cise of its free-agency by the conception of obligation. The Ego labours to realise this duty, and consequently to recognise a moral creation in the midst of the world without, which it has itself produced: in this manner it approximates the Deity, and attains to the life which proceeds from God. In this moral order of the world felicity is the result of moral worth. This felicity is not to be confounded with happiness; which does not and cannot exist a doctrine which prohibits all reference to the latter as a final end. It is not necessary to think of the Deity as something distinct from the moral world just described, notwithstanding our proneness to conceive of Him as a separate being, and the author of that creation: 1st. Because we cannot attribute to the Divinity the qualities of Intelligence or Personality, without making Him a finite being, like to ourselves. 2ndly. It is a species of profanation to conceive of the Deity as a separate essence, since such an conception implies the existence of a sensible being limited by Space and Time. 3rdly. We cannot impute to Him even existence without confounding him with sensible natures. 4thly. No satisfactory explanation has yet been given of the manner in which the creation of the world could be operated by God. 5thly. The idea and expectation of happiness is a delusion; and when we form our notions of the Deity in accordance with such imaginations, we do but worship the idol of our own passions-the Prince of this world.

Views of this nature, developed in a paradoxical form, though coupled with a depth of moral feeling, procured for their author the charge of being a sort of atheist, and procured for Fichte some troubles and persecutions which he did not entirely deserve. He lived, however, to renounce his earlier doctrines.

Remarks on the Doctrine of Science, at large.

404. The system of Fichte is distinguished by a perfect unity and remarkable logical accuracy. It solves many difficulties, but at the same time gives occasion to many new ones, and was exposed to the following objections. By the Kantists it was urged that, 1st. Fichte had proposed

for solution a grand philosophical problem, without previously inquiring whether it was capable of being solved. He pretends to explain everything, but attempts this only by means of a seeming transcendental deduction, and is constantly driven back to gratuitous assertions and cyclical arguments. 2ndly. The principles laid down are the laws of Logic, which can never enable us to attain to an accurate knowledge of the nature and properties of any cognizable subject or object. These laws are forms of thought, devoid in themselves of all substance. It is only by a forced application that they are invested with the semblance of entity, particularly in the case of principle the first (§ 401), by the substitution of the Ego to an indeterminate object. The defect of these false realizations is cleverly concealed by the logical artifice of all these positions, oppositions, and compositions, which only present, after all, the appearance of a real cognition, instead of the real knowledge to which they aspire. The non-Kantians objected: 1st. That this system converts the Ego into an absolute and independent essence, annihilating the existence of external Nature, its independent reality, and its conformity to the laws of Reason. 2ndly. It is inconsistent with itself. The Ego at first is represented as nothing but infinite activity, opposing to itself as a limitation the Non-Ego, and thereby producing all things -space included. But in the first place; what is it which compels the Ego, as yet unlimited and unrestrained, to circumscribe itself by the position of the Non-Ego ?—" Because otherwise it could not attain to a knowledge of objects." But what necessity can be shown for its aiming at the knowledge of objects, being itself infinite and unlimited? The pretended principle of the Activity of the Ego, in virtue of which it establishes an objective world, is a primordial fact, of which we have no perception in the empirical consciousness, and which can only be ascertained by an intellectual perception (Anschauung), and is therefore a postulate arbitrarily, and, as it were, surreptitiously assumed for the purposes of the theory. Fichte confounds the operations of transcendental imagination in the construction of geometrical figures with the creation of determinate objects, without stopping to explain how the multiplicity of external objects and their various properties can possibly be affected

