning of the document, the more readily will they be convinced of its obvious sense. I wish to assert nothing special of my own faculty of interpretation, much less to boast that I have succeeded in disengaging the true sense from all clouds of doubt. But I have endeavored to do so, and am willing to be further taught and enlightened by those who are wiser than myself.

But to return to the question: Will this change be productive of good? Any one who has due reverence for Rome can scarcely bring himself calmly to debate the question whether a canonical regulation for the better government of the American Church, long and patiently discussed and weighed at Rome, and at last deliberately adopted by one of her highest tribunals, is or is not likely to benefit our Church. There can be no doubt that it must and will do good. It is not class legislation, as some unthinkingly imagine and say, meant to exalt one order of the clergy at the expense of the other. It is intended for the common good, both of bishops and of priests.

It does not deprive the bishop of any of his faculties, or strip him of the least portion of his governing and judicial power. It only adds to his episcopal administration of justice the perpetual prestige of an ecclesiastical court, of which he is central point and sole judge, and of which the new judicial forms will only serve to invest his decisions with additional weight and dignity. As to the second order of the clergy, it protects them from the effects and evil consequences, as it protects their superiors from the responsibility, of arbitrary use of power. For even legitimate power may be arbitrarily used. It makes it nearly impossible for an innocent man to be involved in unjust condemnation; it cuts off all or almost all hope from the guilty of escaping just punishment.

It will also be an advantage to Rome. Appeals will no longer be the miserable, loose, slipshod things they were, a mere waste of time and money, ending in uncertainty or in utter hopelessness of ever coming to a decision. Besides, the cases of recourse to the Holy See

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will be, necessarily, much fewer. And when it does take place, as the whole procès verbal must be forwarded to Rome, one hour's examination of it will be sufficient to bring to light the merits or the worthlessness of the appeal.

The new legislation introduced by the Instruction will do good everywhere, and therefore should everywhere find a welcome. It has also in it germs of further development for good, of which we may learn hereafter. It should neither be hailed with intemperate exultation, nor frowned upon in a skeptical, captious, fault-finding spirit; but like every other boon that comes to us from our mother, Rome, it should be received with devotion, reverence, and thankfulness. Wishing to yourselves, Messrs. Editors, and to your journal, a prosperous New Year, I remain,

Your humble servant in Dno,

F. PORPHYRIUS.

BOOK NOTICES.

ELEMENTS OF INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.

By Rev. J. De Concilio.

This is the first instalment of a work intended by the author to cover the whole range of philosophy. It is meant to be a textbook for those especially who are unable to read any of the ordinary handbooks of philosophy written in Latin. We cannot but be thankful to those whose labors help to render this study less severe, and to bring it within the reach of larger numbers of our youth. There can be no question that for Catholics the study of philosophy is a necessity. In the intellectual, as in the religious world around them, the utmost anarchy prevails. The revolt against the Church was followed by an effort to discard the scholastic system of philosophy, which the most distinguished men in the Church had used and consecrated to her service. ended in disaster. The history of modern philosophy reveals a succesBut the attempt has sion of systems, one more erroneous and pernicious than another; idealism, sensism, skepticism, pantheism, materialism, nihilism; of which the outcome is chaos.

The literature of the day, with which young Catholics must become more or less familiar, reflects this confusion and contradiction. The books of science, the reviews, and magazines, which they can scarcely be expected not to read, abound in reckless assertions, false assumptions, or illogical conclusions, which it is essential that they should be able to detect and expose. to distinguish a fallacy from an argument, and recognize sophistry from They must know how, at a glance, More than this, to sustain their part as educated Catholics, they must be ready not only to refute, but also to convince; not only to defend the truth, but also to attack error and rout its forces; to uphold the truths of reason as well as to guard those of revelation. Hence the need, greater now than ever before, of studying the science of philosophy, and especially of a careful training in logic.

sound reasoning.

For this reason, on its first appearance, we welcomed Fr. De Concilio's book as an encouraging sign that there was a greater demand

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among Catholics for works on philosophy, and that competent men were devoting themselves to the task of preparing such works for the public. On its merits as a textbook we were not yet ready to speak. We waited till we could examine it more at leisure, and hear from teachers whose experience would give weight to their judgment. Now that we have read it, we must say that we are somewhat disappointed in it. Whilst it cannot be denied considerable merit, it has also serious defects. Nor can it serve as a safe and useful textbook without much correction and many changes.

