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authors of certain new doctrines; such as Herbart, Bouterwek, and Jacobi, whom we shall have occasion to mention below. The religious opinions of Schelling were especially attacked by the theologians; who appear, however, to have often understood them but imperfectly. Others (for instance Daub) endeavoured to apply them to Religion.

Other Systems.

413. Fr. Bouterwek, an acute reasoner who had originally embraced and even given a new exposition of the theory of Kant, abjured the tenets of his master from a conviction that they were not proof against Scepticism, and professed himself dissatisfied with the partial character of Fichte's Idealism. He maintained that Science demands the Absolute, without which no knowledge nor even thought is possible, inasmuch as something real,-a Being, or Esse, -the Absolute,-is pre-supposed in all demonstration, (this Absolute is the unknown X, which, according to Kant, lies at the bottom of all appearances). Accordingly he endeavoured to demonstrate in his Apodiktik' the inefficiency of former philosophical systems, alleging that they had attempted to arrive at cognition and conviction only by means of mental conceptions and certain formularies, without ever arriving at real and living Science. His leading principles were, that all Thought and Sensation are founded on some real ground and Esse-the Absolute; which itself is dependent on nothing else. Such an Esse is not discoverable by Thought, inasmuch as Thought pre-supposes its existence, as something superior to itself. Consequently, we are driven to conclude either that all Being is imaginary and all Thought without foundation, or that there exists an absolute faculty of cognition, which neither feels nor thinks, constituting the fundamental principle of Reason itself, and by virtue of which all Being is demonstrable. Subsequently Bouterwek retracted this doctrine, and adopted a new universal theory of Truth and Science, leading to a moderate system of Transcendental Rationalism, by means of the principle of the Faith of Reason in itself. He defined the end of philosophy to be the solution of the enigma of nature and man, by distinguishing between the appearances

1 Born 1766, at Goslar; died a professor at Göttingen, 1828.

and the realities of objects, as far as it is attainable by unassisted human reason. This must be effected by a system of demonstration (Apodiktik), to which empirical Psychology and Logic (in the popular sense of the term) can contribute only the premises. This theory, like that of Jacobi (§ 415), supposes all merely logical thought to be mediate. All immediate knowledge (without which all discursive notions assume the character of mediate, and consequently become nugatory) is dependent on the original connection existing between the powers of Thought and the Internal Sense in the Virtuality of Spiritual life—in the oneness of the active powers of our nature, whether subjective or objective. Reason has confidence in herself so far as she is pure Reason, and has confidence in truth so far as she recognises therein (by virtue of the connection just mentioned) her own independent energy; and discovers in this energy the germ of conceptions, by means of which she can elevate herself above sensible impressions to the contemplation of the original principle of all Existence and Thought (the idea of the Absolute). Consequently Truth, in the metaphysical sense of the word, (or the agreement of our thoughts with the supersensuous essences of things, and their necessary connection with the first principle of all Thought and Esse),-can be cognized by reason immediately. Metaphysics (in connection with which comes religious philosophy founded on religious sentiment) complete the scientific development of this idea by instructing us how far a knowledge of the nature of things is possible to the human mind. Philosophical Ethics and Natural Law are connected with the theoretical department of Phi losophy by means of Universal Practical Philosophy.

The subject of Natural Right forms a special chapter in philosophical Ethics, in which Right is treated as a reason able title, in virtue of which man, as a moral being, lay claim to all the external conditions appertaining to him, in all things relating to virtue and justice.

Bouterwek also laboured to establish a system of Æsthetics on psychological principles, and independent, to a certain extent, of Philosophy.

FR. BOUTERWEK, Aphorismen, den Freunden der Vernunftkritik nach Kant's Lehre vorgelegt, Gölt. 1793, 8vo. Paulus Septimius: oder

die letzten Geheimnisse des Eleusin. Priesters. (Philos. Roman), Halle, 1795, II Thle. 8vo. Idee einer allgmeinen Apodiktik, etc. Gött. 1799, II Th. 8vo. Anfangsgründe der speculativen Philosophie, Gött. 1800, 8vo. Die Epochen der Vernunft nach der Idee der Apodiktik, Gött. 1802, 8vo. Anleitung zur Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, Gött. 1803, 8vo. Neues Museum der Philosophie und Literatur, herausgegeben von F. BOUTERWEK, Gött. 1803. Immanuel Kant: ein Denkmal, Hamburg, 1805. Dialogen, Erste Sämmlung. Halle, 1798. Funf kosmopolitanische Briefe, Berl. 1794. Kleine Schriften philosophischen, æsthetischen und literarischen inhalts, Gött. 1818. Briefe an Theokles (über Seelengrösse) Berlin, 1792. Esthetik, Leipz. 1806, II Th.; 3te Aufl. 1824, 8vo. Ideen zur Metaphysik des Schönen; in vier Abhandl. ebend. 1807, 8vo. Praktische Aphorismen; Grundsätze zu einem neuen Systeme der moral. Wissenschaften, Leipz. 1808. Lehrbuch der Philos. Vorkentnisse (Allgemeine Einl., Psychologie und Logik enthaltend; sollte an die Stelle der angeführten Anfangsgründe treten.) Gött. 1810, 8vo. ; 2te Ausg. 1820, 8vo. Lehrb. der Philos. Wissenschaften, nach einem neuem Systeme entworfen, II Thle. Gött. 1813, 8vo. 2te verm. und verb. Auflage, ebend. 1820, 8vo. (the part relating to religious philosophy being entirely re-written). Religion der Vernunft, etc., ebend. 1824, 8vo.

