53. It is thus that man advances, from a state of consciousness, obscure and imperfect, to an enlightened knowledge; from poetry to thinking; from faith to science; from individual to universal. It it thus that, guided by an obscure sentiment of truth, of harmony, of analogy, he prosecutes the pursuit of something certain and necessary; to which may be referred all the points of belief which have attracted his attention; and which may establish the certainty of them. It is thus that he attempts philosophy, at first to satisfy his own mind; afterwards, with a more general view, for the advancement of Reason itself. In the natural order of her progress, Philosophy apprehends at first the complex objects of the world without, which are of a nature to excite in a lively manner its attention; subsequently, it advances by degrees to objects more difficult of apprehension, more obscure, more internal, and more simple.

Observation. This progress may be observed to obtain in a greater or less degree, and with different modifications, among all nations. There is, however, this difference, that only a few have elevated the subjective thinking of the human mind to the rank of a scientific philosophy;-whence proceeds this difference?

54. Philosophy, when it has assumed a scientific character, has a tendency, by the investigation of causes, of the laws, and the ultimate ends of things, to constitute human knowledge as an integral system, independent, and fundamentally established (§ 2 and 44). Such is the task of reason in philosophy; but we must also distinguish the differences which exist in its aim, method, and results.

55. As to its aim, philosophy may be influenced by a solitary and partial curiosity, confined to one point of view, or stimulated by a more liberal and scientific interest, at once practical and theoretical. As to method, it proceeds, on general topics, either from principles to consequences (the synthetic order); or from consequences to principles (the analytic order); and, in special matter, as far as relates to the starting point of its researches, it advances, either from a complete and profound inquiry into the nature of our faculties of cognition to the knowledge itself of things; or from the assumed knowledge of things to the theory of knowledge. This last method of proceeding is called, since the time of Kant, the Dogmatic method, or Dogmatism; the other, the Critical method.

56. The non-critical philosophy has for its aim to establish certain points of doctrine (dogmata) from a blind trust in the reason, or to destroy the dogmatic opinions of others from a blind mistrust of the reason; in which latter case it has the tendency, as it does not substitute other principles for those which it removes, to establish uncertainty and doubt as most consistent with reason. The first of these two schools ends in dogmatism positive; the second in scepticism, or dogmatism negative.

Remark. Dogmatism follows a true idea of reason by a false path. The sceptic attacks the faith of the dogmatist, and endeavours to establish a methodical ignorance, by means of which he destroys that idea of reason. Thus there is truth and error in both doctrines.

See CHRIST. WEISS, De Scepticismi causis atque natura. Lips. 1801, 4to.; ADOLPH SIEDLER, De Scepticismo commentatio, Halle, 1827; and the works above indicated, § 38, II.

57. Dogmatism pretends, either that human reason is, of itself, capable of attaining to a knowledge of the laws and the nature of things; or that it cannot attain thereto without a superior instruction and guidance. The first of these doctrines is Naturalism, or Rationalism, in its most extended signification; the other is Supernaturalism.

58. Rationalism, in the most extended signification of the word, proceeds sometimes upon knowledge, sometimes (like that of Jacobi) upon belief; and either demonstrates the esse (das Seyn) of our representations and knowledge, by the reality of the objects; or, contrariwise, the esse of the objects, by the certainty of the impressions. In the first of these cases we have Realism, which takes for its principle the reality of things; in the second case we have Idealism, which takes our representations as the original things. Several philosophical systems, on the other hand, maintain an original oneness of knowing and being, a view which they sometimes present chiefly in a speculative form) such as the system of Absolute Identity), whilst at other times they represent or assume it as a psychological fact, like the system of Critical Synthetism, and other dualistic views.

59. Dogmatism, with reference to the means of acquiring knowledge, is either Sensationalism or Rationalism in a more restricted sense; or compounded of both (either by blending them,-intellectual perception, or without any

mixture). As far as relates to the origin of knowledge, dogmatism becomes either Empirism, or Nöologism; or compounded of both. Lastly, with reference to the number of fundamental principles, it becomes Dualism or Monism; and to this last description belong both Materialism and Spiritualism, as well as the system of Absolute Identity.

There

60. Supernaturalism not only asserts that the Deity is the real basis of all that exists, but also the source of all truth by revelation; thus referring all knowledge to a supernatural source, unattainable by the steps of science. are diversities in this system, according to the manner in which revelation is considered relatively to its subject or its object; as universal or particular; and as superior or subordinate to reason; or co-ordinate with it.

