the Empiric and Methodic Schools; who confined themselves to the observation of facts, and rejected all theory respecting the causes of diseases. Among these, Favorinus (§ 185) attached himself to the principles of Enesidemus. The most distinguished were Agrippa, Menodotus of Nicomedia, and Sextus. Agrippa reduced the ten Reasons for doubting to five more extensive ones, viz.: 1. Difference of Opinions; 2. the necessity that every proof should be itself capable of proof; 3. The Relativeness of our impressions; 4. The disposition to Hypothesis; 5. The Arguing in a Circle unavoidable in all proofs. Finally he insisted on this, that there cannot be any certain knowledge, either immediately, ég éavrov, nor mediately, ég érépov; and especially applied himself to criticise the Formal part of knowledge, Sextus Empiricus. Sexti Empirici Opera, Gr. et Lat. ed. Jo. ALB. FABRICIUS, Lips. 1718, fol. Editio altera, cum Indd. 2 vols. 8vo. Lips. 1842. Recens. STRUVE, Regiomont. 1823, 2 vols. 8vo. Criticisms on this author: GUIL. LANGIUS, De Veritatibus Geometricis adv. Sextum Empiricum, Hafn. 1656, 4to. De primis Scientiarum Elementis, seu Theologia Naturalis methodo quasi Mathematica digesta. Accessit ad hæc Sexti Empirici adversus Mathematicas decem Modorum έπoxñç seu Dubitationis, secundum editionem FABRICII, quibus scilicet Sextus Scepticorum Coryphæus, veritati omni in os obloqui atque totidem retia tendere haud dubitavit, succincta tum Philosophica tum critica refutatio (per Jac. THOMSON), Regiomont. 1728, (id. 1734), fol. GOTOFR. PLOUCQUET, Diss. examen rationem a Sexto Empirico tam ad propugnandum quam impugnandam Dei existentiam collectarum, Tübing. 1768, 4to. 189. Sextus, surnamed Empiricus, from the School of Physicists to which he belonged, was a native, as appears, of Mitylene, and a pupil of Herodotus of Tarsus, the Sceptic. He put the finishing stroke to the Philosophy of 1 DIOG. LAERT. IX, 116. 2 First or second century after Christ. SEXTUS, Hypotyp. I, 164–178. 4 This has been proved by Visconti in his Iconographie, on the testi5 DIOG. LAERT. IX, 116. mony of a medal of that city. Doubt about the end of the second century. While he availed himself of the works of his predecessors, especially Enesidemus, Agrippa, and Menodotus, he contributed much to define the object, end, and method of Scepticism, particularly in his three books Πυρρώνειων ὑποτυπώσεων and to guard against the attacks of the Dogmatists, he made more acccurate distinctions between the operations of his system and the practice of the New Academicians or of the Dogmatists themselves. ; 190. According to Sextus, Scepticism is the faculty (ovvaus) of comparing the appearances of the senses and thoughts (pawóμevа те Kai vооvueva), in order, by such a competition, so instituted, to arrive (dà Tv év Tois ȧVTIKELμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λογοις ἰσοσθένειαν) at a suspension of all judgment (oxy) on objects the nature of which is obscure to us (aonov, paves): hence results a certain repose of the mind (arapagia), and, in the end, a perfect eqanimity (μετριοπαθεία). His Scepticism admits the existence of representations and appearances (pavóueva); does not deny the possibility of cognition, but the reality of it; and abstains from its pursuit. His system is not a Doctrine, but an entirely subjective mode of viewing things, and consequently does not demand to be proved, but only requires to be stated.' His maxim was, ovdev μâλλov;2 meaning that no one thing deserves to be preferred to another. 191. Sextus appears sometimes to have forgotten this principle, when he would erect his principle into a Doctrine, and represent it as an Art of non-cognition; and an Art destructive of all inquiry after Truth, and denying the possibility of its attainment. He exposed himself to this censure because: 1. When he finds himself at a loss for arguments of Doubt, he suggests that hereafter they may be discovered; 2. He declines all exposition of the real nature of representation and cognition; 3. He intrenches himself, when he finds it necessary, in Sophisms; 4. He endeavours, 1 SEXTUS EMP., Hypotyp. I, 1. 4. 25. 3 Ibid. 33, sqq.; II, 259. Adv. Math. I, 9. 2 Ibid. 14. in this manner, by mere sophistical arguments, to prove that no science can be taught or learnt; 5. He goes so far as to argue, in opposition to his own doctrine (§ 190), against the existence of our representations; 6. He does not define with sufficient perspicuity the facts which he assumes as data, e. g. our representations, and the laws of Thought. 192. Notwithstanding these objections, his statement of Scepticism is a very important work, both in respect of the manner in which he has treated it, and as a record of the state of Science, more especially of Metaphysical Philosophy, among the ancients. In the five last books of his treatises, Πρὸς τοὺς μαθηματικούς, he reviews the doctrines of the principal philosophers in the most important subjects; setting in a strong light the incertitude of their principles, and contradictory or inconsistent conclusions. He endeavonrs to show that the Dogmatists had never discovered any solid and irrefragable criterium of Truth; and that they all disagree with respect to the fundamental notions and principles of Logic, Physics, and Ethics. Denying the existence of any self-apparent Certainty (in consequence of the contradictions which prevail in the theses of Philosophers), he begins by demanding that every truth should be proved; and then goes on to show that such proof is impossible, for want of self-evident data. Beginning with such principles he proceeds to demolish all the scientific labours of the human mind, not excepting the Mathematics. 