313. Although the basis of philosophical Science had not been fundamentally and exhaustively examined, yet the philosophic spirit received continually additions to its power and elasticity. The particular Scientific Sciences made continual advances towards a greater perfection, and philosophy received the greatest extension through the application of its form to the whole province of human knowledge. The Method was, moreover, perfected, the language more developed, and a deeper and more penetrating research was diffused. 314. Practical philosophy was long neglected, because the aim of philosophers was principally directed to speculation. Thomas Aquinas (§ 266), together with his numerous commentators, the Casuists, and (among the Protestants) Aristotle, were long the leaders during this epoch. The Theologians sought zealously to appropriate to themselves the entire province of practical knowledge as their property, and to keep down all spirit of inquiry. A leading thought had been inherited from the Scholastic age, i. e., that God, as Creator of the World, is the Ultimate Basis of all Legal Obligations which spring either from subjective or objective motives and foundations in His Will. This view, which is true in itself, found a support in the consideration attached to divine Revelation; and not only Theologians, but also theologizing philosophers, sought to develope and substantiate it in conformity with their individual points of view. Municipal Legislation, which was the farthest removed from Theology, and the juristic relations of states and peoples, gradually occasioned examinations of these matters. The spirit of inquiry was gradually guided into the province of practical philosophy, through the effort of giving a firm hold to the ruling convictions by means of rational insight and a rational faith; and also, of confirming revealed religion by rational grounds. Hence a certain zeal was awakened for exploring the moral nature of man, and for uniting theoretic and practical philosophy. See Professor SAVIGNY'S Works on Jurisprudence, and the Development of Municipal Institutions in Europe, especially his Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, 3 vols. 8vo. Heidelb. 1834. ATTEMPTS TO GROUND PHILOSOPHICAL I. The Empirism of Bacon. MALLET'S Life of Bacon, prefixed to his Works. RAWLAY, the same; and R. STEPHEN, Letters and Remains of Lord Chancellor Bacon, Lond. 1734, 4to. For the services rendered by Bacon to Philosophy, see HEYDENREICH, in his translation of Cromaziano, vol. I, p. 306. SPRENGEL, Life of Bacon, in the (Halle) Biographia, vol. VIII, No. 1. FEUERBACH, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, von Bacon bis Spinoza (1833), 1844, sec. 32-91. 315. Francis Bacon, lord Verulam, appeared in England as a reformer of Philosophy; a man of clear and penetrating judgment, great learning, great knowledge of the world and men, but of a character not free from reproach. He was born in London, A.D. 1561; attained the highest offices in the state, which he ultimately lost through his failings, and died 1626. In his youth he studied the Aristotelian system of the schools, and the Classics. The latter study, as well as the practical pursuits to which he presently devoted himself, taught him the poverty and insufficiency of the former. In his maturer age he applied himself to consider the means of reforming the Method of Philosophy, to which end he composed some works, which by the new principles they developed had even greater influence over the fortunes of philosophy than if he had completed an entire system of his own. 316. Bacon chose a new path, altogether opposed to the beaten one he wished to see the fabric of human knowledge built not on conceptions through conclusions, but on Experience or perception through Induction, a method which had already been imperfectly attempted by Telesius (§ 298). 1 De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (Latin) 1603; (English), Lond. 1605. His Works, Amsterd. 1662, 6 vols. 12mo., with a Life by W RAWLAY: Lond. 1740, fol. 4 vols. by MALLET: and 1765, 5 vols. 4to. Novum Organum Scientiarum, Lond. 1620, fol. F. BACON'S Neues Organ der Wissenschaften, aus dem Lateinischen übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung und Anmerkungen begleitet von ANT TH. BRUCK, Leipz. Although his views may be said to be in some degree partial, yet he deserves the highest admiration and praise for his triumphant attacks on the School-philosophy; for having applied for information to Nature and Experience; for having referred the question of Final Causes to Metaphysics rather than Physics; for a clear development of certain notions in Psychology, e. g. that of the Association of Ideas, as also by his well-digested refutation of some of the superstitions of his age, and the composition of his Organum, in which he sets forth a new method of extending knowledge by means of Induction; and his systematic review of all sciences, with his determination of their position at that time, and suggestions for their improvement and extension, in his book, De Augmentis Scientiarum.1 To show how far Bacon was from being a mere Empirist, it is sufficient to refer to his expressions relative to the science and object of Philosophy. Science, he says, is nothing more than the image of Truth, inasmuch as the Truth of Being (esse,) and the Truth of knowing, only differ as a direct ray of light does from a refracted one. The object of Philosophy is threefold, God-Nature-Man. Nature presents itself to our understanding, as it were, by a direct ray of light, while God is revealed to us only by a reflected one.3 11. Philosophical system of Campanella. THOME CAMPANELLE De Libris propriis, et recta ratione studendi Syntagma (ed. GABR. NAUDÆUS), Par. 1642, 8vo.; Amstel. 