acre. Subsequently an investigation revealed that a Government employee, upon whose report that the land was worth only $3.50 per acre the land was reappraised, was bribed by various entrymen, and that the land was in truth worth $6.00 an Miller was not found to have been a party to the fraud. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs advised that the reappraisal of Miller's land be vacated together with that of 44 other entrymen, and the original appraisals left undisturbed. This was done on August 21, 1930; and on October 24, 1930, the Commissioner of the General Land Office notified Miller that he would have to pay the difference with interest or suffer cancellation of his entry. From this order Miller appealed to the Department. The statute involved reads as follows (Act of June 6, 1912, 37 Stat. 125): 66 # That the Secretary of the Interior be, and he is hereby, authorized to cause to be classified or reclassified and appraised or reappraised, in such manner as he may deem advisable, the unallotted or otherwise unreserved lands within any Indian reservation opened to settlement and entry but not classified and appraised in the manner provided for in the Act or Acts opening such reservations to settlement and entry, or where the existing classification or appraisement is, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, erroneous.' Under this statute the Secretary may reappraise the land in question if the existing appraisal is, in his opinion, erroneous. In this case you have found that the appraisal of November 10, 1928, was erroneous. You were accordingly authorized to reappraise Miller's lands. Your authority to reappraise is not exhausted by the erroneous reappraisal procured by bribery but is predicated by the statute upon your conclusion that any existing appraisal is erroneous. Cf. Knight v. Land Association, 142 U. S. 161, and Lane v. Darlington, 249 U. S. 331. This view finds support in the general rule that the control of the Secretary of the Interior over the administration of the public lands continues until the issuance of the patent. The rule was stated in a decision of the Interior Department as follows (In re Brady, 27 L. D. 716) : "The control of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and of the Secretary of the Interior, over the title to public land does not cease upon the isuance of final certificate; nor does the party to whom such certificate issues secure thereby such a vested right in the land as to preclude these officers from correcting, or canceling the same for error of law or fact." To the same general effect see Smith v. Custer, 8 L. D. 269; United States v. Bailey, 17 L. D. 468; Bender v. Shimer, 19 L. D. 363; In re Hyde, 33 L. D. 639; Heirs of Ewing v. Cayton, 36 L. D. 474. In Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U. S. 589, the Supreme Court said (p. 593): 66 * * * wherever the granting act specifically provides for the issue of a patent, then the rule is that the legal title remains in the Government until the issue of the patent, * * and while so remaining the grant is in process of administration, and the jurisdiction of the land department is not lost. 66 * * * This jurisdiction of the department has been maintained in cases of preemption where the entire purchase money has been paid and a receiver's final certificate issued." See also Knight v. Land Association, 142 U. S. 161; Parsons v. Venzke, 164 U. S. 89; Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S. 372; United States v. Steenerson, 50 Fed. 504; Moses v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 206 Fed. 51; Swigart v. Walker, 30 Pac. (Kan.) 162. It is quite apparent from these decisions that the issuance of a final certificate does not prevent inquiry by the Secretary of the Interior to ascertain whether the rights of the United States have been fully protected. Until patent issues, the Secretary has the power, and it is his duty, to see that the interests of the Government in the public lands placed in his hands for administration are properly protected. In this case it was discovered before the patent issued that the first reappraisal had been secured by fraud in that the agent recommending it had been bribed by various entrymen to report favorably on their applications for reap praisal. Thus it became apparent that the interests of the United States had not been protected and that the duty which the Government owed its Indian wards in the disposal of their lands had not been properly performed. Therefore, it was not only within your power, but it was your duty, to examine into the proceedings and correct the wrong that had been done. It is true that Miller was not concerned in the fraud. But from the fraud he received a benefit which he is not entitled to retain against your assertion of the right to correct the fraudulent and erroneous appraisal. This conclusion is supported by the cases. In New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U. S. 261, an officer of the Land Department was about to relocate the boundaries of a land grant. An injunction was sought on the theory that a former survey of the same line had been examined, approved, and paid for, and that the rights of the plaintiff to the lands included in such survey had become vested. The Supreme Court said (p. 266): "If the department was not