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die by reason of any injury "which under the conditions and limitations of such sections would have entitled him to an invalid pension had he been disabled," his widow shall receive a pension.

The meaning of the phrase "in the line of duty" in section 4693 was recently considered by Acting Attorney General Hughes in an opinion dated January 6, 1930 (36 Op. 156, 158), involving the pension claim of Sidney Floyd Love. In that opinion it was held that Love, an enlisted man in the Navy, who was injured at 6 p. m. while returning to his post of duty on his own motor cycle, from a liberty granted to him from 1 p. m. to 8.30 p. m., was injured in the line of duty. Acting Attorney General Hughes there quoted with approval the following statement from 32 Op. 12, wherein Attorney General Palmer considered the meaning of the words "in the line of duty" in the War Risk Insurance Act.

66* * * The mere fact that an injury or disease is coincident in time with service is not sufficient to class it as suffered or contracted in the line of duty.' It must have been caused by the presence of its victim in the line of duty when it was received or contracted. But the relation of causation is sufficiently shown when it appears that the victim was at a place and doing what was required or permitted by his duty as a soldier, and that, between his presence and conduct and the injury or disease, no adequate and sufficient cause, for which he is responsible, intervened. This, I think, is the true meaning of the criterion laid down by Mr. Cushing (7 Op. 149, 162).”

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Since at the time of the injury which caused his death Burdick was riding upon and in charge of a Marine truck engaged in official business, I am of the opinion that he lost his life in the line of duty within the meaning of the above definition and the opinion in the Love case. Accordingly, as far as sections 4692 and 4693 of the Revised Statutes are concerned, the right of Burdick's widow to a pension seems clear. Those sections, however, must be read in connection with section 4694, R. S. (U. S. C., Title 38, section 155), which provides:

"No person shall be entitled to a pension by reason of wounds or injury received or disease contracted in the serv

ice of the United States subsequent to the twenty-seventh day of July, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, unless the person who was wounded, or injured, or contracted the disease was in the line of duty; and, if in the military service, was at the time actually in the field, or on the march, or at some post, fort, or garrison; or en route, by direction of competent authority, to some post, fort, or garrison; or if in the naval service, was at the time borne on the books of some ship or other vessel of the United States, at sea or in harbor, actually in commission, or was at some naval station, or on his way, by direction of competent authority, to the United States, or to some other vessel or naval station, or hospital."

As a member of the Marine Corps stationed in Haiti, it is patent that Burdick was either "in the military service" or "in the naval service," within the meaning of section 4694. See the Act of June 12, 1916, c. 140, 39 Stat. 224 (U. S. C., Title 34, Sec. 445); section 1621, R. S., as amended by the Act of June 4, 1920, c. 227, 41 Stat. 787 (U. S. C., Title 34, sec. 715). At the time of the injury which caused his death he was en route, "by direction of competent authority," to a place at which armed forces of the United States were quartered and maintained. Unquestionably, the Marine Barracks at Cape Haitien is a "post, fort, or garrison " within the meaning of section 4694 if the forces there maintained be considered as "in the military service." On the other hand, if such forces be considered as "in the naval service," the Marine Barracks at Cape Haitien clearly fall within the term "naval station," as used in section 4694. See United States v. Phisterer, 94 U. S. 219, 222; Caldwell's Case, 19 Wall. 264, 268; McGowan v. United States, 48 C. Cls. 95, 98.

In my opinion Sergeant Major Burdick lost his life "in the line of duty" and under such circumstances as to comply with sections 4693 and 4694 of the Revised Statutes. Accordingly, his widow is entitled to a pension under section 4702 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by section 1 of the Act of August 7, 1882.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

To the ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS' AFFAIRS.

SATURDAY HALF HOLIDAY LAW-FIELD EMPLOYEES OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

Under the Act of March 3, 1931, providing for Saturday half holidays for certain Government employees (46 Stat. 1482), Saturday should be counted as four hours when computing the annual leave provided by the Act of August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 617), for employees in the field service of the Navy Department.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 25, 1931.

