certain technical senses relating habitually either to grammar, music, medicine, mathematics, or chemistry. Secondly, it is employed here only with respect to various drugs, and may be appropriately understood as those called upon to deal in drugs would naturally understand it. The chemical definition of 'derivative' is thus given in Webster's International Dictionary:

"A substance so related to another substance by modification or partial substitution as to be regarded as derived from it; thus, the amido compounds are derivatives of ammonia, and the hydrocarbons are derivatives of methane, benzene, etc.'

แ "The corresponding definition of the verb 'derive' is:

"To obtain one substance from another by actual or theoretical substitution; as to derive an organic acid from its corresponding hydrocarbon.'

"Applying this definition to the subject matter of discussion, I can answer your first question only by saying that, in my opinion, acetphenetidine is to be considered a 'derivative' of acetanilid, if it is so related to the latter substance that it would be rightly regarded by recognized authorities in chemistry as obtained from the latter 'by actual or theoretical substitution'; and it is not indispensable that it should be actually produced therefrom as a matter of fact."

The statement last above quoted is explicity supported by the chemical definition of "derivative" given in the latest edition of Webster's International Dictionary (1925), which is as follows:

"6. Chem. A substance so related to another substance by modification or partial substitution as to be regarded as derived from it, even when not obtainable from it in practice; thus, the amido compounds are derivatives of ammonia; toluene, C.H,CH,, is a metyl derivative of benzene C.H (that is, it may be regarded as benzene in which methyl has been substituted for a hydrogen atom)."

The opinion quoted above appears to have been approved in United States v. Antikamnia Co., 231 U. S. 654, 662-663.

As in the Food and Drugs Act, the word "derivative" in the Federal Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act is employed "with respect to various drugs and may be ap

propriately understood as those called upon to deal in drugs would naturally understand it." If, as seems to be uncontroverted, tropacocaine hydrochloride, as a matter of scientific definition, is a "salt, derivative, or preparation of opium, coca leaves, or cocaine," using those terms in their chemical sense, any specific quantity of that drug is a "narcotic drug" within the meaning of the statute. It is not indispensable that it should be actually produced or derived, in the commercial or popular sense, from opium, coca leaves, or cocaine in order to bring it under the ban of the statute.

These conclusions seem to be fortified by the way the statute would apply in the case of cocaine. Cocaine is included by name in the definition of a "narcotic drug." Section 1 (a). No distinction is made in the Act between cocaine which occurs in nature as an alkaloid in coca leaves and cocaine which may be manufactured synthetically from a different substance. Since synthetic cocaine is a "narcotic drug" that falls under the ban of the statute, it is a fair inference that Congress intended a like result in the case of synthetic substitutes for the other drugs that admittedly fall under the ban of the statute. It does not militate against this inference that such other drugs are not specifically referred to in the Act by name. They are identified just as definitely as if they had been named and there is no reason to believe that Congress intended that drugs named generically should be treated any differently from drugs named specifically. It is not denied that tropacocaine hydrochloride is a "narcotic drug" if it is produced from coca leaves or cocaine. Tropacocaine hydrochloride that is produced from other substances is none the less tropacocaine hydrochloride. There would be no question that the ten boxes of the drug involved in your question would fall under the ban of the statute if tropacocaine hydrochloride, like cocaine, had been specifically named. In my opinion the statute should be construed as if it were specifically named.

The principle applicable here is that all laws are to be given a sensible construction. A construction or literal application of a statute which would lead to absurd conse

quences should be avoided whenever a reasonable construction or application can be given to it consistent with the legislative purpose. United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 357; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, 212. Cf. also Danovitz v. United States, 281 U. S. (decided May 5, 1930).

