of philosophy, when being asked by Hiero who he was, he answered, "I am a looker-on; for as at the Olympic games some come to try for the prize, others to sell, others to meet their friends and be merry, but others again come merely as spectators, I am one of the latter." But men ought to know that in the theatre of human life it is only for God and angels to be spectators. Nor could any doubt about this matter have arisen in the Church, if a monastic life had been merely contemplative and unexercised in ecclesiastical duties, -as continual prayer, the sacrifice of vows, oblations to God, and the writing of theological books, for propagating the Divine law-as Moses retired in the solitude of the mount, and Enoch, the seventh from Adam, who, though the Scripture says he walked with God, intimating he was the first founder of the spiritual life, yet enriched the Church with a book of prophecies cited by St. Jude. But for a mere contemplative life, which terminates in itself, and sends out no rays either of heat or light into human society, theology knows it not.

It also determines the question that has been so velemently controverted between the schools of Zeno and Socrates on the one side, who placed felicity in virtue, simple or adorned, and many other sects and schools on the other, -as particularly the schools of the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who placed felicity in pleasure; thus making virtue a mere handmaid, without which pleasure could not be well served. Of the same side is also that other school of Epicurus, as on the reformed establishment, which declared felicity to be nothing but tranquillity and serenity of mind. With these also joined the exploded school of Pyrrho and Herillus, who placed felicity in an absolute exemption from scruples, and the allowing no fixed and constant nature of good and evil, but accounting all actions virtuous or vicious, as they proceed from the mind by a pure and undisturbed motion, or with aversion and reluctance. But it is plain that all things of this kind relate to private tranquillity and complacency gomind, and by no means to the good of communion.

it is a p

er Zeit."

worthy andccount of these sects, consult Ritter's "Geschichte der conservation as been revived in the Anabaptist heresy, who mea. e humours and instincts of the spirit and constancy : SEd.

Again, upon the foundation above laid we may confute the philosophy of Epictetus, which rests upon supposing feli city placed in things within our power, lest we should otherwise be exposed to fortune and contingence, as if it were not much happier to fail of success in just and honourable designs, when that failure makes for the public good, than to secure an uninterrupted enjoyment of those things which make only for our private fortune. Thus Gonsalvo at the head of his army, pointing to Naples, nobly protested he had much rather, by advancing a step, meet certain death, than by retiring a step prolong his life. And to this agrees the wise king, who pronounces "a good conscience to be a continual feast;"a thereby signifying that the consciousness of good intentions, however unsuccessful, affords a joy more real, pure, and agreeable to nature, than all the other means that can be furnished, either for obtaining one's desires or quieting the mind.

It likewise censures that abuse which prevailed about the time of Epictetus, when philosophy was turned into a certain art or profession of life, as if its design were not to compose and quiet troubles, but to avoid and remove the causes and occasions thereof, whence a particular regimen was to be entered into for obtaining this end, by introducing such a kind of health into the mind as was that of Herodicus in the body, mentioned by Aristotle, whilst he did nothing all his life long but take care of his health, and therefore abstained from numberless things, which almost deprived him of the use of his body; whereas, if men were determined to perform the duties of society, that kind of bodily health is most desirable which is able to suffer and support all sorts of attacks and alterations. In the same manner, that mind is truly sound and strong which is able to break through numerous and great temptations and disorders; whence Diogenes seems to have justly commended the habit which did not warily abstain, but courageously sustain,"—which could check the sallies of the soul on the steepest precipice, and make it, like a well-broken horse, stop and turn at the shortest warning.

Lastly, it reproves that delicacy and unsociable temper Rhet. i. 5, 10.

Enchir. Arrian. i.

Prov. IV. 15.
Summa Stoic. Philos.

observed in some of the most ancient philosophers of great repute, who too effeminately withdrew from civil affairs, in order to prevent indignities and trouble to themselves, and live the more free and unspotted in their own opinions; as to which point the resolution of a true moralist should be such as Gonsalvo required of a soldier,-viz., "Not to weave his honour so fine, as for everything to catch and rend it.”

CHAPTER II.

Division of Individual Good into Active and Passive. That of Passive Good into Conservative and Perfective. Good of the Commonwealth divided into General and Respective.

