Anti-dogmatism of Schulze.

418. Ernest Schulze, an Aulic councillor and professor at Göttingen, born in 1761, at Heldrungen in Thuringia, proved with great sagacity the insufficiency of the theory of Reinhold (398) concerning the faculty of representation; and in the same way that Jacobi had formerly opposed his Doctrine of Faith to systematic philosophy, in like manner Schulze opposed his criticism of theoretic philosophy to this same philosophy, with the view of destroying the illusions of an imaginary knowledge, and to favour, on a more extended plan than that of Kant, the knowledge of reason in itself, by discovering the essential error of every philosophy. From his various researches, Schulze came to the conclusion that the origin of human knowledge cannot be an object of knowledge; that every philosophy that proposes to make known this origin is impossible; that all the statements given forth by the different schools on the origin of our knowledge are only empty and fantastic conceptions; lastly, that we must confine our curiosity to the examination of the elements of our cognitions, of their distinction, and of the laws that determine the relation of our conviction with the different kinds of our knowledge (Critique, p. 258, part I). These are the fundamental pursuits of the scepticism of Schulze, or, as he styled it, his Anti-dogmatism, which is based on a natural and necessary disposition of the human mind. This scepticism acknowledged, therefore, the facts of Consciousness, and even maintained that it belonged to the constitution of human nature to acknowledge Consciousness to be what it is, and to act in accordance with it.

As a deduction from ulterior observations, Schulze ends by narrowing more and more the limits of his scepticism. Thus, whilst denying the possibility of certain criteria of truth, or of the agreement of our cognitions with their objects, he granted to the human mind the faculty of discerning what relates to the disposition of our faculty of cognition in general, and of distinguishing it from all that is only individual (Enc., § 17). Later, being convinced of the insufficiency of scepticism, he devoted himself to the

research of the origin of certitude, of the development and of the limits of human knowledge, in conformity with the exact rules of natural observation (Psychological Anthropology, 3rd edit.). His actual ideas approach considerably the doctrines of Jacobi, and agree with those of the philosophers who acknowledge Plato as their head, distinguish Reason from the Understanding, and see in Reason the source of supersensuous knowledge, and the means of arriving at the solution of the real problems of philosophy. It is according to different phases of sentiment, that faculty which distinguishes man from the lower animals, that Schulze divides philosophy into four principal branches, namely, 1st. Theoretical Philosophy, or Metaphysics, embracing the development of the religious feeling; 2nd. Practical Philosophy, comprising Ethics, Polity, and the Morality of nations, embracing the moral feeling (for he does not admit, like Bouterwek, a special natural law, see § 413, note); 3rd. Logic, in the acceptation of the ancients, embracing the intellectual feeling; and finally, Esthetics, embracing the feeling of the beautiful. He regards modern logic (formal logic) as well as empirical psychology, as nothing more than the propedeutics or initiatory preparation of philosophy.

GOTTLIEB ERNEST SCHULZE, Some Observations on the religious philosophy of Kant, Kiel, 1795. On the highest aim in the study of Philosophy, Leipz. 1789. Elements of the Philosophical Sciences, 1788-90, 2 vols. 8vo. Enesidemus (see § 406). Criticism of Theoretical Philosophy, Hamb. 1801, 2 vols. 8vo. The principal motives of Scepticism in relation to human knowledge, in the Museum of BOUTERWEK, vol. III, 2nd number. Principles of General Logic, Helmstadt, 1802; 4th edit. corrected, 1822. Guide to find the principles of Civil Law and of Penal Law, Gött. 1813.

A controversial article appeared against the scepticism of Schulze, entitled: The relation of Scepticism to Philosophy, &c. in the Critical Journal of SCHELLING and of HEGEL, tom. I.

Schulze published, moreover: An Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences; for the use of his students, Gött. 1814; 3rd edit. 8vo. 1824. In it will be found a complele exposition of the doctrine of the author. Physical Anthropology, Gött. 8vo. 1816; 2nd edit. 1819; 3rd edit. 1826. Philosophical Morality, 8vo. Gott. 1817.

Herbart.

419. Besides Bouterwek and Schulze, John Frederic Herbart, born at Oldenburg, professor at Königsberg, and particularly excited by Fichte, has developed peculiar opinions opposed to the greater part of the existing systems, and which he has succinctly consigned to posterity in several treatises under a polemical form. He wishes philosophy to abandon the psychological direction which has been erroneously praised in modern times. According to him, to attempt to measure the limits of the faculty of cognition, and to criticise metaphysics, is to have the strange illusion of thinking that the faculty of cognition is more easy to understand than the object itself with which metaphysics concerns itself: this illusion is so much the greater, since all the conceptions by means of which we represent to ourselves the faculty of cognition, proceed from a metaphysical source. The psychological premises on which the criticism is based are for the most part obtained surreptitiously. Philosophy is an elaboration of conceptions, called forth by the collection of observations relating to these same conceptions. Its method is the method of relations, that is to say, a method that consists in seeking for the ideas necessary to complete an order of thoughts: it starts from the supposition of contradictions in a given object— contradictions that push you on to a higher degree in thought. The elaboration of conceptions consists sometimes in their elucidation and explication; hence logic freed from all psychological mixture: at other times, it consists in cutting off, in connecting, and completing-hence metaphysics; when the author sometimes returns to the doctrine of the Eleatæ Psychology, Natural Philosophy, and Religious Philosophy are in his eyes parts of applied metaphysics. The science of ideas, united to a judgment competent to approve or condemn, is Esthetics, which, applied to a given object, is distributed in a series of doctrines, among which that which bears the charaeter of necessity, has received the name of the doctrine of duties and of virtue (Practical Philosophy). In these different parties, the author develops views that are peculiar to him, and which evidence a great sagacity, but which often become obscure on account of their brevity,