satisfied with this survey, there was no rule of law standing in the way of its ordering another. Until the matter is closed by final action, the proceedings of an officer of a department are as much open to review or reversal by himself, or his successor, as are the interlocutory decrees of a court open to review upon the final hearing." In Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 473, the Supreme Court said (pp. 476, 479): "Until the legal title to public land passes from the Government, inquiry as to all equitable rights comes within the cognizance of the land department. * * * 66 * * *The naked proposition upon which the plaintiff relies is that upon the creation of an equitable right or title the power of the land department to inquire into the validity of that right or title ceases. That proposition cannot be sustained." See also Parcher v. Gillen, 26 L. D. 34; Aspen Consolidated Mining Co. v. Williams, 27 L. D. 1; In re State of Louisiana, 33 L. D. 13; Aztec Land and Cattle Co. v. Tomlin son, 35 L. D. 161; Beley v. Naphtaly, 169 U. S. 353, 364; Knight v. Lane, 228 U. S. 6; West v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 200, 210. In my opinion the second reappraisal was within the lawful authority of the Secretary and the entryman Miller may lawfully be required to pay for the lands at $6.00 per acre. Respectfully, WILLIAM D. MITCHELL. To the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. VALIDITY OF ORDER OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT FIXING THE CLOSING HOUR OF THE PORT OF TIA JUANA The order of the Treasury Department of October 28, 1926, closing the Port of Tia Juana at 6.00 p. m., having for its object the enforcement of the customs laws against smuggling, is a reasonable and valid regulation under section 251 of the Revised Statutes, which has the force and effect of law, provided said order had the personal approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. As such an order is a valid regulation having the force and effect of law, customs guards can legally detain persons who insist upon entering the United States after the port of Tia Juana has been closed. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to refer to your letter of November 21, 1931, complying with my request of October 9, 1931, for certain additional information necessary to enable me to reply to your earlier request for an opinion (1) as to the validity of an order of the Treasury Department of October 28, 1926, closing the port of Tia Juana at 6.00 p. m., and (2) as to the right of customs guards to detain persons who insist upon entering the United States after the port has been closed. The facts as they appear from your letters and enclosures, so far as material here, are as follows: Prior to February 27, 1924, the ports of Tia Juana and Calexico were closed to entry of all persons at midnight; subsequently, it was discovered that under the cover of darkness a brisk trade in smuggling had sprung up, particularly in the smuggling of aliens and prohibited articles such as liquor, narcotics, etc., and to abate this practice an order of February 27, 1924, closing the ports of Tia Juana and Calexico at 9.00 p. m., was issued. On October 28, 1926, the closing hour at Tia Juana was advanced to 6.00 p. m. and the opening hour fixed at 8.00 a. m. Later, the opening hour was advanced to 6.00 a. m. Your request is prompted by the fact that some have questioned the right of the Secretary of the Treasury to close the Mexican border, insisting that he has no authority to keep American citizens, without dutiable or contraband merchandise, from entering the United States at any hour of the day or night, and to enforce the closing of the border to the extent of denying them admission during certain hours, is an unwarranted interference with their rights as American citizens. Section 582 of the Tariff Act of 1922, c. 356, 42 Stat. 858, 979 (U. S. C., Title 19, sec. 484), now section 582 of the Tariff Act of 1930, c. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 748 (U. S. C., Title 19, sec. 1582, Supplement), provided: "The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe regulations for the search of persons and baggage and he is authorized to employ female inspectors for the examination and search of persons of their own sex; and all persons coming into the United States from foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search by authorized officers or agents of the Government under such regulations." Acting under the authority of this statute, the Secretary of the Treasury has promulgated regulations requiring customs inspectors to inspect the person and baggage of all persons coming into the United States from foreign countries. (Articles 1202 and 1203, Customs Regulations of 1923, amended to 1925.) It is clear, therefore, that before anyone, including an American citizen, can enter the United States from a foreign country, he must first submit himself and his baggage to inspection by authorized officers or agents of the Government regardless of whether he has on his person or in his baggage dutiable or contraband merchandise. No one, not even an American citizen, can decide for himself that he has no dutiable or contraband merchandise on his person or in his baggage and without further ado enter the United States, |