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illustrious brotherhood of the luminaries of the Church. A certain family likeness may be traced between all the members of this memorable group.

Benedict, St. Francis, and Loyola, were a union of contradictions; themselves living paradoxes. The first a burning Calabrian rhapsodist,' could descend from the sublimest extacies and the most rapturous trances, to draw up a legislative code, whose propriety, expediency, and sound practical sense, have astonished the world for above one thousand years.

St. Francis of Assisi was another instance of the blending of superior diplomatic acuteness with a grasp of Faith that revealed to his glowing vision those things that eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. The Franciscan Order still remains as a monument of the man, who was as wise as a serpent, and as harmless as a dove; and its history attests the giant arm that raised it.

Loyola, whose merits none can dispute, notwithstanding the sins of his Order, coupled the extreme of ascetic humiliations and apostolic devotion with a dry business-like style, and a deliberate shrewdness in his knowledge of mankind, and in the reading of the human heart. Similarly, Swedenborg, when treating of the sublimest realities, proceeds with the coolness and imperturbable deliberation of a man entering items in his ledger.

As previously observed, however, the revelation and commentaries of Swedenborg do not fall exactly within our province. Nevertheless, since his philosophical writings are considerably influenced and modified by his theology, we must consider the latter in order to estimate the former. On a general survey of his works it appears that he must

See Sir J. STEPHEN'S Article on the French Benedictines; and History of the Benedictine Order.

2 See the Article on St. Francis, in Sir J. STEPHEN'S Ecclesiastical Biography.

3 See the Article of Sir J. STEPHEN'S on the Founders of Jesuitism; and ISAAC TAYLOR'S Ignatius Loyola, or Jesuitism in its Rudiments.

* Lord Chesterfield and Voltaire call him a madman. Thus one man's meat is another man's poison. Irving was said to look on one side of his face like an angel, and on the other like a devil.—ED. * See LOYOLA's Spiritual Exercises.

be classed with Empirists, Supernaturalists, and perhaps with Mystics. Let not, however, the latter term be taken as a condemnation. Since the diffusion of Kantian and other Rationalisms, there has been an evident tendency to pronounce Supernaturalism identical with Mysticism; and Mysticism, hallucination. The impartiality and dignity of history require us to abstain from attaching a stigma to any honest and enlightened phase of thought and feeling, whether positive or negative.

EMPIRICAL SCEPTICISM.

I. Scepticism of Hume.

375. The spirit of Empiricism continued to retain its predominant influence in England. David Hartley,' the physician, whose religious and moral character bore a considerable resemblance to that of Bonnet (§ 378), pursued the inquiries of Locke relative to the soul, on principles exclusively materialist. The Association of Ideas he made the foundation of all intellectual energy; and derived it from certain vibrations of the nerves. He allowed to man only a subordinate degree of free-will, asserting that the Deity is the original cause of all the operations of Nature, and that mankind are nothing more than his instruments, employed with reference to the final end of the Universe. The morality or immorality of actions is determined by their tendency to produce happiness or misery. Presently a much more acute genius pursued the path marked out by Locke, till he arrived at a more complete and decided Scepticism. The idealism of Berkeley (§ 349), which had never been popular, instead of checking, as its author had hoped, the spirit of Scepticism, contributed to encourage it. This was what David Hume did not fail to remark. He was born at Edinburgh in 1711, and early forsook the study of law for that of history and philosophy, to which he devoted the remainder

1 Born at Illingworth, 1704; died at Bath, 1757.

David Hartley, Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations; in two parts, Lond. 1749, 2 vols. 8vo. Theory of Human Mind, with Essays, by Jos. PRIESTLEY, Lond. 1775, 8vo.

of his life. With a deeply penetrating genius, he investigated the nature of Man as a cognizant and acting being, from the point of view of Locke's Empiricism. This led him, by consequent thinking, to the sceptical result that there is no such thing as ascertained objective philosophical knowledge: that our views are limited to the phenomena of Consciousness, the representations we are conscious of, -and the subjective relations of the latter. And in these investigations of Hume, philosophical scepticism stands forth with a power, depth, and logical consistency, such as had never before appeared; recommended, moreover, by great correctness, clearness, and elegance of diction. Our Representations, according to Hume, are to be divided into Impressions (Emotions) or Conceptions and Ideas; the last are copies of the former, and differ from them only inasmuch as they are less forcible and vivid. All the objects of reason are either relations of Conceptions (for instance, the elements of Mathematics), or facts and matters of

The Life of David Hume, written by himself, Lond. 1777, 12mo. Supplement to the same, by ADAM SMITH, 1789.

A Letter to Ad. Smith, on the Life, Death, and Philosophy of his friend D. Hume; by one of the people called Christians, Oxford, 1777. Apology for the Life and Writings of D. Hume, ete., Lond. 1777. Curious Particulars and Genuine Anecdotes respecting the late Lord Chesterfield and D. Hume, etc., Lond. 1788.

