however, properly deal with matters concerning conformity to statutory requirements. The situation now placed before me, as I understand it, is that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board does not question the constitutionality of the statute, but seeks an opinion merely because the Board contemplates the issuance, in the future, of the debentures authorized by the act, apparently conceiving that the views of the Attorney General upon the constitutionality of the statute may be a proper step in the plan. If I should undertake to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes authorizing the issuance of bonds and other obligations, buyers of these securities would probably soon come to insist upon. such an opinion in every case. The embarrassing consequences of yielding to such importunities have already been sufficiently considered. Such a departure from sound principles should not be countenanced. Moreover it has frequently been decided that it is not within the scope of the Attorney General's duty to render opinions for the guidance of private persons who engage in transactions with the United States and, aside from this, it is clear that the same. individual should not act as counsel for both buyer and seller. I quote from an opinion of August 27, 1892 (20 Op. 463, 464):

"The function of the Attorney-General is to advise the several heads of the other executive departments upon the questions of law which, in the administration of their respective Departments, they are required to decide.

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I know of no law which requires the Secretary of the Treasury to become the legal adviser of a party proposing to enter into a contract with the Government. The request here is made for the benefit of the proposed contractors to enable them to decide questions of interest in their business, and not to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to discharge a public duty. Repeatedly, as often as this question has been presented to my predecessors, it has been decided that the Attorney-General is not authorized to give an opinion in such a case, and I am constrained to follow these precedents, in which my judgment concurs."

Suggestions of the unconstitutionality of statutes always may be made by private persons, whether with or without foundation. Should the Attorney General undertake to render opinions to quiet such intimations (even assuming that his opinion could have that effect), and if each opinion rendered for that purpose should be made to serve as a reason for the rendering of another, it would set in motion an unfortunate train of circumstances.

I suggest, therefore, that in the present instance the request of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board be withdrawn. Respectfully,

HOMER CUMMINGS.

LEGALITY OF PROPOSED EXTENSIONS OF CERTAIN

AIR-MAIL ROUTES

It is discretionary with the Postmaster General, under the contract covering the carriage of mail on route FAM 9, to add Cordoba as an intermediate stop.

The Postmaster General is authorized under U. S. C., title 39, sec. 465, to arrange with the contractor carrying mail on routes FAM 9 and FAM 10 for the inauguration of additional service intermediate between the northern and southern termini of these routes.

The POSTMASTER GENERAL.

MARCH 31, 1937.

MY DEAR MR. POSTMASTER GENERAL: I have your letter of March 23 in which you request my opinion as to the legality of the institution and maintenance of certain air-mail schedules as hereinafter indicated.

By contract dated March 2, 1929, Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., undertook for 10 years to carry mail for the United States on route FAM 9 from Cristobal, Canal Zone, via designated intermediate points along the west coast of South America to Santiago, Chile, and return; and the contract contained the following provisions:

"3. That the Department may increase or decrease the number of intermediate stops, or the number of trips per week, and change the termini of the route, dispatch mail on any plane of the contractor flown over the route, and mod

ify or change the schedule as the needs of the service require; and the Department may also extend or curtail the route, with pro rata allowance or reduction of pay.

"4. That service on this route may be extended at the option of the Post Office Department from Santiago, Chile, by such intermediate points as the Postmaster General may determine, to Buenos Aires, Argentine, and Montevideo, Uruguay, at not exceeding pro rata allowance of additional pay."

By another contract, dated September 24, 1930, Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., undertook to carry mail for the United States, until January 8, 1939, on route FAM 10 from Paramaribo, Dutch Guiana, via designated intermediate points along the east coast of South America to Santos, Brazil, and return; and the contract contained the following provisions:

"That the Postmaster General may increase the frequency of service on this route to twice a week or a greater number of flights, and may extend the service to other points in South America or the West Indies, curtail the route to omit points, omit or embrace intermediate points, and reduce the number of flights."

It appears that route FAM 9 has heretofore been extended from Santiago to Buenos Aires and Montevideo, and that route FAM 10 has heretofore been extended from Santos to Montevideo and Buenos Aires, under the abovequoted provisions of the contracts.

It is now proposed to add Cordoba as a stop on route FAM 9, which would increase the mileage of that route by approximately 90 miles. This, I think, is discretionary with the Post Office Department. Cordoba, while off the direct line of flight, may be regarded as substantially intermediate between Santiago and Buenos Aires.

It is further proposed to inaugurate additional service from Arequipa (on route FAM 9) to Buenos Aires via La Paz and other points, and from Rio de Janeiro (on route FAM 10) to Buenos Aires via Asuncion and other points. The apparent purpose in each case is to provide service for interior points in Bolivia, Paraguay, and Argen

tina which may be regarded as intermediate between the northern and southern termini of routes 9 and 10 but off the line of those routes as now established and operated.

You state that "the contractor will become a concessionaire in all countries involved on route FAM 10 as well as route FAM 9," and your Solicitor has concluded that authority for the proposed extensions may therefore be found in the statutory provision (U. S. C., title 39, sec. 465a) "that the Postmaster General may make arrangements with concessionaires operating air-mail service in foreign countries for transportation by their service of mails of the United States and its possessions or Territories." I concur in this conclusion.

Your Solicitor also is of the opinion that the proposed extensions come within the provisions of the contracts hereinbefore set forth. Apparently this is the view of the contractor and it has indicated its willingness to perform the additional service. It might, indeed, allege breach of faith if you should advertise for proposals and award contracts to competitors to carry mail from Arequipa to Buenos Aires and from Rio de Janeiro to Buenos Aires via routes approximately paralleling those now established. It is to be borne in mind, however, that, if the proposed extensions of the service are within the terms of the contract, other like extensions could be made within the discretion of the Post Office Department, regardless of the willingness or unwillingness of the contractor, and the principle might be carried so far as to cover all South America with a veritable network of routes-all established under these two contracts, without any further competitive bidding. I think it is unnecessary, however, in the present instance, to consider further the extent of the undertaking of the contractor, under such contracts, in view of its willingness to perform the additional service and in view of the fact that you are clearly authorized to arrange with the contractor to perform this service as a concessionaire operating air-mail service in the countries affected.

Respectfully,

HOMER CUMMINGS.

STATUS OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MINIMUM WAGE LAW

The courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute; it remains on the statute books notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional; and if such decision is subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid from the date it became effective. The District of Columbia minimum-wage law, held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in a decision subsequently overruled, is now a valid act and may be administered in accordance with its terms. APRIL 3, 1937.

The PRESIDENT.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In answer to your request of April 2, 1937, for my opinion respecting the present status of the District of Columbia minimum-wage law, in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, overruling the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, I have the honor to advise you as follows:

The District of Columbia minimum-wage law was approved and became effective on September 18, 1918 (c. 174, 40 Stat. 960). The act provided for its administration by a Minimum Wage Board to be appointed by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia. It further provided for the organization of the Board and defined its powers and duties. The Board appointed under the statute, acting in pursuance thereof, issued its order prohibiting the employment in the District of Columbia of women or minor girls in certain industries at less than a prescribed wage per month. The Children's Hospital sought to enjoin the Board from enforcing its order against the hospital. An injunction issued was sustained by the Supreme Court in the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, decided April 9, 1923, on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional. The effect of this decision was to suspend the further enforcement of the act.

In the case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra, the Supreme Court said "Our conclusion is that the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra, should be, and it is, overruled."

The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that