WE divide individual or self-good into active and passive. This difference of good is also found impressed upon the nature of all things, but principally shows itself in two appetites of the creatures; viz.,-1. That of self-preservation and defence; and, 2. That of multiplying and propagating. The latter, which is active, seems stronger and more worthy than the former, which is passive; for throughout the universe the celestial nature is the principal agent, and the terrestrial the patient; and in the pleasures of animals that of generation is greater than that of feeding; and the Scripture says, "It is more blessed to give than to receive."a And even in common life, no man is so soft and effeminate, as not to prefer the performing and perfecting of anything he had set his mind upon before sensual pleasures. The pre-eminence of active good is also highly exalted from the consideration of the state of mankind, which is mortal and subject to fortune; for if perpetuity and certainty could be had in human pleasures, this would greatly enhance them; but as the case now stands, when we count it a happiness to die late, when we cannot boast of to-morrow, when we know not what a day may bring forth, no wonder if we earnestly endeavour after such things as elude the injuries of time: and these can be no other than our works. Accordingly it is said, “Their works follow them."b

Another considerable pre-eminence of active good is given

it, and supported by that inseparable affection of human nature-the love of novelty or variety. But this affection is greatly limited in the pleasures of the senses, which make the greatest part of passive good. To consider how often the same things come over in life,—as meals, sleep, and diversion,-it might make not only a resolute, a wretched, or a wise, but even a delicate person wish to die. But in actions, enterprises, and desires, there is a remarkable variety, which we perceive with great pleasure, whilst we begin, advance, rest, go back to recruit, approach, obtain, &c.: whence it is truly said, "That life without pursuit is a vague and languid thing;" and this holds true both of the wise and unwise indifferently. So Solomon says, "Even a brain-sick man seeks to satisfy his desire, and meddles in everything." And thus the most potent princes, who have all things at command, yet sometimes choose to pursue low and empty desires, which they prefer to the greatest affluence of sensual pleasures: thus Nero delighted in the harp, Commodus in fencing, Antonius in racing, &c. So much more pleasing is it to be active than in possession!

It must, however, be well observed, that active, individual good differs entirely from the good of communion, notwithstanding they may sometimes coincide; for although this individual active good often produces works of beneficence, which is a virtue of communion, yet herein they differ, that these works are performed by most men, not with a design to assist or benefit others, but wholly for their own gratification or honour, as plainly appears when active good falls upon anything contrary to the good of communion; for that gigantic passion wherewith the great disturbersf of the world are carried away, as in the case of Sylla and others, who would render all their friends happy and all their enemies miserable, and endeavour to make the world carry their image, which is really warring against heaven,-this passion, I say, aspires to an active individual good, at least in appear• Seneca. d Seneca, Epist. xxiv. § 23-25. e Prov. xxi. 25. So Barrow, "Sermon iii. on Redemption." There are some personз of that wicked and gigantic disposition, contracted by evil practice, that should one offer to instruct them in truth or move them to piety, would exclaim with Polyphemus

Νήπιός εἰς, ὦ ξεῖν, ἢ τηλόθεν ειλήλουθας,

"Ος με θεοὺς κέλεαι ἢ δειδίμεν, ἢ ἀλέασθαι.—Odyss. ix. 273

ance, though it be infinitely different from the goou c munion.

We divide passive good into conservative and perfective; for everything has three kinds of appetite with regard to its own individual good,—the first to preserve itself, the second to perfect itself, and the third to multiply and diffuse itself The last relates to active good, of which we have spoken already; and of the other two the perfective is the most excellent; for it is a less matter to preserve a thing in its state, and a greater to exalt its nature. But throughout the universe are found some nobler natures, to the dignity and excellence whereof inferior ones aspire, as to their origins;— whence the poet said well of mankind, that "they have an ethereal vigour and a celestial origin:"

"Igneus est ollis vigor et cœlestis origo;" s

for the perfection of the human form consists in approaching the Divine or angelic nature. The corrupt and preposterous imitation of this perfective good is the pest of human life, and the storm that overturns and sweeps away all things, whilst men, instead of a true and essential exaltation, fly with blind ambition only to a local one; for as men in sickness toss and roll from place to place, as if by change of situation they could get away from themselves, or fly from the disease, so in ambition, men hurried away with a false imagination of exalting their own nature, obtain no more than change of place or eminence of post.

Conservative good is the receiving and enjoying things agreeable to our nature; and this good, though it be the most simple and natural, yet of all others it seems the lowest and most effeminate. It is also attended with a difference, about which the judgment of mankind has been partly unsettled and the inquiry partly neglected; for the dignity and recommendation of the good of fruition or pleasure, as it is commonly called, consists either in the reality or strength thereof, the one being procured by uniformity, and the other by variety. The one has a less mixture of evil, the other a stronger and more lively impression of good: which of these is the best, is the question; but whether human nature be not capable of both at once, has not been examined.

See Virgil, Eneid, vi. 730.