But the more difficult part of our task consists in the form of induction, and the judgment to be made by it; for that form of the logicians which proceeds by simple enumeration, is a childish thing, concludes unsafely, lies open to contradictory instances, and regards only common matters, yet determines nothing: whilst the sciences require such a form of induction, as can separate, adjust, and verify experience, and come to a necessary determination by proper exclusions and rejections. Nor is this all; for we likewise lay the foundations of the sciences stronger and closer, and begin our inquiries deeper than men have hitherto done, bringing those things to the test which the common logic has taken upon trust. The logicians borrow the principles of the sciences from the sciences themselves, venerate the first notions of the mind, and acquiesce in the immediate informations of the senses, when rightly disposed; but we judge, that a real logic should enter every province of the sciences with a greater authority schemata are resolvable into propositions, and propositions into words, which, as he says, are but the tokens and signs of things. Now if these first notions, which are as it were the soul of words and the basis of every philosophic fabric, be hastily abstracted from things, and vague and not clearly defined and limited, the whole structure, whether erected by induction or deduction, or both, as is most frequently the case, must fall to the ground. The error, therefore, does not lie in the deductive mode of proof, without which physical science could never advance beyond its empirical stage, but in clothing this method in the vulgar language of the day, and reasoning upon its terms as if they pointed at some fact or antithesis in nature, instead of previously testing the accuracy of such expressions by experiment and observation. As such notions are more general than the individual cases out of which they arise, it follows that this inquiry must be made through the medium of induction, and the essential merit of Bacon lies in framing a system of rules by which this ascending scale of inference may be secured from error. As the neglect of this important preliminary to scientific investigation vitiated all the Aristotelian physics, and kept the human mind stationary for two thousand years, hardly too much praise can be conferred upon the philosopher who not only pointed out the gap but supplied the materials for its obliteration. The ardency of his nature, however, urged him to extremes, and he confounded the accuracy of the deductive method with the straw and stubble on which it attempted to erect a system of physics. In censuring intermediate propositions, Bacon appears to have been unaware that he was con. demning the only forms through which reason or inference can manifest issi¡, and lecturing mankind on the futility of an instrament which he was employing in every page of his book. E than their own principles can give; and that such su principles should be examined, till they become abs clear and certain. As for first notions of the mir suspect all those that the understanding, left to procures; nor ever allow them till approved and auth by a second judgment. And with respect to the inform of the senses, we have many ways of examining them; senses are fallacious, though they discover their own e but these lie near, whilst the means of discover remote. The senses are faulty in two respects, as they either deceive us. For there are many things that escap senses, though ever so rightly disposed; as by the subt the whole body, or the minuteness of its parts; the di of place; the slowness or velocity of motion; the co ness of the object, &c. Neither do the senses, when th hold of a thing, retain it strongly; for evidence, and formations of sense, are in proportion to a man, and proportion to the universe. And it is a grand error to that sense is the measure of things. C Hence b Bacon held, that every perception is nothing more than t sciousness of some body acting either interiorly or from witho that portion of the frame which is the point of contact. knowledge we have of the material world arises from the mov which it generates in our senses. These sensations simply in that a wide class of objects exist independent of ourselves, whic us in a certain manner, and do not convey into our minds the r perties of such objects so much as the effects of the relation in whi stand to our senses. Human knowledge thus becomes relativ that which we call the relation of objects to one another, is nothin than the reiation which they have to our organization. Hence a relations of objects, either internal or exterior to the mind vary, tions must vary along with them, and produce, even in the sam vidual, a crowd of impressions either conflicting or in some m opposed to each other. So far as these feelings concern mo is the business of ethics to bring them under the influence of and, selecting out of them such as are calculated to dignify and man's nature, to impart to them a trenchant and permanent cha As respects that portion which flow in upon the mind from the in world, it is the peculiar province of induction as reformed by our a to separate such as are illusory from the real, and to construct the latter a series of axioms, expressing in hierarchical gradatio general system of laws by which the universe is governed. Ed. The doctrine of the two last paragraphs may appear contrad to the opinion of some p...osophers, who maintain the infallibi To remedy this, we have from all quarters brought together, and fitted helps for the senses; and that rather by experiments than by instruments; apt experiments being much more subtile than the senses themselves, though assisted with the most finished instruments. We, therefore, lay no great stress upon the immediate and natural perceptions of the senses, but desire the senses to judge only of experiments, and experiments to judge of things: on which foundation, we hope to be patrons of the senses, and interpreters of their oracles. And thus we mean to procure the things relating to the light of nature, and the setting it up in the mind; which might