LAMPRECHT, Leben des Herrn v. Leibnitz, Berlin, 1749, 8vo. Geschichte des Herrn von Leibnitz, aus den Franz. des RITTER V. JANCOURT, Leipz. 1757, 8vo.

A. G. KASTNER's Lobschrift auf Leibnitz, Altona, 1769, 4to.

MICH. HISSMANN, Versuch über das Leben des Freiherrn von Leib. nitz, Münster, 1783, 8vo.

A Life of Leibnitz, by REHBERG, is to be found in the + Hanoverian Magazine, 1787, year xxv; and another among the + Lives and Characters of distinguished Germans, by KLEIN, 1 vol.; as well as a third in the German Pantheon, by EBERHARD.

GUHRAUER, Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von Leibnitz: eine Biographie, (1842-1846).

355. The comprehensive genius of Gottfried William Leibnitz embraced the whole circle of philosophy, and imparted to it, in Germany at least, a new and powerful impulse. All that can interest or exercise the understanding was attempted by his great and original mind, more especially in Mathematics and Philosophy. He was ignorant of no one branch of learning, and in all he has shown the fertility of his mind by the discoveries he suggested or attempted. He was the founder of a school in Germany, which distinguished itself for the fundamental nature of the principles it embraced, and the systematic manner in which these were developed a school which effected the final overthrow of the Scholastic system, and extended its beneficial influence over the whole range of the sciences. Leibnitz, by his example and his exertions, laid the foundations of this great revolution, by combining the philosophical systems which had prevailed up to his time by his welltrained and original spirit-by his extraordinary learningthe liberality of his mind, and that spirit of toleration which led him always to discover some favourable point of view in what he criticised-something, even in the most despised and neglected systems, which might suggest matter for research. To this must be added his sense of harmony, and the infinitude of bright ideas, hints, and conjectures, which were perpetually, as it were, scintillating from his brilliant mind, though he left to others the task of collecting and combining them.

He was born June 21, 1646, at Leipsic, where his father was professor of moral philosophy, and studied the same

science under J. Thomasius (born 1622, died 1684), applying himself at the same time to the Mathematics1 and the study of Natural Law; read the Classics in the original tongues, particularly Plato and Aristotle, whose doctrines he endeavoured at an early age to combine. The cultivation of his mind was advanced, and the versatility and address of his natural parts promoted, by immense reading and a multifarious correspondence-by his early independence of mind-by his travels, particularly to Paris and Londonand by his acquaintance with the most distinguished statesmen and princes, and most illustrious sages of his time. He died, November 14, 1716, at Hanover, of which state he was a privy-councillor and keeper of the library; scarcely less honoured after his death than during his life, as is testified, among other things, by a monument recently erected to him.

§ 356.

Works: His Dissert. de Principio Individuationis. Lips. 1664. Specimen Quæstionum Philosophicarum ex Jure collectarum, ibid. eod. Tract de Arte Combinatoria, cui subnexa est Demonstratio Existentiæ Dei ad Mathematicam certitudinem exacta, Lips. 1666; Fref. 1694. The first Philosophical Treatises of Leibnitz are to be found in the Acta Eruditorum, from 1684; and in the Journal des Savans, from 1691.

GOTTFR. W. LEIBNITII Opera, studio LUD. DUTENS, Genev. 1768, 6 vols. 4to. Opera Philosophica, ed. ERDMANN, roy. 8vo. Berol. 1840. German works, ed. by GUHRAUER, 8vo. Berl. 1838, et seq. Euvres Philosophiques, par M. RUD. ERICH RASPE et M. KASTNER, Amsterd. 1765, 4to. The German edition contains Remarks and Additions, by J. H. F. ULRICH, Halle, 1778-1780, 2 vols. 8vo.

A Collection of Papers which passed between the late learned M. LEIBNITZ and Dr. Clarke, in the years 1715 and 1716, relating to the Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion; London, 1717, 8vo.

Leibnitii Otium Hanoveranum, sive Miscellanea G. W. Leibnitii, ed. JOACH. FS. FELLER, Lips. 1718, 8vo.; et, Monumenta varia inedita, Lips. 1724, 4to. Epistolæ ad Diversos, ed. CHR. KORTHOLD, Lips. 1734, 1742, 4 vols. 8vo.

Commercium Epistolicum Leibnitianum, ed. Jo. DAN. GRUBER, Hanov. et Götting. 1745, 2 vols. 4to.

1 Under Erh. Weigel, at Jena, (who died 1690).

Commercii Epistolici Leibnitiani typis nondum evulgati selecta specimina, ed JOH. GE. H. FEDER, Hanov. 1805, 8vo.

Comparison between the Metaphysics of Leibnitz and Newton (§ 347, bibliogr.), by L. MART. KAHLE, Götting. 1741; translated into French, Hague, 1747, 8vo. A similar work (French), by BEGUELIN, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Berlin, 1756.

Recueil de Diverses Pièces sur la Philosophie, la Religion, etc., par MM. Leibnitz, Clarke, Newton (publ. par DES MAIZEAUX, Amsterd. 1719, second edit. 1740, 2 vols. 8vo.)