The reverend author frankly invites criticism from "the learned professors of this study scattered throughout the land, from whom we (the author) shall thankfully receive any suggestions or corrections which they shall see fit to make." Emboldened by this invitation, we venture to make some observations. And first, as to the form. To many the catechetical form of question and answer appears to be too puerile for a textbook on philosophy. A professor who cannot formulate questions for his pupils as well as any author can do it, is not fit for his office. But if this form is used, as it is in some compendiums of theology, at least let the questions be real questions; let them be to the point, and lead easily to the answer. In these respects the book before us is very defective, as may be seen at a glance almost anywhere throughout the volume. The subjects treated in the "Elements" are generally well divided and distinctly stated. We cannot admit, however, that the author's opinions are always sound or his explanations as clear as they should be. Even a hasty examination will disclose several instances of confused or incorrect statements, and so large a number of verbal inaccuracies and grammatical mistakes that we are at a loss to account for them except on the score of extreme haste. We will point out some examples.

In the introduction, Art. II., in answer to the question, "How is philosophy divided?" the author first divides being into rational, real, and moral. After defining each of these parts or divisions of being, using the definite article, however, incorrectly, he goes on as follows: "The rational (being) is called logic, etc. The moral (being) is the science of ethics, etc. The real (being) is called metaphysics, and is subdivided into three parts, because, as St. Thomas observes, real being may be classified under four heads." Of course, three is a printer's mistake. But the reverend author must pardon us for saying that these sentences denote unmistakable confusion of ideas. Logic is not rational being, but, from treating of rational being, is called rational science, etc. On page 12, we read: "The natural philosopher studies the body." Not at all. It is the physician that studies the body; the natural philosopher studies bodies. This is one of the many instances where a wrong use is made of the definite article. Another may be found on the same page. But in truth, they are "too numerous to mention."

On page 32 we find this curious specimen of scholarship: "The word universal is derived from the Latin words unum versus alia, and signifies a thing which refers to many." This has, at least, the merit of novelty. To say that the Latin word universalia is derived from unum versus alia is just as correct as to say that universaliter is derived from unum versus alia ter. It is well known to every one who has studied Latin etymology, that there is a large class of adjectives in alis derived from substantive nouns or adjectives, and that universalis is one of these, derived from universus, which is formed of uni and versus, meaning turned or gathered into one, entire, whole.

On page 21 we read this definition of logic: "Logic may be generally understood as meaning the right use of those faculties which

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are destined to acquire knowledge." That is, logic is the right use of the reasoning faculties. We had an idea that logic teaches the right use of those faculties. Compare this sentence with the one quoted above: "The rational (being) is called logic," and it will be hard to say which is the graver mistake. If clearness of ideas and precision of language are needed at all times in a treatise on philosophy, they are especially necessary in definitions. We think the author singularly unhappy in this Introduction to Logic. We can admit neither his division of logic nor the explanation he gives of it. And it is on his own principles that we feel compelled to reject both.

And first, the division is faulty. Logic is not divided into natural and scientific. It is divided into natural and artificial or acquired. Either kind may also be scientific. One who has by nature strong powers of reasoning and a correct judgment is said to possess natural logic. If he knows by the force of native genius or, better still, by education, the leading principles on which sound reasoning depends, his logic, on the author's own showing, is scientific. If, besides, he is trained in the application of those principles and knows how to use the rules of logic, he is said to be versed in artificial logic. The argument to prove that logic is not an art does not convince. would follow that music, painting, any of the fine arts, or any of the It proves too much. Indeed, it industrial arts, would cease to be an art, if the artist should know the principles of the science on which his art depends. There is no need to enlarge on this point. We hold with the best authors, that logic may be considered both as an art and a science. And in this connection we may be allowed to observe, that there appears in this volume a striking disregard of the views and merits of other authors distinguished in this branch of study. A reasonable respect for the opinions of others, at least some indication that there are other opinions entitled to consideration, will do more to gain the favor of the judicious than the most positive tone of assurance. We think an impartial examination of this book will discover no grounds for overconfident satisfaction on the part of the author. We will go on with our list of errors.

