park area and which are required for the protection of the area for park purposes, although there are limits beyond which you can not go on roads constructed by the State before the park was established. See Colorado v. Toll, 268 U. S. 228. As long as the regulations established by the State and those prescribed by you are not necessarily inconsistent and they may be concurrently enforced, I see no reason why the State regulations enacted in the exercise of its jurisdiction should be held invalid: The fact that the State law requires a motor license for privately owned vehicles operated within the park and your regulations require an additional park permit does not make them necessarily inconsistent, as both permits are obtainable. As the fact that the operator of a motor vehicle is engaged in the performance of a Government contract does not exempt him from the requirement of the State law that a license be obtained, to hold that the State license law is inapplicable to a Government contractor operating his trucks within the park would mean that no privately owned and operated motor vehicle within the park would have to obtain a State license. That conclusion does not seem to be justified by any principle yet announced by the courts. With respect to any traffic on roadways constructed and maintained by the National Park Service, you have power to establish regulations reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose for which the park has been established and is being operated, and with respect to such roadways any State regulations necessarily inconsistent with yours would be invalid, but no such inconsistency has developed.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

To the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

REQUEST OF SENATE FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION ON RAILROAD MERGERS

The Attorney General feels obliged to refrain from responding to a request from the Senate for his opinion respecting the legality of recent railroad mergers, since the Federal statutes do not authorize, empower, or require him to give opinions to either House of Congress or to the committees thereof.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 25, 1932.

SIR: Senate Resolution 173, after reciting that it has been asserted that through the formation of holding companies, combinations of parallel and competing railroads engaged in interstate commerce have recently been made without authority of law, proceeds as follows:

"Resolved, That the Attorney General of the United States be requested to inform the Senate as soon as practicable (1) whether such transactions constitute contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or attempts to monopolize or restrain such commerce, in violation of the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890, as amended, commonly called the Antitrust Act; (2) in what respect, if any, such transactions differ from the operation condemned by the Supreme Court of the United States in the so-called Northern Securities case (193 U. S. 197); and (3) what steps, if any, have been taken, or are contemplated by the Department of Justice for the enforcement in these instances of the antitrust laws."

The first two subdivisions of this resolution request me to give an opinion to the Senate on legal phases of the subject matter of the resolution. I feel obliged to refrain from responding to this request.

The powers of the Attorney General in the matter of giving opinions on questions of law are defined in sections 354 and 356 of the Revised Statutes (Title 5, Sections 303 and 304, U. S. C.). These statutes are:

"The Attorney General shall give his advice and opinion upon questions of law, whenever required by the President," and

"The head of any Executive Department may require the opinion of the Attorney General on any questions of law arising in the administration of his Department."

These statutes, in substantially this form, have been in effect since 1789. They do not authorize, empower, or require the Attorney General to give opinions to committees of Congress or to either House. For more than one hundred years there has been an unbroken line of authority to that

effect. As early as 1818 Attorney General Wirt held that under these statutes Attorneys General are not authorized to give officials opinions on questions of law except upon call of the President or at the request of one of the heads of the executive departments to enable him to decide a question pending in his own department for action.

In the following instances the Attorneys General have, for the reasons stated, declined to give official opinions on questions of law or on the constitutionality or construction of legislation either pending or enacted, to committees of the House or to committees of the Senate or in response to resolutions or requests from the Senate itself or from the House of Representatives: 1 Op. 335; 5 Op. 561; 10 Op. 164; 12 Op. 544; 14 Op. 17; 14 Op. 177; 17 Op. 357; 18 Op. 87; 18 Op. 107.

Under date of January 28, 1820, the House of Representatives entered an order requesting the opinion of Attorney General Wirt respecting a matter in which the House was interested. In declining to give the opinion the Attorney General, among other things, said:

"The Attorney General is sworn to discharge the duties of his office according to law. To be instrumental in enlarging the sphere of his official duties beyond that which is prescribed by law would, in my opinion, be a violation of this oath." (1 Op. 336.)