H. D. HUME, Treatise of Human Nature, etc., Lond. 1738, 2 vols. 8vo.; 1739, 2 vols. 4to.

Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, 5 vols. 8vo. Edinb. 17421748. Vol. I contains Moral, &c.; vol. II, Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding; vol. III, Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals; vol. IV, Political Discourses; vol. V, Natural History of Religion, of the Passions, of Tragedy, of Taste. These five volumes have frequently been reprinted in 2 vols. 8vo. ; latest edition, Edinb. 1817. Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul, 12mo. Lond. 1783; 8vo. 1789.

Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, 2nd edition, Lond. 1779, 8vo. (On this subject consult JACOBI, + David Hume, or, An Essay on Faith, Idealism, and Realism, Breslau, 1787, 8vo.)

Account of the Life and Writings of D. Hume, by T. E. RITCHIE, 8vo. Lond. 1807.

Hume: in Lord BROUGHAM's Lives of Men of Letters, vol. I, Lond. 1845.

Life and Correspondence of D. Hume, by J. H. BURTON, 2 vols. 8vo. Elinb, 1846.

Hume's Philosophical Works, 4 vols. 8vo. Edinb. 1827.

experience. Our conviction of the reality of any fact is founded on Sensation, Reflection, and an estimate of the relations of cause and effect. Our acquaintance with the laws of Causality does not come to us by any à priori principles, but simply by experience. We expect from similar causes similar consequences; and the principle of this anticipation is to be sought in the habitude of the connection of certain phenomena, and the Association of our Representations. There exists, therefore, no certain knowledge independent of experience, nor any Metaphysical science, properly so called. After all, Experience does not possess any such demonstrative evidence as do the Mathematics: but is based upon a certain instinct, which may prove deceptive. We find that instinct contradicts the conclusions of philosophy with respect to the ideas of Space, Time, and Causality; and consequently we are compelled to doubt the evidence of Experience in these particulars: unless we give the preference to Natural Instinct over philosophical Scepticism. Geometry and Arithmetic are objects of abstract Science: Criticism (Esthetics) and Morality are objects of Sensation, and in no respect form part of the province of the understanding. In Morals, Hume asserted that merit consists in the utility or agreeableness (utile et dulce) of man's character and qualities, as relating to himself or others: he allowed that Reason, as the faculty of reflection, had considerable weight in the formation of a moral judgment, but denied that it was sufficient of itself to pronounce a sentence of moral approbation or disapprobation. Consequently he was led to make the Moral Sense, which he compared with Taste, the primum mobile of moral action. This Sense consists in a sentiment of human happiness and misery. His theory was calculated to support that of an original Moral Sense.

As for the question whether Self-love or Benevolence preponderate in the human mind, he leaves it unanswered.

The deeply penetrating Scepticism of Hume was originally directed against the conclusions only of Speculative Philosophy, but in fact would destroy the essential of all know- · ledge. He directed, however, his objections principally against the Existence of the Deity, His Providence; against the Reality of Miracles, and the Immortality of the Soul:

and proved that all these doctrines were unsupported by any evident principles begetting perfect conviction.*

His life and character were estimable. He died, August 25th, 1776, with perfect serenity and even gaiety.

OPPONENTS OF HUME, AND OTHER PHILOSOPHERS OF THE ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH SCHOOLS.

376. The Scepticism of Hume acquired of course the greatest notoriety, attacking as it did the foundations of religion as well as the objects of experience. Many anta gonists of his doctrines undertook to refute them; but, instead of striking at the root of his sceptical objections, and demonstrating their fallacy, they contented themselves with weakly appealing to Common Sense, or a natural instinct, which was just what Hume desired. Among his opponents we must reckon in the first place three Scotchmen; Thomas Reid, a sincere inquirer after Truth, who maintained indeed the existence of certain principles of knowledge independent of experience, but considered philosophy as the science of the human mind, which must be founded on the principles of Common Sense, regarding the latter as a species of Intellectual Instinct.

The eloquent James Beattie, espoused the same cause with greater ardour, but with less of a philosophic spirit, and laboured to vindicate the truths attacked by the Scep

* Modern Science, Transcendentalism, and the Philosophy of Intuition, demolish at once the unnatural fabric of Hume's scepticism.-ED. 1 Born 1704; became a professor at Glasgow; and died 1726. THOMAS REID, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principle of Common Sense, third edition, Lond. 1796, 8vo. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Edinb. 1785, 4to. Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, Lond. 1819, 3 vols. 8vo. Complete Works, with Preface and Notes, by SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, 8vo. Edinb. 1846.

Born 1735; professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh, and afterwards at Aberdeen. Died 1803.

Account of the Life of James Beattie, by ALEX. BOWER, Lond. 1804. JAMES BEATTIE, Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism, Edinb. 1770; fifth edition. Lond. 1774. Theory of Language, Lond. 1788, 8vo. Dissertations Moral and Critical, Lond. 1783, 4to. Elements of the Science of Morals, tom. I, Edinb. 1790; tom. II, 1793.

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