Leibnitz, Essai de Théodicée sur la Bonté de Dieu, la Liberté de l'Homme, et l'Origine du Mal, Amsterd. 1710, 8vo.; 1712-14-20-48, (Lat.): Colon. 1716, 8vo.; Francf. 1719, 2 vols. 8vo. Leibnitii Tentamina Theodica de Bonitate Dei, Libertate Hominis, et Origine Mali. Versionis novæ editio altera cum Præf. AUG. FR. BOECKHII, Tubing. 1771, 2 vols. 8vo. Theodicee, oder Versuch von die Güte Gottes, &c., Ham. 1763.

+ Doctrine of Leibnitz, etc., translated from the French by J. H. KOHLER, Francf. 1720, 8vo.; new edition by HUTH, Francf. 1740, 8vo. Ejusd. Principia more geometrico demonstrata, cum excerptis et Epistolis Philosophi et Scholiis quibusdam ex Historia Philosophica, auctore MICH. GOTTL. HANSCHIO, Francf. et Lips. 1728, 4to.

Leibnitz was led to the composition of his philosophical system by various causes: by the acute comparison he was induced to make of the most celebrated of former systems with a reference to the exigencies of his own time; by a capacity fruitful in ingenious hypotheses and in improvements or the accommodation of opposite systems; as well as by his great mathematical acquirements. His object was so completely to reform Philosophy that it might possess a strictness of demonstration analagous to that of the Mathematics, and to put an end to all disputes between its. factions, as well as the differences existing between it and Theology; with the hope of diminishing the principal difficulties belonging to some great questions, and, at the same time, the causes of dispute, by improving the method of philosophy, and ascertaining, if possible, some positive and invariable principles. It was his opinion that the same course should be pursued as in the Mathematics, which led him to prefer the method of Demonstration and the system of Rationalism; such as it had been embraced by Plato and Descartes; without entirely concurring with either. The method thus adopted induced him to appreciate even the Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison (in the Théodicée).

labours of the Schoolmen. There are certain necessary Truths (such was his opinion) belonging to Metaphysics as well as Mathematics, the certainty of which cannot be ascertained by Experience, but must be sought within the Soul itself. This is the corner-stone of the Rationalism of Leibnitz, who endeavoured to liberate the Cartesian system from its attendant improbabilities; without, however, effecting any accurate determination of the principal conditions of philosophical knowledge, by a profoundly penetrating Reflection, or any complete definition of its method or limits. The Rationalism of Leibnitz is especially apparent in his Theory of Knowledge, essentially opposed to that of Locke, in his Monadology and his Théodicée. Leibnitz interested himself in the investigation of the possibility of a Characteristic or Universal Language-which might contain in itself the art of discovering and of judging, and which might be of the same service to universal knowledge as arithmetical and algebraic signs, which express the proportion of numbers and quantity. (Euvres Philosophiques, p. 535, sqq.; Princip. Philos. § 30, 33, 35, 37.)

357. According to Leibnitz, Necessary Truths are innate: not that we are from our birth actually conscious of them, but are born with a capacity for them. Our representations, however, differ by being clear or obscure, distinct or confused. Sensational representations are indistinct-all precise knowledge being the property of the understanding. The criterium of Truth which Descartes laid down (§ 334), is inadequate; the rules of Logic, which are the same in substance with the laws of Mathematics, are more appropriate to the purposes of Philosophy. All our conclusions must be founded on two grand principles; 1st. That of Identity and Contradiction. 2ndly. That of a Sufficient Basis. These two principles are as applicable to necessary as to contingent truths. Necessary truths are discoverable on the principle of Contradiction, by the analysis of compound objects into their simple elements; accidental truths, on the other hand, are ascertained by virtue of the Sufficient Basis, which conducts us to an ulterior and absolute Basis, beyond the range of what is contingent. The represenPrinc. Philos. § 31-46. Théodicée, p. 1, § 44.

1

tations which relate to objects without the soul, must have a correspondency with such objects; otherwise they would be mere illusions. The ultimate foundation of innate and necessary principles resides with the Deity, as the source of all necessary and eternal Truths, which are dependent on the Divine Understanding (not the Divine Will) as their inner object.

LEIBNITII Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate, et Ideis; in the Acta Eruditorum, 1684.

Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, par l'Auteur de l'Harmonie pré-établie; in the ŒŒuvres Philosophiques, published by RASPE.

358. His Monadologia is the central point of the system of Leibnitz, by which he believed himself to have ascertained the ultimate grounds of all real knowledge. Plato's theory, and possibly the ideas of the physician Francis Glisson,1 led him to these speculations, by which he also believed himself to have found a way of reconciling the Aristotelian and Platonic systems. Experience proves to us the existence of compound objects; consequently, we are led to believe in the existence of simple ones (Monades) of which the other are compounded. Our senses cannot apprehend these, inasmuch as they present to us knowledges or objects of which we are cognizant in their confused and compound state, the understanding alone contemplating them with precision. That which is Simple is the elementary principle of the Compounded, and as the former cannot be distinctly apprehended by the senses, it appears to us multiplied and confused. The Monades cannot be influenced by any change from without, their principle of modification being internal to themselves; and inasmuch as all real substances must have their internal properties, by which they are mutually discriminated, and as there is no other internal property but that of representation, it follows that the Monades are

1 Died 1677.

Tractatus de Natura Substantiæ Energitica, sive de Vita Naturæ ejusque tribus facultatibus perceptiva, adpetitiva, et motiva, auct. FRANC. GLISSONIO, Lond. 1672, 4to. 2 Princip. Philos. p. 1.

3 "Because there cannot be two things which completely agree in their internal properties."