414. C. G. Bardili1 endeavoured to make The Absolute the basis of all philosophy on a new principle. He believed himself to have detected such an one in Thought, and sought to constitute Logic the source of real cognition; elevating it to the rank of Metaphysics. Hobbes, and the physician Leidenfrost (in his Confessio, 1793), had already represented Thought as calculation, but Bardili was the first to imagine that he could discover in Thought per se (contemplated under its formal character), a real existence; nay, even the essence of the Deity. The nature of Thought is such, that while it continues always the same it is capable of infinite repetition and multiplication. It is A quatenus A, in A-Identity. Thought as Thought is neither Subject nor Object, nor the relation of the one to the other; but their common elementary principle, in which the conceptions and judgments of the mind have their origin, being at the same time an infinitivus determinans and a determinatum. This principle of Thought, however, determines nothing until applied to something else, that is, to Matter; which is a necessary postulate of the system. The charac teristics of Thought, as Thought, are Unity in Plurality :

'Born at Blaubeuern, 1761; died at Stuttgard, 1808.

-Identity. The characteristics of Matter are Diversity and Multiplicity. Thought, the First and Absolute principle, is not determined by Matter; but vice versa, the latter by it. The application of Thought to Matter brings with it a judgment in the thing thought; 1. as something real apprehended by the mind (B-Reality). 2. as a mere conception of the mind (B-Possibility). The agreement of Thought with Matter constitutes Reality, which is only a more express determination of the Possible. Thus, in the conception of every object, pure possibility and reality perform the functions of arithmetical factors. God is pure possibility repeating itself in every thing and determining every thought, the first foundation of all truth, and consequently also of logic.

Bardili styled his obscure and empty abstraction a Primary Logic, and announced its pretensions with considerable ostentation, but without much success.1 The system of Rational Realism it was designed to support was no less unsuccessful, notwithstanding the subtle analysis of Reinhold (§ 398.) About the same time many systematic essays appeared, which were either too eccentric and obscure, or too shallow to answer the demands of science. Of this number was the Archimetria of the ingenious Swede, Th. Thorild, which

1 BARDILI'S Grundriss der ersten Logik, gereinigt von den Irrthumern der bisherig. Logik, besonders der Kantischen, Stuttg. 1800, 8vo. Philosophische Elementarlehre, I Heft. Landsh. 1802; II Heft, 1806, 8vo. Beiträge zur Beurtheilung des gegenwärtigen Zuständes der Vernunftlehre, Landsh. 2 vols. 8vo. 1802-1806.

At an earlier period Bardili had distinguished himself as an acute thinker by his Epochen der vorzuglichten philosophischen Begriffe, I Th. Halle, 1788, 8vo. Sophylus: oder Sittlichkeit und Natur, als Fundament der Weltweisheit, ebend. 1794. Allgemeine praktische Philosophie, ebend. 1795. Ueber die Gesetze der Ideenassociation, ebend. 1796, and, Ueber den Ursprung des Begriffs von der Willensfreiheit (gegen FORBERG), Stuttg. 1796. Briefe über den Ursprung der Metaphysik (anonym.) Altona, 1798, 8vo.

2 Died a professor at Greifswald, 1808. Maximum, sive Archimetria. Berol. 1799, 8vo. He defines it as, Generalis critica Tanti et Totius: the foundation of knowledge he finds in the necessity of thus thinking. There are only true objects; all error and all difference of cognition consists in the quantum (Wieviel). His Philosophisches Glaubensbekentniss appears to have been suppressed by authority. His complete works were published at Upsala, 8vo. 1819.

refers everything to the theory of Magnitudes, containing many eccentric ideas, afterwards developed by others; and the Epicritique' of F. Berg, who assumes Logical Will as the key to the nature of all Reality; and lastly, the Altogether-practical Philosophy,' of Rückert and Weiss (§ 416). The labours of J. H. Abicht are not more deserving of specification; consisting in a compilation of the works of others, in which nothing but the phraseology is his

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own.

PHILOSOPHY OF SENTIMENT AND BELIEF.

Jacobi's Theory of Belief.

415. A friend of Hamann (§ 395), E. H. Jacobi, advanced a theory totally at variance with the Critical and Dogmatical systems which then divided the philosophical world, and allied to the more noble kind of mysticism. He possessed a profound and religious mind, with lively and genial powers of expression and a sincere hatred of the empty formularies of system-makers. The last principle he carried so far as almost to show himself an enemy of philosophical reason itself, from a conviction that a consistent dogmatical theory, like that of Spinoza, which admitted no truth without demonstration, could conduct only to Determinism and Pantheism; while the Critical theory, by its prejudice in favour of demonstrative and mediate knowledge, was led to reject all cognitions of supersensuous objects, without being able to establish their reality by means of practical rational belief.

1 Berg, Epikritik der Philosophie, Arnstadt u. Rudolst. 1805.

2 Jos. RUCKERT, der Realismus, oder Grundzuge zu einer durchaus praktischen Philos. Leipz. 1801.

3 CHR. WEISS, Winke uber eine durchaus prakt. Philos. ebend. 1801. Lehrbuch der Logik, ebend. 1801, 8vo.

ABICHT'S Revidirende Kritik der Speculativen Vernunft, Altenb. 1799-1801, II Th. 8vo. System der Elementarphilosophie, oder verständige Naturlehre des Erkentniss- Gefühls und d. Willenskraft, Erlang. 1798, 8vo. Psychol. Anthropol. I Abth. Erl. 1831. Ency klopädie der Philos. Frkf. 1804, 8vo. Verbesserte Logik, oder Wahrheitswissenschaft, Fürth. 1802, 8vo.

5 Born at Dusseldorf, 1743; became in 1804 president of the Academy of Munich, and died 1819.

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