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intellect, to the exclusion of sense, the faculty of scientific knowledge; and ideas or universals the sole objects of philosophical investigation. The Platonic philosophy, called, in this aspect of it, dialectic, had for its object of investigation the true nature of that connection which exists between each thing and the archetypal form or idea which makes it what it is, and to awaken the soul to a full remembrance of what had been known prior to being imprisoned in the body.
Aristotle made a great advance beyond Plato, towards correlating the a priori and a posteriori elements of our knowledge. He rejected the Platonic doctrine of ideas, as universals existing anterior to and separate from singulars; and thereby ignored the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. Still he did not extricate himself out of the difficulties which environed the problem of human knowledge. He seems to have believed in the existence of universals or forms, not apart from, but in, particulars or singulars. And, to correspond with this metaphysical doctrine, he made both intellect and sense important faculties in science. He maintained an a priori knowledge paramount to, but not exclusive of the a posteriori: that while universals are known through the intellect, and implicitly contain particulars or singulars, yet we may be ignorant of the singulars or particulars, until realised in and through sense; and that, therefore, though all knowing is through previous knowledge, yet the investigation of particulars is not superfluous; because, while we may know the universal, we may be ignorant of the particular. Therefore intellect and sense combine in framing the fabric of our knowledge.
The Aristotelic method of investigation is therefore twofold, deductive and inductive; the first allied with intellect and with universals, the latter allied with sense and with particular. Aristotle, in accordance with this doctrine of method, seems to have considered syllogism proper, or deduction, no less ampliative than induction, that deductive inference did in some way assure us, or fortify our assurance, of real truth. We greatly doubt whether he discriminated at all the difference between formal and material inference; we think that he rather referred all difference in the cogency of inference to the difference of necessity or contingency in the matter. He, strangely enough, maintains for the syllogism proper the power to deduce true conclusions from false premises. Therefore the syllogistic inference is not wholly dependent on the premises; and consequently, deduction is not dependent on induction, whose office it is to supply the premises.
This logical doctrine of Aristotle corresponds with his metaphysical and his psychological doctrine. As he makes universals the paramount object of science, and intellect its
paramount principle; so does he make syllogism the paramount process, and induction the inferior process in logic: for though intellect is not with him, as with Plato, the sole principle of science, but conjunct with sense, yet sense is logically subordinate to intellect. There are, according to his theory of knowledge, certain universal principles of knowledge existing in the mind, rather as native generalities than as mere necessities of so thinking, which furnish the propositions for syllogism; therefore syllogism is not dependent for these on induction. It is nevertheless true, that, according to the Aristotelic theory, there is perfect harmony between intellect and sense, between syllogism and induction. And though syllogism is the more intellectual, the more scientific, yet induction can be legitimately used as corroborative and complemental of syllogism, and particularly by weak minds, who can discern the universal in the particulars, but cannot apprehend it a priori as a native generality. It was because of this theory of knowledge that induction holds so subordinate and inferior a place in the Aristotelic logic.
Whether our account of Aristotle's theory of knowledge be the true one or not, for there is much obscurity over his doctrine, it is nevertheless certain that Aristotle had a very imperfect insight into induction as an objective process of investigation. And the slighting manner in which he passes induction over shows how little he appreciated it. He has made a crude and superficial distinction, which has been perpetuated to this day, between the universals derived from induction and universals derived from similars. In other words, he has correlated induction and analogy as different kinds of reasoning. And all writers on logic, including, we suspect, even Sir William Hamilton, still speak of reasoning by induction, and reasoning by analogy. This, it seems to us, is a great confusion and error. We make induction the process, and analogy or similarity the evidence by which the illation is warranted. That analogy which is the mere resemblance of relations has nothing to do with philosophy, but only that analogy which consists of an essential resemblance or similarity. The tendency to generalise our knowledge by the judgment, that where partial resemblance is found total resemblance will be found, is an original principle of our intelligence, and may be called the principle of philosophical presumption. Upon this principle the objective process of induction is founded, by which we conclude from something observed to something not observed,—from something within the sphere of experience to something without its sphere. This principle of philosophical presumption is brought to bear under two objective laws: the first proclaims, One in many, therefore one in all; the
second proclaims, Many in one, therefore all in one. Through the first law, we conclude from a certain attribute being possessed by many similar things, or things of the same class, that the same attribute is possessed by all similar things, or things of the same class. Through the second law, we conclude from the partial similarity of two or more things in some respects, to their complete or total similarity. Both laws conclude to unity in totality; by the first, from the recognised unity in plurality; by the second, from the recognised plurality in unity. Both of the laws, it is very apparent, are phases of the principle of resemblance or analogy. To call the first of these laws induction, and the second analogy, as has been done, destroys the correspondence between abstract or pure, and concrete or applied logic. In abstract or pure logic, induction is recognised, but analogy not; therefore analogy cannot rest on the same basis with induction in concrete or applied logic, else, like induction, it would have its counterpart in abstract logic.