The construction advanced by the claimant, if adopted, would lead to difficulties of administration, evasions and frustration of the statute, and absurd consequences. Tropacocaine hydrochloride may be actually and physically derived from coca leaves or cocaine and possibly coal tar or some other substance as the source or starting point. Yet when created it is impossible, so I am informed, to determine by an examination of the finished product from which substance it was actually produced. Primary evidence of the method of production of narcotic drugs offered for import would generally have to be obtained abroad, or secondary evidence of facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer would have to be accepted without adequate means of verification. If, to take only one narcotic as an example, tropacocaine hydrochloride that is obtained from coal tar could be imported without restriction and only tropacocaine hydrochloride that is obtained from coca leaves or cocaine should be excluded, it is obvious that the purpose of the statute would be frustrated. Such an interpretation would lead to the apparently absurd result that of two shipments of a drug which are indistinguishable, one would fall under the ban of the statute and the other be exempt.

The following expressions of the Supreme Court relating to the Food and Drugs Act in the case of United States v. Antikamnia Co., supra, pages 667-668, are pertinent here: "The purpose of the law is the ever insistent consideration in its interpretation. The purpose is to prevent the surreptitious sale of certain noxious drugs or their derivatives, the latter supposedly partaking of the quality of parent article and as effective of evil consequences. This being the purpose, did the law leave it unexecuted? We can not attribute to it such defect, and a serious defect it might be. Nor can we consider as a case of omission that which involves so definitely the mischief which was intended

to be redressed and which is fairly within the language of the law."

For the reasons stated, I have the honor to advise you. that the restrictive interpretation of the Act advanced by the claimant should be rejected, and that even if the data furnished by the claimant proved that the specific quantity of tropacocaine hydrochloride, to which your question relates, was not in fact obtained from opium, coca leaves, or cocaine, it would nevertheless be unlawful to import the same into the United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction.

The conclusions herein reached seem to require an amendment of Article 1 (d) of the Regulations approved by the Federal Narcotic Control Board which took effect on April 1, 1928.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

CONTRACTS UNDER BOULDER CANYON PROJECT ACT

The contract for lease of power privilege, under section 4 (b) of the Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1059), herein set forth, between the United States, the City of Los Angeles, its Department of Water and Power, and the Southern California Edison Company, Ltd., is a valid agreement which is binding upon the said Edison Company, and also upon the City of Los Angeles and its said department to the extent to which funds are available under the provisions of the charter to that department. All the requirements of section 4 (b) of the Boulder Canyon Project Act which are made conditions precedent to the appropriation of money, the making of contracts, and the commencement of work for the construction of a dam and power plant in Boulder Canyon have been fully met and performed by the Secretary of the Interior in securing contracts which in his judgment are adequate for the purposes specified in said section of the Act.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 9, 1930.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication of June 6, 1930, transmitting a letter dated June 6, 1930, from the Secretary of the Interior, advising that, as required by section 4 (b) of the Boulder Canyon

Project Act (45 Stat. 1057), a contract has been secured with the City of Los Angeles, its Department of Water and Power, and the Southern California Edison Company, Ltd., which will provide revenue adequate in his judgment to pay operation and maintenance costs and insure the repayment to the United States within fifty years from the completion of the dam, power plant and related works, of all amounts to be advanced for the construction of such works, together with the interest thereon made reimbursable by the Act, and that in addition two contracts have been secured with the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California which will provide additional revenues for such purpose, and requesting that the opinion of the Attorney General be obtained as to whether or not these contracts comply with all the requirements of section 4 (b) of the Boulder Canyon Project Act which are by that section made conditions precedent to the appropriation of money, the making of contracts and the commencement of work for the construction of a dam and power plant in Boulder Canyon.

Responsive to your request for my opinion upon these questions, I have the honor to advise you as follows:

Section 4 (b) of the Boulder Canyon Project Act provides:

"(b) Before any money is appropriated for the construction of said dam or power plant, or any construction work done or contracted for, the Secretary of the Interior shall make provision for revenues by contact, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, adequate in his judgment to insure payment of all expenses of operation and maintenance of said works incurred by the United States and the repayment, within fifty years from the date of the completion of said works, of all amounts advanced to the fund under subdivision (b) of section 2 for such works, together with interest thereon made reimbursable under this Act."

The contracts in question are:

(1) A contract dated April 26, 1930, between the United States of America and the City of Los Angeles and the Southern California Edison Company, Ltd., entitled “Contract for Lease of Power Privilege" as amended by supplemental contract dated May 28, 1930.