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sophie von Kant bis Hegel, 4th ed. enlarged, Dresden und Leipzig, 1848.

An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the nineteenth century, by J. D. MORELL, A.M., 2nd edit. 1848.

A History of the Philosophy of Mind, by ROBERT BLAKEY, c. 2, 1848. K. G. HANSIUS, Materialien zur Geschichte der kritischen Philosophie; nebst eine historische Einleitung zur Geschichte der Kantischen Philosophie, Leipz. 1793.

E. SIGM. MIRBT, Kant und seine Nachfolger; oder Geschichte der neuern Deutschen Philos. Jena, 1841.

K. ROSENKRANZ, Geschichte der Kant'schen Philosophie, Leipzig, 1840.

AMAND SAINTES, Histoire de la vie et de la philosophie de Kant, Paris et Hamburg, 1844.

J. G. MUSSMANN, Im. Kant: eine Gedächtnissrede, Halle, 1822. F. ED. BENCKE, Kant und die philosophische Aufgabe unserer Zeit; eine Jubeldenkschrift an die Kritik der reinen Venunft, Berl. 1832.

A. Critical Idealism of Kant.

Memoirs, etc. of Kant:

LUDW. ERNST. BOROWSKI, Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Kant's, Königsb. 1805, 8vo. REINHOLD BERNARD JACHMANN, Im. Kant, geschildert in Briefen an einen Freund, Königsb. 1805, 8vo. C. A. CH. WASIANSKI, Im. Kant, in seinen letzten Lebensjahren, Königsb. 1804, 8vo. Biographie Im. Kant's, Leipz. 1804, 4 Th. 8vo. J. CH. A. GROHMANN, Dem Andenken Kant's, Berl. 1804, 8vo. FR. BOUTERWEK, Imm. Kant: ein Denkmal, Hamb. 1804, 8vo. F. TH. RINK, Ansichten aus Kant's Leben, Königsb. 1805, 8vo. Kant's Gedachtnissfeier, Königsb. 1811, 8vo. Biographie Kant's, von SCHUBERT, 1842.

388. A reformation in Philosophy had now become necessary. It was effected by a philosopher of the first order, who had qualified himself to correct the principal. defects of the former systems by a long and ardent, but secret study of all the branches of the subject. His appearance at that time was the more opportune, because already several men of talent (Lessing, Winkelmann, Hamann, Herder, Göthe, and others) had excited by their various compositions a great degree of intellectual activity, and created a capacity for the reception of new ideas on Science and the Arts. Emmanuel Kant was born at Königsberg, the 22nd of April, 1724; became a professor in the same city, and died February 12th, 1804. He may be styled a second Socrates, having created a new philosophy, which, by

investigating the origin and limits of human knowledge,* revived the spirit of research, extended it, taught it its present position, and directed it to the true path of Science, through the cultivation of Self-knowledge. For the accomplishment of this task he was qualified by uncommon talents, studiously cultivated, and enriched by extensive reading. His piety and virtue set bounds to an exclusive spirit of speculation, and imparted to his works the character of their author. A profound love of truth and a pure moral sentiment became the principles of his philosophy, to which he added the qualities of originality, solidity, and sagacity, in an eminent degree. The revolution which he was thus enabled to effect was astonishing. It is true that it was not brought about without many impediments, but its consequences have been immense, and the whole course of philosophy has been modified by its influence.

For the works of Kant see below, § 393.

389. Being awakened by the Scepticism of Hume (§ 375), he was led to remark the very striking difference in the result of thinking in Philosophy and in Mathematics; and to speculate upon the causes of this difference. Metaphysics justly claimed his regard; but he was led to believe that as yet the very threshold of the science had only been touched. The consideration and examination of the different philosophical systems, and particularly of the superficial Dogmatism of Wolf, led him to question whether, antecedently to any attempt at dogmatizing in philosophy, it might not be necessary to investigate the possibility of philosophical knowledge; and he concluded that to this end an inquiry into the different sources of knowledge and a critical examination of their origin and employment were necessary in which respect he proposed to complete the task undertaken by Locke. He laid down in the first place that Philosophy and Mathematics are, in their origin, rational or intuitive sciences. Rational Cognitions are distinguished from Empirical by the qualities of necessity and universality. On the possibility of such cognitions depends

Hence called the Critical method, or that of investigation and examination.-ED.

that of the philosophical sciences. These are either synthetic or analytic: the latter of which methods is dependent on the first. What then is the principle of synthetical à priori knowledge in contradistinction to empirical; which is founded on perception ? The existence of à priori knowledge is deducible from Mathematics, as well as from the testimony of common knowledge or cognition; and it is to such knowledge that the aim of Reason and Metaphysics is chiefly directed. A science, therefore, which may investigate with strictness the possibility of such knowledge, and the principles of its employment and application, is necessary for the direction of the human mind, and of the highest practical utility. Kant pursued this course of inquiry, tracing a broad line of distinction between the provinces of Philosophy and the Mathematics, and investigating more completely than had yet been done the faculty of knowledge. He remarked that synthetical à priori knowledge imparts a formal character to knowledge in general, and can only be grounded in the laws of the special and individual faculties working together in the production of cognitions. He then proceeds to analyse the particulars of our knowledge, and discriminates between its elementary parts so often confounded in practice, with a view to ascertain the true nature of each species: the characteristics of necessity and universality which belong to à priori knowledge, being his leading principles.