Observation. Supernaturalism has this in common with Scepticism, that it lays great stress on the false pretensions and the inefficiency of the reason. But by having recourse to a supernaturalist medium, it easily falls into a dogmatism of another kind.

61. Scepticism is opposed to Dogmatism, inasmuch as it seeks to diminish the confidence of reason in the success of its efforts. It uses as arguments the errors which are often with justice imputed to dogmatism, or alleges certain formal propositions of its own, relative to the end and the principles of knowledge. It is, therefore, the perpetual antagonist of dogmatism; but in disputing the pretensions to which knowledge lays claim, it proceeds even to deny its existence and destroy it altogether. Scepticism is sometimes universal, sometimes particular, and has been the precursor of the critical method, which leads to the true science of reason.

62. The result of philosophizing research is philosophy; and there can be only one philosophy, which is that ideal of the science reason perpetually aims at (§ 2). But the various attempts of individual thinkers to attain thereto have given occasion to a number of systems, which approximate this ideal object and each other in proportion to the degree of the development in the knowledge they evince of the reason, the true end and principles of philosophy,—to the extent of information they convey, the validity of the reasoning they contain, and the accuracy of their technical language (cf. § 3).

Observation. Until a more complete examination of the powers of the reason shall have been instituted, and a more extensive analysis of the faculty of knowledge, systems of philosophy must inevitably contain a mixture of universal and particular, of true and false, of determinate and indeterminate, of objective and subjective. All these qualities suffer increments, blendings, and divisions, in various degrees, during the process of their propagation and diffusion. (e. g., Plato's Innate Ideas).

63. These different systems are opposed to each other and to scepticism. The consequence has been a contest which we see carried on with a greater or less degree of ardour, maintained by the love of truth, and too frequently also by private interests and passions; until at last either indifference, or a revolution in the direction of reason, or the acuteness of logicians and critics, put an end to it for the time, and introduced a more liberal system of inquiry.

64. More than one system has figured upon the stage in various dresses, and certain philosophical questions have frequently been repeated under different forms. These apparent reiterations do not, however, prove that philosophy has been retarded in its progress; the repetition of old ideas does not render its advance towards new ones more tardy, but only more sure. By this very circumstance analysis is rendered more exact and more complete ; and the search after unity, consistency, and perfection, more accurate and profound. The ideal of the science is more completely grasped, and better appreciated; errors and unfounded theories are more cautiously avoided.

65. But, with all these retrogradations and moments of apparent relaxation, advancement is impossible except by the aid of a sustained zeal for philosophical investigation. This science demands a perpetual agitation of doubts and discussions; of controversy between dogmatism and scepticism, between the partizans of ancient systems and of modern ideas.

PARTICULAR INTRODUCTION.

RAPID REVIEW OF THE RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL OPINIONS OF THE ORIENTAL NATIONS, AND OF THE FIRST PERIODS OF GRECIAN CIVILIZATION.

To this head belong the works on the religions and the discoveries of the East at large; some of which, for example those of Plessing, have been noticed above, § 38; see, besides, the mythological treatises, such as:

+ FR. CREUZER, Symbolical and Mythological System of the Ancients, etc. 4 vols. Leips. and Darmstadt, 1810-12, second edition, 1820 (and following years), 5 vols. 8vo. 4 vols. 8vo. Lips. 1843.

† J. GÖRRES, History of the Fables of the Asiatic World, 2 vols. Heidelb. 1810, 8vo.

+ J. J. WAGNER, Ideas towards an Universal Mythology of the Ancient World, Frankfort on the M. 1808, 8vo.

† J. G. RHODE, On the Age and Merit of certain Records of Oriental Antiquity, Berlin, 1817-18. And Memoirs towards illustrating the science of Antiquities, No. I, Berlin, 1819, No. II, 1820, 8vo.

Particularly a dissertation in No. I, on the most Ancient Religious Systems of the East.

L. C. BAUR, Symbolical and Mythological Systems, 2 parts, Stuttg. 1825, 8vo.

66. Instruction was in part conveyed by the nations of Asia to the Greeks; and the latter had gone through many gradations of intellectual improvement before the epoch when a philosophical spirit was awakened among them. Accordingly, it may not be foreign to our purpose to give a rapid sketch of the religious and philosophical opinions of the oriental nations, as well as of the first advances of intellectual improvement among the Greeks, in order to be enabled to estimate, at least generally, the influence which the former may have had over Grecian genius in its infancy; and consequently over philosophy itself, in its manner as well as its matter. The Hindoos, the Persians, the Chaldeans, the Egyptians, and the Phoenicians, are the principal nations with whom the Greeks have had any intercourse.

1 On the general character of thought in the East, see above, § 19.