exigency, shall be made by advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals respecting the same. The lack of uni formity in the statutes, and of specific provisions in the statute we are considering, together with the other language of the Act, makes clear the purpose of Congress to leave the method of advertising for bids as a detail within the discretion of the Postmaster General. In my opinion the procedure followed was, as to method and length of time, well within that discretion. It was in accordance with methods and practice which had been generally followed by the Post Office Department. The real question in the case is whether the contract is void because the advertisement for bids and the reception of the bids took place before the passage of the statute authorizing the making of the contract. The purpose of Congress in requiring that contracts shall be let after public advertisement is to procure open competition. Any course of action which has the effect of defeating that purpose would be contrary to law. The argument now made against the validity of this contract is that persons who might otherwise have entered the competition and submitted bids may have been deterred from so doing by uncertainty as to whether the bill, which would enable the Postmaster General to make a contract in accordance with the advertisement, would be passed. In my opinion, it cannot be said, as matter of law, that advertising for bids before the enactment of a statute authorizing the contract necessarily renders void the contract let after the required statutory authority is obtained. Whether the purpose of the statute requiring real competitive bidding is defeated by such procedure depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. A case may well be imagined where uncertainty in ultimately obtaining statutory authority for the contract is great, and the expense to bidders of making bids or putting themselves in a position to perform the contract would be so great, that the possibility that the contract might never be awarded through lack of statutory authority would seriously restrict the competition. There are no circumstances in this case which justify the conclusion that responsible concerns equipped to perform the contract were deterred from entering the competition by any uncertainty as to whether statutory authority would be obtained. The bill ultimately enacted into law was introduced for the very purpose of providing the authority for this contract. Several of the amendments affecting this case were for the purpose of clarifying and removing obvious defects in the original statute. It does not appear that the substantial changes which were made in the law related to controversial matters. There seems to have been every reasonable probability that the enabling legislation would pass promptly and there is no suggestion from any source that uncertainty as to the enactment of the enabling legislation, or the fact that the advertisement was published and bids received in advance thereof had the effect of restricting the competition or preventing bids which might otherwise have been submitted. The question is largely one of first impression. There is very little in the way of precedent to rely on. The question comes down to the practical one whether on the 2nd of March, 1929, when the Act became effective, the Postmaster General was in possession of bids from "bidders," one of whom he had a right to regard as the lowest responsible bidder that could in his opinion satisfactorily perform the service required to the best advantage of the Government. There is no question that bids had been received; there is no question that reasonable notice had been given, and reasonable opportunity afforded for those who wished to bid to do so. There is no doubt that the bids related to the specific service which was required, and, so far as I can see, there is no reason to believe that the purpose of the law in providing for the award of a contract upon competitive bidding had not been accomplished; or, that in accepting the bid, the Postmaster General did not protect the interest of the United States according to his best judgment in the exercise of the very broad discretion entrusted to him by Congress. The conclusion that, as matter of law, the bids thus obtained must be rejected and the whole thing done over again, merely because, at the time the bids were received, there was no specific provision of law authorizing the making of the contract contemplated, is not required or justified by any statute or by any fundamental principle of law. Neither my own research, nor that of counsel for the successful and unsuccessful bidders, has found any judicial authority which I deem controlling, or indeed very helpful. I think the question calls for the application of sound sense and good judgment upon a practical business proposition. To say that other persons or corporations competent to perform the service, and willing to bid therefor, would or might have been prevented from bidding because the Act of March 2, 1929, had not then become law appears to me to be mere speculation, without basis of probability. A doubt based upon such considerations seems fanciful rather than substantial. There is a decision by Comptroller General McCarl (2 Dec. Compt. Gen., 739), which is based upon principles which we are justified in applying here. From his decision it appears that the city commissioners of Pawhuska, Oklahoma, had received bids for paving and otherwise improving certain streets, some of which abutted lands owned by Indians which