by the construction of Form in Space. The postulate of an obstacle encountered by the infinite activity of the Ego, which throws it back upon itself, and creates a consciousness of the necessity attaching to certain mental representations, is not to be accounted for either by the nature of the Ego or the Non-Ego. In short, instead of one mystery, this theory would establish another still more incomprehensible, all the time pretending to explain the former by the latter, and ending with an admission that its own principle of explanation is incomprehensible. Accordingly, in the most recent statement of his theory, the author is compelled to assert (in order to account for the feeling of necessity attached to certain mental representations, arising from their relation to an object), that the Ego is restricted in the exercise of its energies by certain determinate limits, although he had described it as Infinite Activity or an Absolute Doing (Thun). These limits or restrictions he proceeds to call incomprehensible and inexplicable, which nevertheless were precisely the object at which his Scientific Theory of Philosophy was levelled. His Idealism, therefore, is an example of speculation carried to the extremest limit, and ending in the destruction of itself—after having first annihilated all science and free-agency.

Compare this transcendental Idealism with the supernatural Idealism of Berkeley, and the Realism of Spinoza.

405. Fichte himself endeavoured to accommodate his theory to the opinions of others by subjecting it to various modifications, particularly with reference to the agreement

1 FICHTE'S Works. On the Theory of Science at large: Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, Weimar, 1794, 8vo. Zweite verb. und verm. Aufl. Jena, 1798, 8vo. Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, Weimar, 1794, 8vo. ; 2te Aufl. 1802, 8vo. Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre, Jena und Leipz. 1795, 8vo.; 2te verb. Aufl. ebend. 1802, Grundlage, etc., und Grundriss, neue unveränderte Aufl. Tüb. 1802. Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre, und zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre (in dem Philosophischen Journal, herausgeg. von NIETHAMMER und FICHTE, 1797. St. I. S. 1 f., St. IV. S. 310, S. V. S. 1 f. und VI). Antwortschreiben an K. L. REINHOLD auf dessen Beitrag zur leichtern Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beim Anfange des XIX Jahrhunderts, Tüb. 1801, 8vo. Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grössere Publicum über das eigentliche Wesen der neucsten Philosophie, etc., Berlin, 1801, 8vo. Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinsten

he pretended to have established between it and the Critical method; as also with regard to the means of detecting in Consciousness the original activity of the Ego. At first he attempted this on the laws of Thought, but subsequently had recourse to Intellectual Perception; (in his Sonnenklarer Bericht, mentioned p. 432, note). The most remarkable difference, however, between the earlier and later editions of the Theory of Science, is this: that the first was composed on the principles of Idealism, the latter on those of Realism. The former sets out with asserting the unlimited and independent activity of the Ego; the latter by maintaining the absolute Esse of the Deity, as the only true reality-the only pure and self-existing life of whom the world and consciousness are but the image and impress; treating objective nature as nothing more than a limitation of Divine Life. The philosophical system of Schelling appears to have contributed, no less than the religious sentiment, to effect this change.

The Doctrine of Science excited a prodigious deal of attention and gained a great number of partisans: among others, F. K. Forberg, (see the catalogue of Fichte's works, below); F. J. Niethammer, (born 1766); C. L. Reinhold (see § 398); Schelling (see following §); J. B. Schad (§ 412), afterUmrisse dargestellt, Berlin, 1810, 8vo. Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Vorlesungen gehalten, etc., zu Berlin, 1810-11; Stuttg. und Tüb. 1817, 8vo.

On Religious Philosophy in particular: Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (anonym.) 2te verm. und verb. Aufl. Konigsh. 1793, 8vo. Ueber den Grund unsers Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung (Philosoph. Journal, VIII B. (1798), 1 St. FR. K. FORBERG'S Entwickelung des Begriffs der Religion ebendaselbst.) Appellation an das Publicum über die ihm beigemessenen atheistischen Aeusserungen, Jena und Leipz. 1799, 8vo. Der Herausgeber des Philosophischen Journals gerichtliche Verantwortungsschriften gegen die Anklage des Atheismus, Jena, 1799, 8vo. (FORBERG'S Apologie seines angeblichen Atheismus, Gotha, 1799, 8vo.) Anweisung zum seligen Leben, oder auch die Religionslehre, etc. Berl. 1806, 8vo. The way to the Blessed Life, or the Doctrine of Religion, translated by WILLIAM SMITH, London, 1849.

