images of the mind; that at length we might make sure and certain discoveries for the benefit of poste And if we shall have effected anything to the purpose, led us to it was a true and genuine humiliation of mind. T who before us applied themselves to the discovery of having just glanced upon things, examples, and experime immediately, as if invention was but a kind of contempla raised up their own spirits to deliver oracles: whereas method is continually to dwell among things soberly, wit abstracting or setting the understanding farther from t than makes their images meet; which leaves but little v for genius and mental abilities. And the same hum that we practise in learning, the same we also observ teaching, without endeavouring to stamp a dignity on of our inventions, by the triumphs of confutation, the tions of antiquity, the producing of authorities, or the n of obscurity; as any one might do, who had rather lustre to his own name, than light to the minds of oth We offer no violence, and spread no nets for the judgm of men, but lead them on to things themselves, and t relations; that they may view their own stores, what t have to reason about, and what they may add, or proc for the common good. And if at any time ourselves h erred, mistook, or broke off too soon, yet as we only prop to exhibit things naked, and open, as they are, our er may be the readier observed, and separated, before they o siderably infect the mass of knowledge; and our labours the more easily continued. And thus we hope to establ for ever a true and legitimate union between the expe mental and rational faculty, whose fallen and inauspici divorces and repudiations have disturbed everything in family of mankind. But as these great things are not at our disposal, we he at the entrance of our work, with the utmost humility a fervency, put forth our prayers to God, that remembering t miseries of mankind, and the pilgrimage of this life, whe we pass but few days and sorrowful, he would vouchsa through our hands, and the hands of others, to whom he h given the like mind, to relieve the human race by a new a of his bounty. We likewise humbly beseech him, that wh is human may not clash with what is divine; and that whe the ways of the senses are opened, and a greater natural light set up in the mind, nothing of incredulity and blindness towards divine mysteries may arise; but rather that the understanding, now cleared up, and purged of all vanity and superstition, may remain entirely subject to the divine. oracles, and yield to faith, the things that are faith's: and lastly, that expelling the poisonous knowledge infused by the serpent, which puffs up and swells the human mind, we may neither be wise above measure, nor go beyond the bounds of sobriety, but pursue the truth in charity. We now turn ourselves to men, with a few wholesome admonitions and just requests. And first, we admonish them to continue in a sense of their duty, as to divine matters; for the senses are like the sun, which displays the face of the earth, but shuts up that of the heavens: and again, that they run not into the contrary extreme, which they certainly will do, if they think an inquiry into nature any way forbid them by religion. It was not that pure and unspotted natural knowledge whereby Adam gave names to things, agreeable to their natures, which caused his fall; but an ambitious and authoritative desire of moral knowledge, to judge of good and evil, which makes men revolt from God, and obey no laws but those of their own will. But for the sciences, which contemplate nature, the sacred philosopher declares, "It is the glory of God to conceal a thing, but the glory of a king to find it out."d As if the Divine Being thus indulgently condescended to exercise the human mind by philosophical inquiries. In the next place, we advise all mankind to think of the true ends of knowledge, and that they endeavour not after it for curiosity, contention, or the sake of despising others, nor yet for profit, reputation, power, or any such inferior consideration, but solely for the occasions and uses of life; all along conducting and perfecting it in the spirit of benevo lence. Our requests are,-1. That men do not conceive we here deliver an opinion, but a work; and assure themselves we attempt not to found any sect or particular doctrine, but to fix an extensive basis for the service of numan nature. 2. That, for their own sakes, they lay aside the zeal and • Prov. xxv. 2. prejudices of opinions, and endeavour the common g and that being, by our assistance, freed and kept clear the errors and hinderances of the way, they would thems also take part of the task. 3. That they do not despai imagining our project for a grand restoration, or advancer of all kinds of knowledge, infinitely beyond the powe mortals to execute; whilst in reality, it is the genuine and prevention of infinite error. Indeed, as our stat mortal, and human, a full accomplishment cannot be expe in a single age, and must therefore be commended posterity. Nor could we hope to succeed, if we arroga searched for the sciences in the narrow cells of the hu understanding, and not submissively in the wider w 4. In the last place, to prevent ill effects from content we desire mankind to consider how far they have a r to judge our performance, upon the foundations laid down for we reject all that knowledge which is hastily abstracted from things, as vague, disorderly, and formed; and we cannot be expected to abide by a judgm which is itself called in question. DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORK. 1. Survey and Extension of the Sciences; or, the Advancemen Learning. 