That opinion has stood unquestioned for one hundred and twelve years and has been repeatedly followed in later rulings. Under date of December 17, 1884, Attorney General Brewster felt obliged to decline compliance with a resolution passed by the House of Representatives requesting his opinion on the application of a section of the Revised Statutes (18 Op. 87). Having failed to obtain the opinion by direct request, the House of Representatives passed another resolution requesting the Postmaster General to ask for the Attorney General's opinion, and the Postmaster General transmitted the request to the Attorney General who again refused to give the opinion on the ground that he had no authority to give it to the House of Representatives and the Postmaster General did not need it on any question pending in his Department.

Under date of February 14, 1929, my immediate predecessor declined the request of the House Committee on Expenditures in the executive departments for an opinion, and on June 3, 1930, I felt obliged to decline an opinion requested by the Judiciary Committee of the Senate.

Congress has accepted this long standing interpretation of the law and has never attempted by law to enlarge the powers or duties of the Attorney General so as to require him to give opinions to either House of Congress or to committees thereof. Having in mind the constitutional separation of the functions of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, there has always been a serious question whether the principle of that separation would be violated by a statute attempting to make the Attorney General a legal adviser of the legislative branch, and as a matter of governmental policy the wisdom of constituting as legal adviser of either House of Congress an official of the executive department, who sits in the President's Cabinet and acts as his legal adviser, has always been open to doubt.

When pending legislation affecting the Department of Justice has been referred to Attorneys General for comment or suggestion, it has been their practice to suggest such legal points as are pertinent and which ought to receive consideration by committees, but that practice has never properly involved any formal legal opinions from Attorneys General and has no resemblance to a request for an opinion as to the effect of an existing statute.

With the utmost deference for the request of the Senate, I am obliged to decline to give an opinion in this case.

CITIZENSHIP OF INGRID THERESE TOBIASSEN

Ingrid Therese Tobiassen, a minor, who was born in the United States and whose father, after becoming a citizen of the United States by naturalization, took her to Norway, his native country, where he established and has ever since maintained a permanent residence, has acquired Norwegian nationality through the nat

uralization of her father as a Norwegian subject, and consequently she has ceased to be an American citizen.

DEPARTMENT of Justice,

June 16, 1932.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your request of August 11, 1931, for my opinion with respect to the citizenship of Ingrid Therese Tobiassen, who has applied to your Department for a return permit under section 10 of the Immigration Act of May 26, 1924 (43 Stat. 158; U. S. C. A. Title 8, sec. 210).

From your statement of the facts it appears that Miss Tobiassen, aged twenty, was born in New York City on February 15, 1911; that her father, a native of Norway, became a citizen of the United States by naturalization on February 20, 1912; that in 1919 Miss Tobiassen, when eight years old, was taken by her parents to Norway, where the parents have since resided; that at the age of eighteen Miss Tobiassen returned to the United States, and, so far as the record indicates, has taken up her permanent residence in the city of Princeton, New Jersey; and that her purpose in asking for a return permit is to visit her parents in Norway. According to your letter the State Department declined to issue a passport to Miss Tobiassen on the ground that she had acquired Norwegian nationality and had ceased to be an American citizen, while in a memorandum opinion, a copy of which accompanied your letter, the Solicitor of your Department expressed the opposite conclusion. It is because of this conflict of views that you desire my opinion.

In answer to an inquiry the Secretary of State confirmed your statement regarding the position of his Department and added that its ruling with respect to Miss Tobiassen was in accordance with the practice of his Department in similar circumstances. He explained that, on account of the importance of the question, the Legation at Oslo, Norway, had been requested to ascertain from the Norwegian authorities whether Miss Tobiassen was regarded as having been naturalized as a Norwegian subject. The despatch from the Legation, in response to this instruction, follows:

"The Norwegian Foreign Office has informed this Legation in a letter dated November 9, 1931, that with reference to Miss Tobiassen's status the Department of Justice and