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Police stated that 'Miss Tobiassen's father is presumed to have regained his citizenship in 1919 when he took up his residence in Norway, and that his daughter, Ingrid Therese, in accordance with the law then in force relative to Norwegian citizenship, dated April 21, 1888, paragraph 4, acquired Norwegian citizenship together with her father, provided she lived with her parents or was supported by them.'"

The position of the State Department is predicated upon the provisions of Articles I and III of the Naturalization Treaty between the United States and Sweden and Norway of June 14, 1871, and III of the Protocol thereto, which are as follows:

"ARTICLE I. Citizens of the United States of America who have resided in Sweden or Norway for a continuous period of at least five years, and during such residence have become and are lawfully recognized as citizens of Sweden or Norway, shall be held by the Government of the United States to be Swedish or Norwegian citizens, and shall be treated as such.

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"ARTICLE III. If a citizen of the one party, who has become a recognized citizen of the other party, takes up his abode once more in his original country, and applies to be restored to his former citizenship, the Government of the last-named country is authorized to receive him again as a citizen, on such conditions as the said Government may think proper.

III. Relating to the third article of the convention.

"It is further agreed that if a Swede or Norwegian, who has become a naturalized citizen of the United States, renews his residence in Sweden or Norway without the intent to return to America, he shall be held by the Government of the United States to have renounced his American citizenship.

"The intent not to return to America may be held to exist when a person so naturalized resides more than two years in Sweden or Norway."

The State Department also invites attention to sections. 4 and 6 of the Norwegian Nationality Law of August 8, 1924 (Nationality Laws, Flournoy and Hudson, p. 453):

"SECTION 4. Any person who is a natural-born Norwegian subject, and who has ceased to be a Norwegian subject, will again become a Norwegian subject by taking up his regular domicile in Norway. If, however, he ceased to be a Norwegian subject through acquiring a foreign nationality, or if he later acquired foreign nationality, he will not again be deemed to be a Norwegian subject until he has ceased to be of foreign nationality."

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"SECTION 6. When a person becomes a Norwegian subject in pursuance of section 2 or section 4, his wife, and unmarried children under eighteen years of age, born in wedlock, shall also be deemed to be Norwegian subjects, provided they reside in Norway. If they do not reside there, and the wife subsequently, the marriage being in force, or the children, being unmarried and under eighteen years of age, take up her (their) residence in Norway, she (they) shall then be deemed to be Norwegian subjects provided the husband still is a Norwegian subject."

The power to make treaties is given by the Constitution in general terms, and it has been authoritatively settled that such power was designed to include all those subjects which, in the ordinary intercourse of nations, had usually been made subjects of negotiation and treaty, and which are consistent with the nature of our institutions. That the power includes the right to deal with naturalization can hardly be regarded as debatable. "A treaty is just as much a law of the United States as an Act of Congress. Hence, it was decided, in the case of Crane v. Reeder, 25 Mich. 303, that the minor child of one who became a citizen under Article 2 of Jay's Treaty, if residing in the United States at the time, thereby became a citizen of the United States." Van Dyne, Naturalization, 220. And Attorney General Griggs, in 23 Op. 348, used the following pertinent language:

"It never seems to have been supposed that the power to established a uniform rule of naturalization meant anything more than that individual applications to become citizens by proceedings in judicial tribunals should rest upon uniform authority and should follow the same forms everywhere in the United States, and in the territories when the rules

should be extended and applied to them by Congress. It has never been asserted that the language of this grant of power affected the right of Congress to exclude or to admit certain classes of aliens by special or collective provisions; or the right of the treaty-making power to stipulate for the same results."

The Solicitor of your Department refers to the provision in section 2 of the Act of 1907 that no American citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself while this country is at war, in connection with which he invites attention to the fact that the World War had not ended in 1919 when Miss Tobiassen's father went to Norway. Inasmuch, however, as her father was still residing in that country in 1921, when the war was formally terminated, and has continued to reside there ever since, the point appears to be of no importance. That he established a permanent residence in Norway is not disputed, and there is, I think, no doubt that this action on his part effected a like change in the residence of Miss Tobiassen. To constitute a change of domicile, there must be residence with the intention that it is to be permanent. In Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 452, 470, the court said:

"An infant cannot change his own domicil. As infants have the domicil of their father, he may change their domicil by changing his own; and after his death the mother, while she remains a widow, may likewise, by changing her domicil, change the domicil of the infants; the domicil of the children, in either case, following the independent domicil of their parent."

