lated, without having been produced the one by the other. All finite things (e. g. Body and Soul) exist in the Deity; the Deity is their immanent Cause, Natura naturans. He himself is not finite, though from him all finite things have necessarily proceeded: there is no such thing as Accident, but an universal Necessity, which in the case of the Deity is united to Liberty; because the Deity is the only Substance, and alone is not circumscribed by the existence or operations of any other being. He operates according to the internal necessity of His own nature; and His will and knowledge are inseparable. There is no free Causality of Ends and final Causes; but only the Causality of Necessity and natural Causes. The immediate and direct conception of any real and present thing is called the Spirit or Soul (Mens) of such a thing; and the thing itself, or the direct and immediate object of such a conception, is called the Body of such Spirit. United, they compose one and the same individual object; which may be apprehended in a twofold relation, under that of the attribute Thought or the attribute Extension. All ideas, as far as they have a relation to the Deity, are true; because all ideas which exist in the Divine mind are perfectly correspondent to their respective Objects; and consequently every idea of our own which is absolute, perfect, and corresponds with its object, is true also, and discloses itself; and the Reason contemplates things according to their true nature, inasmuch as it contemplates them with a view to their eternal and necessary properties.2 Falsehood has its origin in the negation of Thought; which entails the admission of irregular and imperfect thoughts. Every idea of a real object embraces at the same time the eternal and infinite essence of God, (Prop. 45): the knowledge of the Infinite and Eternal Essence of God which every idea embraces in itself is adequate and complete. The human understanding can therefore adequately apprehend the nature of God. On the other hand, the knowledge we are able to acquire of individual objects is neces

1 Prop. 43. "Sicut lux seipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est."

26 E natura rationis non est, res ut contingentes, sed ut necessarias contemplari (et) sub quadam eternitatis specie percipere."-Propos. 44. 3 Eth. P. II, Propos. 32-34 sqq. 4 Prop. 46, 47.

sarily imperfect. In the lively knowledge of the Deity consists our greatest happiness: since the more that we know of God, the more inclined we are to live according to his will; in which consists at the same time our happiness and our free-will:-Deo parere summa libertas est. Nevertheless our Will is not absolutely free, inasmuch as the mind is directed to this or that end by some external cause, which cause is dependent on another, and so on in perpetual concatenation, In like manner no other faculty of the mind is altogether absolute and uncontrolled. prop. 48).

(P. II,

339. The leading ideas of his system Spinoza had amassed in the course of his early study of the Rabbinical writings, and the theory of Descartes had only supplied him with a scientific form. He draws all his conclusions, after the mathematical method, by a regular deduction from a small number of axioms and a few leading conceptions, which he assumes to be self-evident, such as those of Substance and Causality. His conclusions have all a mathematical strictness, and constitute a perfect edifice if you grant him his premises; but they appear to labour in this respect, that it may be questioned how the infinitude of finite objects is a necessary result of the infinite attributes of the Deity. The grand defect of his theory is, that all Individuality and Free-will is lost in subordination to the Divine Substance, and that his system of Ethics is made one of mere Physics, because all finite things, in so far as they are determinations of the Infinite, belong to the necessary Essence of God, but as finite determinations form parts of a chain of absolute and necessary Causality. The profoundness of his ideas; the syllogistic method of his reasoning; the hardihood of his attempt to explain things finite by infinite; give an air of obscurity to the whole system, and make it difficult to be apprehended in its peculiar character: it does not, however, deserve the appellation of an atheistic theory, which has been liberally bestowed upon it ever since its first appearance, rather in consequence of the pas sions of the disputants, than from anything contained in "Amor Dei non nisi ex cognitione ejus oritur."-Tract. Theol. cap. IV, p. 42. 2 Ep. 62. See Tract. Theol.-Polit. cap. XVI.

the work itself. It is rather a system of Pantheism (not material like that of the Eleatæ, but formal), which embraces and illustrates the most exalted idea of the Divinity, as the Original Esse (Urseyn), so far as it was attained by specu lations purely ontological. Nevertheless, such a conception does not satisfy the reason, and contradicts the principles of Theism, such as reason is obliged to presuppose, especially in their practical relations and applications.

340. Spinoza's character was no less misrepresented than his doctrines. Few at first dared to profess themselves his friends and adherents. His first opponents, either from not having understood his system, or from some secret attachment to it which they were at pains to conceal, allowed him to have the advantage, and contributed to his reputation. Of this number were: Fr. Cuper," Boulainvilliers,3 Chr. Wittich, (who answered him the most fully of them all), P. Poiret, Sam. Parker (§ 342), and Isaac Jacquelot. Those who undertook the conflict with more sincerity (such as J. Brendonburg), found themselves involved in contra

1 Of these we may mention, J. Oldenberg, who nevertheless, on many points, differed from Spinoza. The following writers have, perhaps improperly, been designated as Spinozists: the physicians L. MEYER and LUCAS, the first the author of a work entitled Philosophia Sacræ Scripturæ interpres : see § 336, note; X. JELLES, ABR. CUFAELER, who defended and exposed Spinozism in two treatises: Specimen Artis Ratiocinandi Naturalis et Artificialis ad Pantasophiæ Principia manuducens, Hamb. (Amst.) 1684; et Principiorum Pantosophiæ, P. II, et P. III, Hamb. 1684; J. G. WACHTER, Concordia Rationis et Fidei, etc., Amstel. (Berol.), 1692, 8vo. ; and THEOD. LUD. LAW: Meditationes de Deo, Mundo, et Homine, Francof, 1717, 8vo, et: Meditationes, Theses, dubia Philosophico-Theologica, Freystadt, 1719, 8vo.

