characteristic of sovereignty. Whatever changes or convulsions disturbed or threatened the peace of other countries, Russia remained unchanged, undisturbed, quiet.

Nor is this all. The "Emperor of all the Russias" played with success the rôle of restorer of peace and order by aiding in pacifying or subduing popular uprisings in other countries. An instance directly in point is the assistance he rendered Austria in suppressing the rebellion of her Hungarian subjects. It was, therefore, quite natural that Russia, of all European powers, came to be considered as the one country above all danger of infection from revolutionary ideas. The events following 1848 did not weaken that prestige. The Crimean War, ended by the Treaty of Paris, had practically no other effect than to convince the governments of Europe that the Slav power of the North was one of gigantic dimensions; one whose ambitious schemes in the East could be neutralized only by a concerted action of Middle Europe; one, finally, which, at a future day, might endanger the balance of power by a Northern dictatorship. Then, again, many other considerations confirmed the belief that Russia had entered with a will upon what she conceived to be her mission; and that progress and civilization had acquired their full modern significance even in the realm of the Czar. Of these we enumerate the abolition of serfdom throughout the vast dominion of the Czar, the construction of a network of railroads, the expansion of commerce and trade, the conquest of Khokand, and the expeditions to Khiva. The campaigns of 1859, 1864, 1866, and the Franco-German War left Russia free to devote her undivided energies to the development of her immense resources. Thus she became per fas vel nefas the "Colossus of the North." No wonder, therefore, that when the outbreak of hostilities between Servia and the Porte signalized a new phase of the Eastern question, Europe concerned itself chiefly about the attitude which Russia would take.

It is not necessary to dwell here upon the series of events which began with the review of troops at Kischeneff, when the Czar bade them cross the Pruth, and ended, south of the Balkans, with the appearance of the Russian eagles before the walls of Constantinople. In spite of Osman Pasha's heroic defence of Plevna; in spite of the stubborn resistance offered in the Shipka Pass, Russia entered upon a career of success, victory following victory, until the Ottoman power lay crushed and exhausted at the mercy of the Czar, in Europe as well as in Asia. The Treaty of San Stefano, dropping the humanitarian pretext put forth at the beginning of the campaign, was an emphatic declaration in the face of Europe that Russia meant to supersede the rule of the Turks in Europe, and intended henceforth to act as "apostle of civilization" in the

Levant. Then came the memorable Congress at Berlin. The demands of Russia, it is true, were considerably curtailed by the diplomates assembled in the Palais Radzivill; but to the peace of Berlin has been applied what was said of the peace of Amiens, namely, that it was a treaty" about which every one was glad, but nobody proud." Despite large concessions-concessions that were compulsory-Russia nevertheless gained her end. For, Russian influence in the East is more potent to-day than it ever was before, and though the nominal dependency of the Sultan, namely, the suzerain principality of Bulgaria, has been made to embrace only the country north of the Balkan range of mountains, in direct opposition to Russian wishes, Bulgaria under Prince Battenburg, the grandnephew of the Czar, is de facto a Russian province, and the Southern frontier of Russia, though not reaching, as Russia at first demanded, to the Ægean Sea, is virtually advanced to the Balkan Mountains. It is true, therefore, that the fruits of victories won by Russian arms in the field of battle were somewhat lessened by defeats in diplomacy. But often a diplomatic defeat has the effect of a victory, and vice versa; and this is the case as regards Russia's position after the labors of the Congress at Berlin. The instrument there drawn up by the representatives of the great powers of Europe has neither checked Russian ascendency in the East, nor has it prevented the Cabinet of St. Petersburg from converting the Porte from an enemy into an ally.

Allowing their due force to these considerations it would be entirely incorrect, it seems to us, to believe what has been asserted, namely, that the present discontent in Russia springs from the anger of the nation at finding that the immense sacrifices, made necessary by the late war, have brought no advantage to the empire. Nor can we share the opinion of those who ascribe the revolution、ary outbursts in Russia solely to the mischievous workings of the Nihilists. Both views, the one which makes the war, and the other which makes the Nihilists, responsible for the disorder, are superficial. Both are dangerous illusions, and have resulted, we think, from a certain reluctance to resign long-held and apparently correct, but in reality incorrect, opinions respecting Russia. If we recall to mind that the disturbances began to show themselves in force long before the war was concluded, we will be forced to acknowledge that they cannot spring from dissatisfaction with the result of the war. The first view has, therefore, no actual basis of fact.

As to the second, it is not a handful of reckless miscreants which the government at St. Petersburg has to deal with, and endeavors to strike down. Were this the case, the social struggle in Russia would be divested of any deep meaning, and might be regarded as

simply a transitory disturbance. For, then, indeed, we might hold that "the force which a settled government can bring to bear upon Communists, Socialists, Nihilists, or by whatever names the conspirators against the social order are to be described, will succeed in repressing the ebulition." But, as a matter of fact, the social discontent is spread through all classes of the population and is found in every rank of society; and for this reason it seems to us impossible to regard the movement in Russia as only a Nihilistic rebellion.

The war, so Russians argued before its outbreak, might free the country from an arrogant and corrupt despotism; the war might precipitate the downfall of a system of government which had driven the nation to the brink of despair, because, in war, the weakness and the corruption of this system would probably become glaringly visible. Thus, we see, the war was partly the work, as it was also the main hope, of the revolutionists of 1877. Its immediate effect, in our judgment, has simply been to bring the already half-ripe elements of universal dissatisfaction to an early maturity. Looked at in this light the exceptional condition in Russia acquires a different and a much graver meaning. The French revolution produced " reigns of terror," as we all know; and "reigns of terror" have in preceding ages, time and again, appeared sporadically. But of all those that we find recorded in history, there is none comparable with that reign of terror from which the realm. of the Czar is now trembling. And, since the tendency to underrate the seriousness of the complications in Russia is both widespread and deeprooted, it is, we hope, not amiss to cite a few facts, the consideration of which will dispel erroneous preconceptions.