The right of expatriation, of which there has been statutory recognition by this country from an early period, was carried into section 1999 of the Revised Statutes. The last legislative expression upon the subject is the provision in section 2 of the Act of March 2, 1907 (34 Stat. 1228; U. S. C. A. Title 8, Sec. 17), which provides as follows:

"Any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state. * *

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There has also been for many years statutory provision whereby foreign-born minor children become citizens of the

United States through the naturalization of their parents. The last enactment upon this subject is section 5 of the above mentioned Act of 1907 (U. S. C. A. Title 8, sec. 8), by the terms of which minor children do not acquire citizenship until they have taken up a permanent residence in the United States. Citizenship acquired by minor children in this manner is deemed equivalent to formal naturalization under Acts of Congress. United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. (C. C.) 82, 85; United States v. Tod, 297 Fed. (C. C. A.) 385, 392.

It is to be noted that the claim that Miss Tobiassen has ceased to be an American citizen does not rest upon the terms of the Naturalization Treaty with Norway, but upon a law of that country, as the result of the renunciation by her father, a native of Norway, of his American citizenship, and the resumption of his Norwegian nationality in pursuance of the terms of that treaty. The law of Norway, under which Miss Tobiassen is said to have forfeited her American citizenship and to have acquired that of her father, is analogous to our statutes, to which attention has just been directed, by virtue of which foreign-born minor children of persons naturalized in the United States are declared to be citizens of this country.

In view of the foregoing it is deemed unnecessary to discuss the doubt suggested by the Solicitor of your Department as to whether it is within the province of the treatymaking power to stipulate the conditions which shall constitute expatriation in respect of a native-born citizen.

Inasmuch as under our laws a foreign-born minor child obtains a citizenship status through the naturalization of the father, it seems to me inconsistent, to say the least, to deny a like effect to similar laws of Norway. For this reason and the other considerations herein mentioned, the conclusion of the State Department that Miss Tobiassen acquired Norwegian nationality, and consequently has ceased to be an American citizen, is, in my opinion, correct.

The file which accompanied your letter is returned herewith, as requested.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.

To the Secretary of Labor.

CLAIM FOR INTEREST PAID ON BORROWED MONEY UNDER THE WAR MINERALS RELIEF ACTS

The claim of Logan Rives under the War Minerals Relief Acts for interest paid on borrowed money for use in operation, which claim was not included in Rives's original application and which was not presented to or considered by the then Secretary of the Interior, should not, under the circumstances herein stated, be allowed.

The Secretary of the Interior should not reopen final decisions of his predecessors under the War Minerals Relief Acts except in those cases in which resort was had to the courts under the amendment of February 13, 1929 (45 Stat. 1166), and then only to the extent directed by the courts.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

June 18, 1932.

SIR: On March 11, 1932, you asked for my advice respecting the claim of Logan Rives under the War Minerals Relief Acts of March 2, 1919 (40 Stat. 1272), November 23, 1921 (42 Stat. 322), and February 13, 1929 (45 Stat. 1166), for interest paid on borrowed money. The amount of this claim is only $178.15, but since the disposition of it raises a number of questions which may be important in respect of other claims, we have given it very careful consideration.

It appears that Rives's claim for losses incurred was filed in your Department on May 8, 1919. Your regulations provided that claims of this nature should be presented in detail on a questionnaire, the form of which was prescribed in your Department, and Rives's claim thus filed was in the form of such a questionnaire with answers inserted by him. He included in his claim demands for reimbursement for losses sustained as the result of purchase of lands and also for losses alleged to have been sustained in operation. Neither the claim for loss resulting from the land purchase nor the claim for loss in operation included any item for interest on borrowed money. Question 27 in the questionnaire form, and the answers thereto made by Rives, are as follows:

"27. (a) What amount and rate of interest did claimant pay on loans used in the production, and preparation for production of any of the above enumerated minerals? "(Ans.) 8% on $20,000.00.

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