The theory of knowledge which we have expounded as his, in which the a priori element is so paramount to the a posteriori, prevented Aristotle from having any but the shallowest insight into the scope of induction. The inevitable result of this was, to make him slight observation through sense, and to rely chiefly on deduction from principles supplied by the intellect. This was the cardinal vice of Plato, and also of Aristotle, but not nearly to so great an extent. The philosophy, therefore, of Aristotle, is rather the result of an analysis of the contents of language, than a product of an original observation of nature. The philosophy of Bacon is just the reverse -it is a product of the observation of nature, and not an analysis of the contents of language. One of the chief precautions of the Novum Organum is, that language is but the registry of the crude notions of imperfect observation, and consequently that nature herself must be interpreted to ascertain the truth. The logic of Aristotle was designed more for evolving, sifting, and methodising, what had already been thought, than for conducting new investigations. The great purpose of Bacon was, to bring philosophy from books and tradition to nature, from words to things, from the syllogism to induction.
The true excellence of the Aristotelic logic, therefore, consists in its being considered formal, and not material. In this view, the Organon of Aristotle is conversant about the laws under which the subject thinks, while the Novum Organum of Bacon is conversant about the laws under which the object is to be known. Viewed in this aspect, the two logics, though contrariant, are not antagonistic, but are the complements of each other. The Aristotelic without the Baconian is null; the
Baconian without the Aristotelic is deficient. The Baconian supplies the material of the Aristotelic; and while the truth of science is wholly dependent on the Baconian, its logical perfection is wholly dependent on the Aristotelic. The transition, in thinking, from the Baconian to the Aristotelic is as follows: The process of induction, as founded on probability, is relative, but its conclusion is absolute. Similarities or analogies retain their character of difference and plurality in the inductive process, but become one and identical in the conclusion, or class, into which they are combined by an act of abstraction and generalization. This conclusion becomes the premise of deduction. It is then within the domain of formal logic.
That Sir William Hamilton has done much to reconcile the Aristotelic logic with the Baconian, by purifying the theory of both, and showing their interdependence, by developing that side of the Aristotelic which lies next to particulars and induction (for all his additions to logic are such), must be admitted by those who can appreciate his writings. And nowhere in the history of philosophy is there a definition of induction which reaches so thoroughly to the heart of the thing, the essential nature of the philosophical inference of the universal from the singular, as that which Sir William has given to discriminate the Baconian from the Aristotelic, the material from the formal. His definition is this: "A material illation of the universal from the singular, warranted either by the general analogies of nature, or by special presumptions afforded by the object matter of any real science." This definition shows that the inductive process of Bacon is governed by the laws, not of the thinking subject, ratione forma, but by the laws of the object to be known, vi materiæ. This definition, though only used to discriminate negatively the Aristotelic or formal induction, sheds so much light on the Baconian induction, as to entitle Sir William Hamilton to the praise of having contributed to a true theoretic exposition of the Baconian method, by showing the ultimate basis of its validity, in disclosing the nature of the determining antecedent and the determined illation. The determining antecedent is shown to be the analogies of nature, which afford presumptions varying in all degrees of probability, from the lowest to the highest certainty, that what is found in the singulars observed is in all the singulars. The physical observer asserts, on the, analogy of his science, that as some horned animals ruminate, all horned animals ruminate. The logician accepts the conelusion, all horned animals ruminate, and brings it under the laws of thought, and considers the some of the physical observer as equivalent to his all. Sir William thus extricates the theory
of material induction from the syllogistic fetters in which the logicians had entangled it. His design was, however, by no means to exalt the dominion of Bacon; but rather, all his labours are designed to draw the age from its one-sided culture -its too exclusive devotion to physics. We, therefore, standing as we do at the Baconian point of view of philosophy, step forward to hail the expositions of Sir William Hamilton, and concatenate them with the philosophy of Bacon. So that the Baconian philosophy, in the future, may cease to be "the dirt philosophy" which some of its heretical disciples have made it, and may embrace all the grand problems of thought which Sir William Hamilton has brought within the philosophy of common sense, and which Bacon certainly intended his philosophy to embrace.
ART. II.-Bible Principles on the Subject of Temperance.*
We wish to ascertain, by a candid investigation of the Scriptures, what are the true rules by which men are to be guided in relation to the great subject of temperance, both in regard to the use and traffic of intoxicating liquors. The world has been tremendously agitated on this subject for the last twenty years. The awful ravages of intemperance on private and public interests have excited, and continue to excite, the intense investigations of moralists, and more latterly of politicians, as to the causes, operation, and consequences, of this vice, and the principles of policy by which it is to be checked. The most prodigious efforts have been made, the pulpit and the public forum, the press and the arm of the law, have all been put into requisition. Associations of various forms, and of the most extensive ramifications, have been formed; large amounts of capital have been invested in the agencies and conduct of the reform; and high qualities of intellect and private virtue have been enlisted in its advocacy. A degree of interest so intense, producing efforts so vast and complicated, has necessarily accomplished a great deal of good; and like all other enterprises in the hands of fallible beings, and in a world like ours, although substantially good in themselves, it has also done a great deal of incidental evil.
The doctrines by which the great effort to extinguish the vice
This article is directed chiefly against some very extreme views which have been broached in the United States on the subject of the use of intoxicating liquors. We are disposed to go somewhat farther than the author in urging upon grounds of expediency the practice of total abstinence, especially on the young.-ED. B. F. E. R.