Sir: I have the honor to comply with your request of March 27, 1931, as amended by your letter of March 31, 1931, for my opinion whether or not Saturdays shall be counted as full days when computing annual leave for employees in the field service of the Navy Department. These employees come within the provision of the Act of March 3, 1931 (46 Stat. 1482), that "four hours, exclusive of time for luncheon, shall constitute a day's work on Saturdays for all civil employees of the Federal Government," with stated exceptions not here pertinent. Their leave, however, is not governed by the other general statutes considered in the opinion to the President of March 17, 1931. (36 Op. 407.)

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Annual leave for employees in the field service of the Navy Department is provided by the Act of August 29, 1916, c. 417, 39 Stat. 556, 617 (U. S. C., Title 34, sec. 511), which reads in part as follows:

"That each and every employee of the navy yards, gun factories, naval stations, and arsenals of the United States Government is hereby granted thirty days' leave of absence each year, without forfeiture of pay during such leave: Provided further, That it shall be lawful to allow pro rata leave only to those serving twelve consecutive months or more: And provided further, That in all cases the heads of divisions shall have discretion as to the time when the leave can best be allowed: And provided further, That not more than thirty days' leave with pay shall be allowed any such employee in one year: Provided further, That this provision shall not be construed to deprive employees of any sick leave or legal holidays to which they may now be entitled under existing law."

An earlier Act, approved February 1, 1901, c. 190, 31 Stat. 746, had provided for these employees "fifteen working days' leave of absence each year." Although the 1916 Act did not specify working days, it has always been interpreted as increasing the amount of annual leave from fifteen working days to thirty working days; and it was expressly provided in the Act that it "shall not be construed to deprive employees of any sick leave or legal holidays to which they may now be entitled under existing law."

It has been suggested that the proviso in the Act of August 29, to the effect "That this provision shall not be construed to deprive employees of any sick leave or legal holidays to which they may now be entitled under existing law" only saved to the employee, in addition to his annual leave, those legal holidays which had been established by law in force when the Act of 1916 was passed, and not holidays established by law since 1916.

There is no rational ground for believing that the Congress intended to make a distinction, in computing annual leave, between holidays created by law before the Act of 1916 was passed and those created afterwards. The proviso may fairly be construed to mean merely that any existing law providing for not counting holidays as part of the leave period, should remain unaffected. So construed, holidays created after 1916, as well as those created before, would be treated alike.

The effect, therefore, was to authorize for the field employees the same amount of leave which the statutes considered in the opinion of March 17 had granted to other employees of the Government, that is, "thirty days

exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays," and no reason appears for considering that the holidays to be excluded under one Act differ from the holidays to be excluded under the other.

It appears that heretofore the field employees of the Navy Department were charged with a full day toward annual leave for absence on Saturday during the summer months when Executive orders prescribed only four hours of labor, the practice in this respect forming an exception to that followed in other services of the Government. The documents submitted with your letter indicate that such

practice was based upon a view that the field employees were entitled to have excluded from their annual leave only legal holidays and that the holiday granted by Executive order on Saturday afternoon was not a legal holiday. It is unnecessary to consider the correctness of that conclusion and the practice based thereon. As pointed out in the opinion of March 17, Saturday afternoon is now to be considered a legal holiday within the purview of the general leave Act construed in that opinion, and I must conclude that it is likewise to be considered a legal holiday for the purposes of the Act of August 29, 1916.

It is therefore my opinion that Saturday should be counted as four hours when computing the annual leave provided by the Act of August 29, 1916, for employees in the field service of the Navy Department.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

CITIZENSHIP OF WIFE AND MINOR CHILD OF
PIETRO MARIANI.

Pietro Mariani, a native of Italy, was regularly admitted to the United States in 1913 and was naturalized in 1919. Within five years after his naturalization he went to Italy with an American passport. While there he married, in 1921, and a child was born in 1923. Because of his long absence from the United States, his certificate of naturalization was canceled under section 15 of the Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 601). In 1926 Mariani returned to the United States as an alien under the provisions of the Act of May 26, 1926 (44 Stat. 654), extending naturalization privileges to certain alien veterans of the World War, and he was naturalized again in 1929. Held, under the circumstances herein stated, that the wife of Mariani and his child born in Italy in 1923 are not citizens of the United States.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
July 16, 1931.

SIR: Response to your request of July 10, 1930, for my opinion with respect to the citizenship of the wife and a minor child of Pietro Mariani was postponed because of the possibility of a judicial determination of the point at issue in a pending case. Since that case has now been de

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