2 Arcana Atheismi Revelata; a work severely censured by H. MORE, Opp. Philos. tom. I, p. 596, and by JÆGER: Fr. Cuperus mala fide aut ad minimum frigide Atheismum Spinozæ oppugnans, Tub. 1710. 3 The Comte de Boulainvilliers; born 1658, died 1722. See bibliography of § 337. 4 See § 337.

5 See § 337. POIRET, Fundamenta Atheismi eversa; in his Cogitata de Deo, etc.

6 Born in Champagne, 1674; died 1708.

ISAAC JACQUELOT, Dissertations sur l'Existence de Dieu, etc., par la Réfutation du Système d'Epicure et de Spinoza, La Haye, 1697. See § 334, note.

7 Enervatio Tractatus Theologico-Politici, una cum Demonstatione geometrico ordine disposita, Naturam non esse Deum, Roterod. 1675, 4to

dictions, being unable to refute the demonstration of Spinoza, and not enduring to admit its validity.

It is only of late that the talents and opinions of Spinoza have been better appreciated; at the same time that the Critical method of the Rationalists has enabled them to detect the weak side of his system.1

The most recent philosophical system approaches in many respects that of Spinoza.

III. Malebranche. Fardella.

FONTENELLE, Eloge de Malebranche, dans le tom. I, de ses Eloges des Académiciens, La Haye, 1731, p. 317.

NIC. MALEBRANCHE, De la Recherche de la Vérité, Paris, 1673, 12mo.; seventh edit. 1712, 2 vols. 4to., or 4 vols. 12mo. In Lat. by LENFANT, De Inquirenda Veritate, Genev. 1691, 4to.; 1753, 2 vols. 4to. NIC. MALEBRANCHE, Conversations Chrétiennes, 1677. De la Nature et de la Grâce, Amst. 1680, 12mo. Méditations Chrétiennes et Métaphysiques, Cologne (Rouen), 1683, 12mo.

MALEBRANCHE, Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la Religion, Rotterd. 1688, 8vo. Entretiens d'un Philosophique Chrétien et d'un Philosophe Chinois, sur la Nature de Dieu, Paris, 1708. Réflexions sur la Prémotion Physique, etc. Paris, 1715, 8vo.; Œuvres, Paris, 1712, 11 vols. 12mo.

341. Nicole Malebranche, one of the Fathers of the Oratoire, whose disadvantageous person concealed a pro found genius, and indisputably the greatest metaphysician that France has produced,* developed the ideas of Descartes, and imparted to them a fresh originality, and greater clearness and vivacity: but his views of religion led him to superadd some tenets of his own inclining to mysticism.

' CHRISTIAN WOLFF, for instance, and BAYLE; the first of whom has refuted the system of Spinoza in his + Translation of his Ethics, Francf. and Hamb. 1744, 8vo. See also JARIGES, quoted at the head of § 338. The dispute between Jacobi and Mendelssohn on the Spinozism of Lessing, was the occasion of a great number of writings respecting the tenets of Spinoza. See the same section. The + Translation of the Ethics of Spinoza, by EWALD (Gera, 1791-33, 8vo.), also contains a refutation of Spinozism, on the principles of the Critical system.

2 Born at Paris 1638; died 1715.

*This observation requires limitation. In the nineteenth century V. Cousin, P. Leroux, Jouffroy, &c., may probably dispute the palm with Malebranche.-ED.

He has been peculiarly successful in discussing the theory of knowledge, the sources of error, (especially those which have their origin in illusions of the Imagination), as well as in his examination of the proper Method for the investigation of Truth. He described the understanding as passive; maintained extension to be the characteristic of Body; the soul to be an essence simple in its nature, and therefore distinct from its body; and represented the Deity as the only Real Basis of all thought and all being. These opinions led him to controvert, by acute arguments, the doctrine of Innate Ideas, and gave rise to the extraordinary assertion peculiar to him, that it is in and through the Divinity that we have an intuitive perception of all things, which are comprehended intellectually in His essence; that the Divinity is the Intellectual World; Infinite and Universal Reason, and the abode of Spirits: in these respects making near approaches to Spinozism. The doctrine of Occasionalism (which he enlarged and extended) is closely connected with such speculations; by which he was farther led to assign to the Soul and Body a sort of passive activity, and to represent the Deity as the only original cause of all their changes: a species of religiousmystical Idealism. We may trace in it the consequences of a blind devotion to Demonstration, as the only method of attaining philosophical knowledge. The Abbé Foucher opposed to his system one of scepticism.

1 SIMON FOUCHER, Critique de la Recherche de la Vérité.

Among the authors who discussed and opposed the theory of Malebranche, we may mention FATHER DU TERTRE (who did not understand it): Réfutation du nouveau Système de Métaphysique composé par le Père Malebranche, Paris, 1718, 3 vols. 12mo.; and ANT. ARNAULD: Des Vrais et des Fausses Idées contre ce qu'enseigne l'Auteur de la Recherche de la Vérité, Cologne, 1683, 8vo. To the latter work Malebranche replied by his Réponse de l'Auteur de la Recherche de la Vérité au livre de M. Arnauld, des Vrais et des Fausses Idées, Rotterdam, 1684. Défense de M. Arnauld contre la Réponse au livre des Fausses Idées, Cologne, 1684, 12mo.; Trois Lettres de l'Auteur de la Recherche de la Vérité, touchant la Défense de M. Arnauld contre la Réponse, Rotterd. 1685, 12mo. The dispute was prolonged in some other writings; by LOCKE, in the second vol. of his Miscell. Works, Amsterd. 1732, 8vo. and by LEIBNITZ, in the second vol. of a Collection of Philosophical Pieces, by LEIBNITZ, CLARKE, NEWTON, etc., 2nd edit. Amst. 1740, 8vo.