were under the supervision of the United States Government and against which the city was powerless to assess the cost of the improvements. With the advertisement notice was given that the city would not contract for that part of the work, but that bids would be received for the entire work. The Government was represented in the preparation of the specifications and at the opening of the bids. The manner and form of securing competition were in all respects substantially similar to the procedure as it would have been had the advertising been by the Government pursuant to the provisions of section 3709, R. S., and the prices quoted in the lowest and accepted bid were reasonable and satisfactory. Later, Congress made an appropriation for the cost of the work adjoining the Indian lands. The question presented was whether the Government could avail itself of the bids already received and join in the contract already made, or whether there would have to be readvertisement for those parts of the streets paved by the United States. In holding that readvertisement was not necessary, the Comptroller General said: แ Whether section 3709, Revised Statutes, requires that the competitive bids be secured by the Government need not be determined. The manner in which bids shall be procured, is not fixed and if the facts show the bids were, in fact, pro cured for the use of the United States, it may be accepted as a compliance with said section 3709, Revised Statutes, other facts appearing showing the necessity for proceeding in the manner indicated." In the case of State v. King, 109 La. 799, the court took a different view of a somewhat similar situation. In that case the City of New Orleans advertised for bids on a contract for the construction of an electric light plant. One of the specifications contained in the advertisement was that the work would be paid for from anticipated revenues. There was at the time, and had been for years, a statute prohibiting the municipalities of the State from anticipating their revenues. Though a subsequent statute authorizing the proposed contract was passed, the court nevertheless held that the original advertising was not a compliance with the city charter. In reaching that decision the court held that the advertisement was void upon its face, for it purported to obligate the municipality in a manner prohibited by law. There were several considerations which undoubtedly influenced the court which are not present in the case I am considering, and I do not regard the case as sufficiently strong to cause me to doubt the correctness of the conclusion which I have already indicated. In my opinion, under the circumstances of this case, the course which was followed was in substantial compliance with the requirements of law, and within the limits of discretion vested in the Postmaster General, and the contract is valid. Respectfully, WILLIAM D. MITCHELL. To the POSTMASTER GENERAL. AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY TO COMPROMISE FINAL JUDGMENTS The Secretary of the Treasury has no authority under section 3469 of the Revised Statutes to accept the offer of the Great American Indemnity Company in compromise of certain final judgments recovered by the United States against the surety company upon forfeited bail recognizances, there being no doubt as to the entire collectibility of these judgments. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, May 8, 1929. SIRS: Your letter of March 16, 1929, submits for my opinion the question whether you have authority under section 3469 of the Revised Statutes to compromise certain judgments recovered by the United States upon forfeited bail recognizances. The circumstances giving rise to your inquiry appear to be as follows: On September 14, 1927, each of five defendants held upon a charge of having conspired to violate the National Prohibition Act and the Tariff Act of 1922 entered into a bond, in the sum of $5,000, with the Great American Indemnity Company as surety, conditioned upon the appearance of the principal at the November Term, 1927, of the United States District Court at Norfolk, Virginia. The criminal case was set for trial on December 5, 1927, and on December 20, 1927, none of the defendants having appeared, the court declared each of the bonds forfeited. Scire facias proceedings thereafter brought resulted in the recovery by the United States of a separate judgment upon each bond. On June 1, 1928, one day after the entry of these judgments, four of the defendants surrendered, and they were subsequently tried, convicted and sentenced. The fifth defendant, Joseph Dally, has neither surrendered nor been apprehended, and the judgment upon the bond given by him, together with interest and costs, has been paid by the surety company. Petitions by that company, under section 1020 of the Revised Statutes, for remission of the amounts of the remaining four judgments having been denied by the court, the company, by letter dated December 17, 1928, submitted to you an offer of $1,000 in compromise of these unsatisfied judgments, which total $20,000. As reasons why the offer should be accepted, the letter referred to the fact that the company had already paid in excess of $5,000 in satisfaction of the judgment upon the bond given by the defendant Dally, and stated that, owing to its lack of experience in such matters, the company had not entered into any separate indemnity agreements with the principals at the time it became surety upon these bonds, and that any loss resulting therefrom would, therefore, fall entirely upon it; that it |