Ethical and other writings: Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, Jena, 1794, 8vo. System der Sittenlehre, Jena und Leipz. 1798, 8vo. Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums über die Französische Revolution, 1793, 8vo. Grundlage des Naturrechts, Jena, 1796–97, II Theile, 8vo. Ueber die Bestimmung des Menschen,

wards a disciple of Schelling; Abicht (§ 414); Mehmel, and others.1

It also encountered many sturdy antagonists and severe critics, especially among the Kantists. The end of it has

Berl. 1800, 8vo. The Vocation of Man, translated by W. SMITH, 8vo. London, 1849. Der geschlossene Handelsstaat: ein philosoph. Entwurf als Anhang zur Rechtsl. Tüb. 1800, 8vo. Vorlesungen über das Wesen des Gelehrten, Berl. 1806, 8vo. The Nature of the Scholar, and its Manifestations, translated by W. SMITH, Second edition, 8vo. London, 1849. Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters, Berl. 1806, 8vo. The Characteristics of the Present Age, translated by W. SMITH, 8vo. London, 1849. Reden an die Deutsche Nation, Berl. 1808, 8vo. Die Vorlesungen über den Begriff des wahrhaften Kriegs, ebend. 1813, 8vo. Die Staatslehre, oder über das Verhältniss des Urstaats zum Vernunftreiche in Vorträgen, etc., aus dem Nachlasse herausgeg. Berl. 1820, 8vo. Fichte's Sämmtliche Werke (complete works), 11 vols. 8vo. Berlin, 1845, &c.

1 Works illustrative of those of Fichte: Philosophisches Journal, herausgegeben von NIETHAMMER, Neustrel und Jena, 1795-96, 4 B.; mit FICHTE, 1797-1800, V-X B.

FR. W. JOS. SCHELLING, Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissensschaftslehre in dem Philos. Journal von FICHTE und NIETHAMMER, 1796 und 1797; and in SCHELLING'S Philos. Schriften, 1 Band.

Joh. Bapt. SchAD, Grundriss der Wissenschaftlslehre, Jena, 1800, 8vo. Gemeinfassliche Darstellung des Fichteschen Systemes und der daraus hervorgehenden Religionstheorie, Erfurt, 1799-1801, III B. 8vo. Geist der Philosophie unserer Zeit, Jena, 1800, 8vo. Absolute Harmonie des Fichteschen Systems mit der Religion, Erfurt, 1802, 8vo. Transcendentale Logik, Jena, 1801, 8vo.

G. E. A. MEHMEL, Lehrbuch der Sittenlehre, Erlang. 1811. Reine Rechtslehre, ebend. 1815, 8vo. At an earlier date: Versuch einer vollst. analyt. Denklehre, 1803, and Ueber das Verhältniss der Philos. zur Religion, 1805, 8vo. u. a.

2 Criticisms of Fichte's theory:

Stimme eines Arktikers über Fichte und sein Verfahren gegen die Kantianer (von K. T. RINK), 1799, 8vo.

Vom Verhältniss des Idealismus zur Religion: oder, Ist die neueste Philosophie auf dem Wege zum Atheismus? 1799, 8vo.

Freimüthige Gedanken über Fichte's Appellation gegen die Anklage des Atheismus und deren Veranlassung, Gotha, 1799, 8vo.

J. H. GL. HEUSINGER, Ueber das Idealistisch-Atheistische System des Hrn. Prof. Fichte, Dresden und Gotha, 1799, 8vo.

K. L. REINHOLD, Sendschreiben an Lavater und Fichte über den Glauben an Gott, Hamb. 1799, 8vo.

F. H. Jacobi an Fichte, Hamb. 1799, 8vo.

W. TR. KRUG, Briefe über die Wissenschaftslehre, Leipz. 1800, 8vo.