Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centered Institutionalism In Policy ResearchRoutledge, 2018 M03 9 - 336 pages Games Real Actors Play provides a persuasive argument for the use of basic concepts of game theory in understanding public policy conflicts. Fritz Scharpf criticizes public choice theory as too narrow in its examination of actor motives and discursive democracy as too blind to the institutional incentives of political parties. With the nonspecialist in mind, the author presents a coherent actor-centered model of institutional rational choice that integrates a wide variety of theoretical contributions, such as game theory, negotiation theory, transaction cost economics, international relations, and democratic theory.Games Real Actors Play offers a framework for linking positive theory to the normative issues that necessarily arise in policy research and employs many cross-national examples, including a comparative use of game theory to understand the differing reactions of Great Britain, Sweden, Austria, and the Federal Republic of Germany to the economic stagflation of the 1970s. |
Contents
| 1 | |
1 Policy Research in the Face of Complexity | 19 |
2 ActorCentered Institutionalism | 36 |
3 Actors | 51 |
4 Actor Constellations | 69 |
5 Unilateral Action in Anarchic Fields and Minimal Institutions | 97 |
6 Negotiated Agreements | 116 |
7 Decisions by Majority Vote | 151 |
8 Hierarchical Direction | 171 |
9 Varieties of the Negotiating State | 195 |
A GameTheoretical Interpretation of Inflation and Unemployment in Western Europe | 217 |
Efficient SelfCoordination in Policy NetworksA Simulation Study with Matthias Mohr | 245 |
| 281 | |
About the Book and Author | 303 |
| 305 | |
Other editions - View all
Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centered Institutionalism In Policy Research Fritz W Scharpf No preview available - 1997 |
Common terms and phrases
able achieved action actors adjustment agreement associations assumed assumptions assure avoid bargaining capacity cell central Chapter choices coalition collective common competition complete concept consequence considered constellations cooperative coordination costs countries course deal decisions defined depend described Dilemma discussed distributive economic effective elections empirical equilibrium European example existence expected explanations fact Figure gains given hence hierarchical implies important increase individual inflation institutional interaction interest involved issues labor less limited majority modes move mutual Nash Negative negotiations noncooperative normative options organizations orientations outcomes particular parties payoffs players political Positive possible potential practice preferences present problem processes produce reached reason reduce relatively represented rules self-interest side social solution specific status strategies structure studies theory tions true types unemployment unilateral unions units vote voters wage welfare