1645; Rotterd. 1692, 4to. See also, CRENII Collectio Tractatuum de Philologiæ studiis, liberalis Doctrinæ Informatione et Educatione Literaria, Lugd. Bat. 1696, 4to. ERN. SAL. CYPRIANI Vita et Philos. Thomæ Campanellæ, Amstel. 1705, 8vo.; ed. II, 1722, 8vo. Consult German Museum, 1780, No. XII, p. 481; and SCHRÖCKH, Biogr. etc., tom. I, p. 281. Prodromus Philosophiæ Instaurandæ, id est, Dissertationis de Natura Rerum Compendium secundum Vera Principia ex scriptis Th. Campanellæ præmissum (per Toв. ADAMI), Francof. 1017, 4to. It is very likely that the works of Bacon suggested to J. Barclay his Treatise, called Icon Animorum, Lond. 1614, 8vo. We shall have occasion to speak of Cumberland and Hobbes presently. 2 De Augm. Sc., I, col. 18. 3 Ibid. Sc. III, c. I. + Doctrine of Campanella on Human Knowledge, with some Remarks on his Philosophical System, by FULLEBORN, Collect. Fasc. VI, p. 114. We have already had occasion (§ 298) to mention one work of Campanella, to which we may add these: De Sensu Rerum et Magia, Francf. 1620. Philosophiæ Rationalis et Realis partes V, Paris. 1638, 4to. Universalis Philosophiæ sive Metaphysicarum Rerum juxta propria Dogmata partes tres, Paris. 1638, fol. Atheismus Triumphatus, Roma, 1631, fol. Ad Doctorem Gentium de Gentilismo non metinendo et de Prædestinatione et Gratia, Paris. 1636, 4to. Realis Philosophiæ Epilogisticæ partes IV: hoc est, De Rerum Natura, Hominum Moribus, Politica, cui Civitas Solis adjuncta est, Economica cum Adnotationibus Physiologicis a TOBIA ADAMO, nunc primum edita, Francf. ad M. 1623, 4to. Prodromus Philosophiæ Instaurandæ. Civitas Solis, Ultraj. 1643, 12mo. Scelta d'alcune Poesie Filosofiche di SEPTIMANO SQUILLA, 1632, (sine loco). 317. The contemporary of Bacon, Thomas Campanella, (born at Stilo in Calabria, 1568), made a like attempt to deduce all knowledge from Nature and Experience. Endowed with admirable talents, and carefully brought up, he entered the order of Dominicans, and pursued his philosophical studies as a novice in the convent of Cosenza; but when, by his own reflections as well as in consequence of the objection of Telesius,' he was led to suspect the universal authority of Aristotle, he shook off the prejudices of his education, and endeavoured to satisfy his doubts by studying the remains of other ancient philosophers. But finding that these, as well as the remarks of Telesius himself, who attracted him by the freedom of his inquiries, were insufficient to set his mind completely at rest, he sought for philosophy by a path of his own. He admitted the existence of two sources, and only two, of all knowledge. Revelation and Nature: the first the source of Theology, the last of Philosophy: in other words, the Histories of God and of Mankind. Scepticism, with Campanella, was but a transitory state of the mind: he was too eager to supply its place by a dogmatic edifice of his own, without having cleared his way to it by previous preparation (Propädeutik). He had embraced too great a diversity of pursuits, and aspired to effect a reformation in every art and science, without Telesius was born at Cosenza, where he died, 1588. having acquired a sufficient command of the necessary details. The adversities of his life contributed much to impede his progress as a philosophical reformer: for having been accused of disloyalty to the Spanish government, he was kept twenty-seven years in strict confinement; and when at last, in 1626, acquitted and set at liberty, he was obliged to remove for security to Paris, where he died in 1639. 318. Campanella had a clear and philosophical head, and extensive knowledge; with a genuine love of Truth; which last he asserted to be the proper foundation of all philosophy. He also proposed a new arrangement of the Sciences. His views were often just and clear respecting philosophizing as well as other matters, but his hasty and impatient spirit prevented his bringing them to perfection. His principal efforts were directed to the construction of a system of Metaphysics containing the principles of Theology, Natural History, and Morals. He looked upon the Metaphysics of Aristotle (so called) as nothing more than a sort of Logic, and a Vocabulary. Metaphysics is a necessary science, because our senses convey to us only that which is contingent and individual, without informing us as to the general relations of things and their real nature. Logic is not a science of that which is real and necessary-God and His creation; but an art of language adapted to philosophy (Phil. Rat. II, 2). The only avenue to knowledge is by the senses: Sensation and Emotion (Empfindung) are the sources of knowledge (Sentire est Scire). Consistently with this theory he resolved into Sensation all the operations of the mind. Sensation or Feeling is the perception of being affected or suffering: hence Memory is also Sensation, only under certain conditions. He also asserted that Thought itself is nothing but a combination of the results of Sensation; which combination itself is presented to us by means of Sense or Feeling. 319. The object which Campanella had most at heart was the completion of a system of Dogmatism, which might be successfully opposed to Scepticism; and of which he gave a sufficiently accurate outline in his Metaphysics (lib. I). He either replies to the causes of doubt assigned by the Sceptic School, or invalidates them, or their consequences. He U |