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Shortly after the appointment of General Gourko as military governor of the “government (district) of St. Petersburg," a decree was issued which placed the army under the surveillance of the police. Inasmuch as this measure by its very nature would necessarily tend to create indignation in the ranks of the army, its expediency may be questioned. The General himself, however, declares it a necessity, "because the army," he says, “is infested with discontent." The fact which directly led to it may serve as a case in point. General Gourko one day found a paper on his writingdesk, notifying him that the "Secret National Government" had passed sentence of death upon him. It so happened that only officers of the general staff and of the imperial guard had entered his house on that day, so that suspicion, of course, fastened upon them. The police, intrusted with the search of residences and persons, found, at last, compromising documents on one of the officers, and the result of this discovery was the publication of the decree just mentioned. So much as regards the army.

As to the number and social composition of the revolutionists we need only turn to official statements in the Russian press. Siberia, they say, is threatened with over-population. The colony of Semilashinsk received 3166 exiles within the months of January and February, 1879. Nine thousand arrested persons are on the road via Moscow to Siberia. No less than 58,000 have been transported there during the last three years.

The eleven prisons for the reception of convicts, namely, Irkoutsk, Tobolsk, Vilna, Perm, Pekow, Simbirsk, Iletskaja, Fastchita, Noroborisso, and Kharkoff, are so overcrowded that a regular service of deportation between Odessa and the island Saghalien has been established.

In Kieff ten prisoners were undergoing trial by court-martial in the early part of the month of April. Six of that number were females and only four males. Three of the latter were noblemen; and of the former, one was a lady of title and one the daughter of a privy councillor. Here is a fair specimen of the proportions in which sex and rank are mixed up among the conspirators, and it would be easy to multiply the instances. Suffice it to state, however, that the numbers as well as the rank of the revolutionists warrant the conclusion that Nihilism, pure and simple, could not have spread to such an extent as to produce the results before us. Additional to other reasons there is the fact that the Russian Government has certainly not been backward in resorting at once to measures of a sweeping character, and of the utmost severity against the Nihilists. Yet the situation is becoming graver and graver. From well-informed sources it appears that the revolutionists have adopted a new policy against the stern attitude of the government. This policy, we learn, consists chiefly in spreading terror and confusion in the large cities, and keeping the police incessantly on the "qui-vive." Herewith tallies the report of a proposed attack on the Winter Palace. It was a hoax, but so skilfully devised that the Grand Duke Nicholas remained for eight days with his suite in the building occupied by the general staff, and six or seven regiments were kept in readiness in their barracks, expecting an outbreak every moment. On another occasion, the "Third Section" received information that the blowing up of the gasometers was contemplated during the night, which proved another false alarm. Various corroborative accounts confirm, however, the belief that the revolutionists intended in all earnest to enact a "St. Bartholomew's night" in the capital on the 3d (15th) of June. The plan was frustrated by a timely discovery of it by the police, in consequence of which the authorities made most elaborate precautionary preparations. There seems to be no room to doubt but that these alone prevented the outbreak.

Now, all these facts have a meaning, and it is that the grievances of Russian society are not imaginary but real, grim, calamitous facts. Complaint is made that there is not one single section of the Russian world which does not revolt at the long-prevailing system of administrative corruption and grinding tyranny. The peasant class, it is maintained, suffers more than ever before. They are mercilessly pressed for arrears of taxes; they have been robbed of the lands which, as serfs, they cultivated for themselves under their former masters; they are plundered by those who have the management of their affairs; they are literally reduced to a state of wretchedness for which they find consolation only in drink.

The provincial police exercises more than ever an arbitrary and cruel power, and the peasantry after being beggared are thrown as a helpless proletariat on the world. They are forced in great numbers by compulsory drafts into the army, to be slaughtered on battlefields by the conspicuous inability of generals. In place of free institutions, which Russian society was led to expect at the beginning of the present reign, there is nothing but administrative tyranny and outrageous injustice. All individual rights and the rights of humanity are denied, and trampled upon with pitiless cruelty. The courts of justice are a mockery, the press is subservient to an odious government. Thousands have been imprisoned; the country has been drained of its money and of its resources. To this extreme of misery, malcontents declare, Russia has been brought during the present reign.

We are very far from giving implicit credence to all these statements. There is, doubtless, some exaggeration; but though exaggerated these utterances contain many grains of truth, and, therefore, we cannot afford to either disregard or dismiss them. If we readily concede that the stringency of the measures adopted by the Russian Government for the maintenance of order were justified, as is alleged, by the emergency, we ought to be no less ready to concede that the condition of the population which gave rise to this emergency must have been most deplorable. No doubt. the arbitrary rule of the present régime militaire of governors, invested with absolute power and responsible only to the Emperor, may convert many a peaceful subject of the crown into a secret foe by inflicting undeserved punishment upon the innocent. But we cannot give assent to a mode of reasoning which moves in a circle and explains the existence of seriously disturbed internal relations by the severity of certain measures of the Government, and then justifies this severity by pointing to those disturbed relations. Had not all classes of Russian society been suffering from arbitrary and irresponsible rule for generations; had they not borne a yoke heavier than that of slavery; had they not been driven to