193. Such a system of Scepticism had the tendency to cut short all farther research; and appearing incontrovertible, it stood forth in a terrible aspect. Nevertheless, such a Scepticism contained in itself its own contradiction; it clashes with the natural tendency of the human reason, without being able to make good the object it promised to realise, the repose of the mind. At the time when it appeared it seems to have made little impression, in consequence of the slight interest then felt for philosophical studies; and it died with Saturninus (also called Cythenas), Adv. Math. I, 9. 2 Ibid. 361, sqq. a disciple of Sextus. The only persons who paid attention to it were some physicians, such as Galen (De optimo docendi genere), and the philosopher Plotinus. The latter opposed to it a visionary and hyperphysical Dogmatism. Philosophic Doctrines of the Jews and Gentiles. 6 194. It has not been perfectly ascertained whether at this period there existed an Eastern School of Philosophy, ̓Ανατολικὴ διδασκαλία. It has been asserted by Mosheim, Brucker, Walch,' and Buhle; and denied by Meiners and Tiedemann. It is impossible to controvert the existence of certain opinions peculiar to the East; but the question is, whether they had already assumed a philosophical form and character, or whether they were not rather developed and brought to perfection in proportion to the progress which Grecian philosophy, and particularly that of Plato, made among the Orientals." This last conjecture becomes still more probable when we reflect that at this period appeared the apocryphal writings, falsely ascribed to Zoroaster, Hermes, and others; as well as when we remark the efforts made by several Gnostics," to depreciate the works of Plato.12 1 DIOG. LAERT. IX, 116. 3 See § 203. 2 See § 185. 4 PLOT. Enn. V, lib. V, II. 5 Cf. THEODOT. in FABRICIUS, Bibl. Gr. tom. V, p. 135; PORPHYR. Vita Plotini, E. XVI; EUNAPII Vita Ædesii, p. 61. 6 Hist. Crit. Phil. tom. II, c. 3, p. 639, sqq. 7 Commentat. de Philosophiâ Orientali, in MICHAELIS Syntagma Commentatt. part II, p. 279. 8+ History of Philosophy, p. 170. 9+ Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, tom. III, p. 98. The same (a prize composition): De Artium Magicarum Origine, Marb. 1788, 8vo. 10 BOUTERWECK, in an excellent treatise, which we shall have occasion to notice (§ 201), considers the mystical doctrines of Immediate Intuition, and the Emanation of Spirits, as having been derived from the East and from Persia; particularly through the channel of Alexandria, where they had already been long established. MATTEI, Essai historique sur l'école d'Alexandrie, tom. II, ch. 8, &c. 11 PLOTINUS, Enn. I, lib. IX, 6. 12 See BUHLE, Compendium of the History of Philosophy (§ 37), part IV, p. 73, sqq: and the larger work of TENNEMANN on the History of Philosophy (ibid.) tom. VI, p. 438. 195. On the supposition that the Orientals had a philosophy of their own, it is natural to suppose that the immense extent of the Roman Empire would bring it into contact with that of the Western Nations, and contribute to their admixture. History has afforded us proof of this in the doctrines of the Jews, the Gnostics, and the Neoplatonists. Alexandria, where, from the time of the Ptolemies, every system of philosophy had been taught, was the principal point of union between the Eastern and Western doctrines. I. Jews. See the works mentioned in § 73. 196. During their exile the Jews had collected many opinions belonging to the religion and philosophy of Zoroaster (§ 70), for example, that of a Primitive Light, of two Principles, the Good and the Evil, and of the Demons. Subsequently, a certain number of their countrymen who had settled in Egypt, and, in consequence of their medical studies had engaged in speculation (particularly those who were devoted to a contemplative life, and therefore called Therapeuta), acquired some knowledge of Grecian philosophy; but, faithful to their national prejudice, that all wisdom must have originated from the Jews, they regarded the truths which they met among the Greeks, as well as all that agreed with their ancient religious traditions, as a theft. In order to substantiate this idea, Aristeas2 devised the story of an ancient translation into Greek of the Old Testament; and Aristobulus,3 a Peripatetic, forged certain Apocryphal books and passages. The resemblance of the Essenes to the Pythagoreans had already been observed. See J. J. BELLERMANN, Historical Evidences respecting the Essenes and Therapeutæ, Berlin, 1821, 8vo. 2 HUMFREDI HODY, contra Historiam Aristeæ de LXX interpretibus, etc. Oxon. 1685, 8vo. Et: De Bibliorum Textibus Origine, Versionibus, etc. 1705, fol. 3 LUD. CASP. VALKENAER, Diatribe de Aristobulo Judæo, Philosopho Peripatetico, Lugd. Bat. 1806, 4to. Other critics however consider the very existence of this author as doubtful, and attribute the Commentaries on the books of Moses, which bear his name, to a later period. He lived, perhaps, in the time of Ptolemy Philometor. |