In treating of certainty our author is obscure, from failing to distinguish between subjective and objective certainty, or rather between certitude and certainty.

For certitude, according to Dr. Newman, is a state of the mind; certainty, a quality of propositions.

Thus on page 83, certainty is defined to be: "That state of the mind by which it firmly adheres to a known truth without fear of the opposite. This is evidently subjective certainty or certitude, though it is very awkward to speak of a state of the mind by which it (the mind) adheres, etc. Then follows this sentence: "It (that is, that state of the mind called certainty) may be metaphysical, physical, and moral." We think this division is applicable only to objective certainty or the certainty of propositions.

Among the incorrect expressions and inaccurate statements which are plentifully sprinkled throughout the book, we may notice the following: On page 105 the fallacy which our author calls ignorantia elenchi is, we presume, our old acquaintance ignoratio elenchi. The former is generally regarded as a species of the latter. There is a wide difference between "ignorance of the point at issue" and "ignoring or evading the point at issue." Besides the incorrect use of the definite article, to which we referred above, we noticed several instances of the wrong tense used. For an example, see page 148, the first sentence in the Introduction to Ontology. The explanation of universals is not satisfac

errors.

tory. They are not well defined, and no distinction is made between direct and reflex universals. The chapter on Being contains several Equivocal seems to be taken for analogical, and univocal for identical. How can being be "predicated of itself univocally," when univocal means a term (p. 56) "that is applied to several objects under the same signification ?" And what is meant by this sentence in Article 3? We have said that being is predicated univocally only of itself, therefore it is attributed analogically to all other subjects." What subjects are these which are not being? The last paragraph in the third chapter on the distinction between Essence and Existence is simply unintelligible.

On page 181, in the article on the Beautiful, besides the expression "the beautiful natural," already noticed in the Catholic World, we must object to the following sentence: "Man is composed of body and soul; the body consists of motive, vegetative, sensitive faculties; the soul of intellectual and volitive faculties." Can a substance which is endowed with faculties be said to consist of those faculties?

On page 190 there are two mistakes. It is not grammatical to speak, as this article does repeatedly, of "introducing form in matter." An arrow does not reach the mark because it is thrown by the archer. Arrows are supposed to be shot with a bow.

On page 195 "particular goods" should be "a particular good.” Goods (the plural noun) means wares or property.

On page 196 we are told that, "a man digging the foundation of a house finds a treasure. The actual effect of the man's action is digging, but accidentally the other effect is connected with it." Not so. Though the finding of a treasure may be accidental, it is also actual, unless it should take place in a dream. Actual is not opposed to accidental, but to potential or virtual.

On page 174, in the article on "The Goodness of Being," we must take exception to the definition of goodness, as too restricted. It applies only to that which is formally good, whereas it ought to include also that which is fundamentally good, or which contains the reason and foundation of goodness. Not only is that good which is sought after, but also that which may be sought after, which contains in itself a reason why it may be an object of appetition. If the definition does not include this, it cannot be applied to the three kinds into which the author divides "goodness. But why omit the very important division of which the old authors make so much, the "bonum honestum, delectabile utile?"

On page 215 the author explains the nature of accident. "It is intrinsically necessary for the nature of (the) accident to be supported; but it is quite indifferent to the same nature what it is supported byby its own substance, or any other force sufficient to uphold it." Here there is some confusion of ideas, arising, we think, from the use of the word indifferent. If this were true, as it reads, it would follow that there is no extraordinary exercise of divine power in the Holy Eucharist. If it be "indifferent to the very nature of accident what it is supported by," then in every case it would require the action of some extrinsic cause to determine it to "its own substance or to some other force sufficient to uphold it." In other words, if this be true, accident does not inhere in substance by the force of its nature, but remains in suspense, indifferent till its mode of existence or its inherence is determined by Omnipotence. This we cannot admit. It is not indifferent to the nature of accident what it is supported by. It belongs to its nature to inhere in a subject. Inherence in substance is necessary to the very notion or definition of accident. Not, indeed, that it must actually in