and require meditation; as for instance, his theory of the destruction and preservation of Natures, in his speculative psychology founded on mathematics, and his theory of representations considered as forces. It is proper to notice his criticism of the principles at present dominant in psychology, his critique of Kant's doctrine of free-will, and his own determinative or necessarian doctrine (in the sense of Leibnitz) on the same subject.

HERBART: General Pædagogik, &c. Gött. 1806; and other works on Poedagogik; such as: the Idea of the A B C of Pestalozzi, developed in relation to the study of scientific theories, Gött. 1802, 2nd edit. 1804. On the method of Pestalozzi, &c. Bremen, 1804. On Philosophical Study, Gött. 1807. Treatise on general practical Philosophy, 8vo., Gött. 1808. The principal questions, of Metaphysics, 8vo. Gött. 1808. Articles on speculative philosophy, in the Philosophical Archives of Königsberg, Königsb. 1811-12. Observations on the causes that oppose an agreement between philosophers on the first principles of practical philosophy; a dissertation contained in the posthumous phi losophical works of Christ. James Krause, 8vo. Königsberg, 1812. Theoria de attractione elementorum: Principia metaphysica, § I, II, 8vo. Regiom. 1812. Manual, serving as an Introduction to philosophy. Königs. 1813: 2nd edit. considerably enlarged, ibid. 1821; 4th edit. 1837. Manual of Psychology, Königsberg and Leipzig, 1816; 2nd edit. 1834. On Evil, 8vo. Königsb. 1819. De Attentionis mensura, causisque primariis; Psychologiæ Principia statica et mechanica exemplo illustraturus, &c. 4to. Regiom. 1822. On the possibility and necessity of applying mathematics to psychology, 8vo. Königsb. Psychology scientifically treated, and founded on experience, metaphysics, and mathematics, 2nd part, 8vo. Heidelb. 1824. General Metaphysics, 1st part, Königsberg, 1828. Short Encyclopædia of Philosophy, Halle, 1831, 2nd edit. 1841. Analysis of Right and Morals. Götting. 1836. Commentatio de Realismo Naturali, qualem propos. T. E. SCHULZIUS, Gött. 1837. De Principio Logico exclusi medii inter contradictoria non negligendo Commentatio, Bonn, 1840. Psychological Researches, Gött. 1839-40.

Comparison of the system of Fichte with that of Professor Herbart. by HERM. WILLM. DE KEYSERLINGK, 8vo. Königsberg, 1817.

To the school of Herbart belongs ERNEST STIEDENROTH, author of Theory of Science considered especially in its relation with Scepticism, 8vo. Gült. 1819. Psychology, 2 parts, Königsb. 1824-25.

Schleiermacher.

420. Frederic Schleiermacher, professor of theology, and preacher, first at Halle and afterwards at Berlin, was born at Breslau in 1768, and contributed greatly, by his addresses

and writings, to a more liberal culture of philosophy in general, and especially of moral and religious philosophy. Religion, according to him, attends to the same object as metaphysics and moral science; they only differ as regards the form; their common object is the universe and the relation of man to this same universe. The essence of philosophy consists neither in thought nor in action; it consists in the union of Feeling with Perception. Hence arises a living perception, which cannot take place without our perceiving the Divinity in ourselves as the eternal unity of the universe, which alone in its turn brings God into the consciousness of man. Religion consists in representing all the events of this world as the acts of God; in loving the Being (Weltgeist) who presides over the universe; in contemplating His operation with delight. Such is the end of Religion. But it is necessary for man to find humanity in order to contemplate the world, and to rise to religion; and the only way by which he can rightly find it is in love and through love. To be united, though the finite, with the infinite; to be eternal for a moment; is the immortality imparted by religion. But religion necessarily appears always under some definite form; accordingly Schleiermacher rejects what is called natural religion. In his later works, he maintains that piety considered in itself is neither an acquired knowledge nor a praxis; piety is a particular direction and determination of feeling: in fine, the sublimest degree of feeling. By feeling, he implies the immediate consciousness, inasmuch as it falls within the category of time and appears under opposite forms, more or less marked, composing the agreeable and disagreeable. Feeling gives us, moreover, the consciousness of our dependence on a God, which constitutes the elevated element of all religions.

Schleiermacher exerted a still greater influence on the progress of philosophy by his Critique of Morality, a work displaying a true platonic power of dialectics. He points out in this work, with a great display of talent, the defects of the various doctrines of morals from Plato to Kant and Fichte. He proceeds to show indirectly the conditions of Ethics, as a science, both in connection with its highest principle, and in connection with a perfect development of the whole