2. Novum Organum; or, Precepts for the Interpretation of Nature 3. Phenomena of the Universe; or, Natural and Experimental Histo on which to found Philosophy. 4. Ladder of the Understanding. 5. Precursors, or Anticipators, of the Second Philosophy. 3. Second Philosophy; or, Active Science. WE divide the whole of the work into six parts: the fi whereof gives the substance, or general description of t knowledge which mankind at present possess ; choosing dwell a little upon things already received, that we may t easier perfect the old, and lead on to new; being equally i clined to cultivate the discoveries of antiquity, as to stri out fresh paths of science. In classing the sciences, we con prehend not only the things already invented and known, but also those omitted and wanted; for the intellectual globe, as well as the terrestrial, has both its frosts and deserts. It is therefore no wonder if we sometimes depart from the common divisions. For an addition, whilst it alters the whole, must necessarily alter the parts, and their sections; whereas the received divisions are only fitted to the received sum of the sciences, as it now stands. With regard to the things we shall note as defective; it will be our method to give more than the bare titles, or short heads of what we desire to have done; with particular care, where the dignity or difficulty of the subject requires it, either to lay down the rules for effecting the work, or make an attempt of our own, by way of example, or pattern, of the whole. For it concerns our own character, no less than the advantage of others, to know that a mere capricious idea has not presented the subject to our mind, and that all we desire and aim at is a wish. For our designs are within the power of all to compass, and we ourselves have certain and evident demonstrations of their utility. We come not hither, as augurs, to measure out regions in our mind by divination, but like generals, to invade them for conquest. And this is the first part of the work. When we have gone through the ancient arts, we shall prepare the human understanding for pressing on beyond them. The second object of the work embraces the doctrine of a more perfect use of reason, and the true helps of the intellectual faculties, so as to raise and enlarge the powers of the mind; and, as far as the condition of humanity allows, to fit it to conquer the difficulties and obscurities of nature. The thing we mean, is a kind of logic, by us called The Art of interpreting Nature; as differing widely from the common logic, which, however, pretends to assist and direct the understanding, and in that they agree: but the difference betwixt them consists in three things, viz., the end, the order of demonstrating, and the grounds of inquiry. The end of our new logic is to find, not arguments, but arts; not what agrees with principles, but principles themselves: not probable reasons, but plans and designs of worksa different intention producing a different effect. In one the adversary is conquered by dispute, and in the other nature by works. The nature and order of the demonstr agree with this object. For in common logic, almos whole labour is spent upon the syllogism. Logicians hit appear scarcely to have noticed induction, passing it with some slight comment. But we reject the syllo method as being too confused, and allowing nature to e out of our hands. For though nobody can doubt that things which agree with the middle term agree with other, nevertheless, there is this source of error, t syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words words are but the token and signs of things. Now, i first notions, which are, as it were, the soul of words the basis of every philosophical fabric, are hastily abstr from things, and vague and not clearly defined and lin the whole structure falls to the ground. We ther reject the syllogism, and that not only as regards principles, to which logicians do not apply them, but also respect to intermediate propositions, which the syllogism trives to manage in such a way as to render barren in e unfit for practice, and clearly unsuited to the active br of the sciences. Nevertheless, we would leave to the s gism, and such celebrated and applauded demonstrat their jurisdiction over popular and speculative acts; whi everything relating to the nature of things, we make u induction for both our major and minor propositions we consider induction as that form of demonstration w closes in upon nature and presses on, and, as it were, m itself with action. Whence the common order of den strating is absolutely inverted; for instead of flying im diately from the senses, and particulars, to generals, a certain fixed poles, about which disputes always turn, deriving others from these by intermediates, in a sh indeed, but precipitate manner, fit for controversy, but u to close with nature; we continually raise up propositi by degrees, and in the last place, come to the most gen axioms, which are not notional, but well defined, and w nature allows of, as entering into the very essence of thin This passage, though tersely and energetically expressed, is foun upon a misconception of deduction, or, as Bacon phrases it, syllogi reasoning, and its relation to induction. The two processes are o reverse methods of inferences, the one concluding from a general t particular, and the other from a particular to a general, and b |