well suffice, if the mind were as white paper. But since the minds of men are so strangely disposed, as not to receive the true images of things, it is necessary also that a remedy be found for this evil. The idols, or false notions, which possess the mind, are either acquired or innate. The acquired arise either from the opinions or sects of philosophers, or from preposterous laws of demonstration; but the innate cleave to the nature of the understanding, which is found much more prone to error than the senses. For however men may amuse themselves, and admire, or almost adore the mind, it is certain, that like an irregular glass, it alters the rays of things, by its figure, and different intersections. The two former kinds of idols may be extirpated, though with difficulty; but this third is insuperable. All that can be done, is to point them out, and mark, and convict that treacherous faculty of the mind; lest when the ancient errors are destroyed, new ones should sprout out from the rankness of the soil and, on the other hand, to establish this for ever, that the understanding can make no judgment but by the senses, as well as of reason; but the dispute perhaps turns rather upon words than things. Father Malbranche is express, that the senses never deceive us, yet as express that they should never be trusted, without being verified; charging the errors arising in this case upon human liberty, which makes a wrong choice. See "Recherches de la Vérité," liv. i. chaps. 5, 6, 7, 8. The difference may arise only from considering the senses in two different lights, viz. physically, or according to common use; and metaphysically, or abstractedly. The Novum Organum clears the whole. See also Marin Mersenus, "De la Vérité des Sciences." Ed. induction, and the just form thereof. Whence the do of purging the understanding requires three kinds of futations, to fit it for the investigation of truth; vi confutation of philosophies, the confutation of demonstr and the confutation of the natural reason. But when have been completed, and it has been clearly seen results are to be expected from the nature of things, a nature of the human mind, we shall have then furni nuptial couch for the mind and the universe, the goodness being our bridemaid. And let it be the pra our Epithalamium, that assistance to man may spring this union, and a race of discoveries, which will contrib his wants and vanquish his miseries. And this is the s part of the work. But as we propose not only to pave and show the but also to tread in it ourselves, we shall next exhib phenomena of the universe; that is, such experience kinds, and such a natural history, as may afford a found to philosophy. For as no fine method of demonstrati form of explaining nature, can preserve the mind error, and support it from falling; so neither can it receive any matter of science. Those, therefore, who mine not to conjecture and guess, but to find out and k not to invent fables and romances of worlds, but to look and dissect the nature of this real world, must consult things themselves. Nor can any force of genius, thoug argument, be substituted for this labour, search, an spection; not even though all the wits of men were un this, therefore, must either be had, or the business be des for ever. But the conduct of mankind has hitherto been such, it is no wonder nature has not opened herself to them. the information of the senses is treacherous and dece observation careless, irregular, and accidental; trac idle, rumorous, and vain; practice narrow and ser experience blind, stupid, vague, and broken; and na history extremely light and empty: wretched materia the understanding to fashion into philosophy and the scie Then comes in a preposterous subtilty of argumentation sifting, as a last remedy, that mends not the matter on nor separates the errors. Whence there are absolute hopes of enlarging and promoting the sciences, without rebuilding them. The first materials for this purpose must be taken from a new kind of natural history. The understanding must also have fit subjects to work upon, as well as real helps to work with. But our history, no less than our logic, differs from the common in many respects; particularly, 1. In its end, or office; 2. Its collection; 3. Its subtilty; 4. Its choice į and 5. Its appointment for what is to follow. Our natural history is not designed so much to please by its variety, or benefit by gainful experiments, as to afford light to the discovery of causes, and hold out the breasts to philosophy; for though we principally regard works, and the active parts of the sciences, yet we wait for the time of harvest, and would not reap the blade for the ear. We are well aware that axioms, rightly framed, will draw after them whole sheaves of works: but for that untimely and childish desire of seeing fruits of new works before the season, we absolutely condemn and reject it, as the golden apple that hinders the progress. With regard to its collection; we propose to show nature not only in a free state, as in the history of meteors, minerals, plants, and animals; but more particularly as she is bound, and tortured, pressed, formed, and turned out of her course by art and human industry. Hence we would set down all opposite experiments of the mechanic and liberal arts, with many others not yet formed into arts; for the nature of things is better discovered by the torturings of art, than when they are left to themselves. Nor is it only a history of bodies that we would give; but also of their cardinal virtues, or fundamental qualities; as density, rarity, heat, cold, &c., which should be comprised in particular histories. The kind of experiments to be procured for our history are much more subtile and simple than the common; akundance of them must be recovered from darkness, and are such as no one would have inquired after, that was not led by constant and certain tract to the discovery of causes; as being in themselves of no great use, and consequently not sought for their own sake, but with regard to works like the letters of the alphabet with regard to discourse. In the choice of our narratives and experiments we hope |