390. The faculty of theoretical knowledge is composed of Sensibility and Understanding, Receptivity and Spontaneousness. The material part of Sensibility consists in the feelings which belong to it; the formal conditions are space and time. Space and Time have no reality except in our conception of them, but may be said to exist à priori, as conditions of our perceptions. The understanding combines, in the form of notions or conceptions, and judgments, the materials supplied by the sensitive faculties. The laws according to which the understanding acts, independently of experience (or rather, regulating experience), are the (four) categories. These, with the conditions of sensational perception (viz. Space and Time), make up the forms and elements of pure Intellect. The forms of sensibility and intellect are what determine and define; the material given

by the senses is the thing to be determined: the former are independent of the appearing objects. The grand conclusion of the Critical System of Kant is this, that no object can be known to us except in proportion as it is apprehended by our perceptions, and definable by our faculties for cognition; consequently, we know nothing per se, but only by appearances. In this consists his Critical Idealism (being founded on a critical examination of the faculties of cognition), or, as it is otherwise termed, his transcendental Idealism. In consequence of these distinctions, it follows that our knowledge of real objects is limited by experience; and that à priori knowledge contemplates only their formal conditions, or their possibility. It is only under such limitations that synthetical à priori knowledge is possible; and within these boundaries Metaphysics must be confined. Connected with the above is the acute distinction established by him between Thought and Cognition,* (the neglect of which has been a fertile source of error)—between the objects apprehended and our representations of them; as well as the line drawn between Reason and Understanding, in a Logical and a Transcendental point of view. Theoretical reason, considered as the art of ratiocination, labours to attain a perception of absolute unity, and to produce a connected system, by means of Ideas, which are the forms of the reason's activity. A cognition is not attainable by the means of Ideas, since they have no suitable object within the province of Experience; although Reason is perpetually labouring after a complete knowledge of God, the world, the immortality and free-agency of the soul; and although the whole artillery of Metaphysics has been constantly directed towards these points. True philosophical reason will not presume to make any constitutive use of such ideas, for it is betrayed thereby into the labyrinth of apparent knowledge and a maze of contradictions. This he proceeds to evince by a critical examination of the proofs adduced of the substantiality and immortality of the soulthe termination and commencement of the world (with the contrary suppositions)-the divisibility or indivisibility

*Hence we are enabled completely to separate Logic from Metaphysics.-ED.

of substances the necessity or contingency of Causation and Being in the present world-and the existence of God. Reason cannot demonstrate the existence of the objects of these ideas, which are imperceptible to the senses; nor, on the other hand, can it prove the contrary. All that is permitted to theoretical reason is a moderating power in the employment of our ideas, for the ultimate extension of real knowledge.

391. Reason, however, is not merely theoretical, but also practical, having the effect of limiting our absolute Free-will by the ideas of Duty and Right. An examination of our notions of Duty and of well-regulated Will (in which, by the common reason of mankind, consists the essence of moral worth), leads him to recognise the existence of practical à priori cognitions; which define not what is, but what ought to be. Practical reason is autonomic or self-legislating— simply defining the formal character of the Will, and presupposing free-agency as a necessary condition. The Moral Law stands forth in opposition to an empirically determined free-will, as a categorical Imperative (absolute Ought), occupying the very summit of practical Philosophy. This categorical Imperative, as the universal director of all rational volition, prescribes universal conformity to the law with strict necessity, and determines thereby the absolute and ultimate end and spring of action, which is not a pathological feeling, but respect for the Law. Virtue, therefore, consists in obedience to the dictation of Duty, or the moral constraint imposed by the legislative power of Reason; or, in other words, in the submission of our impulses and inclinations to Reason. Morality is not Happiness, though it implies a rational title to it, and makes us worthy of being happy. It is universal and necessary consistently with freewill. The ideas of Free-will, Immortality, and a Divinity, derive their certainty from the practical laws of Ethics. This conviction, however, is no theoretical science, but a practical rational belief (Moral-Theology). By such a definition of the Summum Bonum and ultimate end of rational existence, we are enabled to perceive with clearness the harmony which exists between the intellectual and sensual nature of man; between Theoretical and Practical Reason.

Civil or juridical law is distinguished from moral, inas

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