Toward an Understanding of StottsU.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1984 - 64 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
actual victims adopted affirmative action apply authority to modify awarded competitive seniority back pay basis of race black employees black firefighters bona fide seniority cert certiorari Cite as 104 Civil Rights Act claims consent decree Court of Appeals court order Court's decision cree demotions discriminatory dissent District Court District Court's authority effect employer's discrimination employer's illegal discrimination enforce enjoin federal court fide seniority system future layoffs hiring and promotion individual intent to discriminate interpretation issue judgment Justice Blackmun Justice O'Connor Justice Stevens laid layoff plan legislative history make-whole relief Mary Frances Berry Memphis Fire Department ment merits minority moot nary injunction niority nonvictims percentage of black plaintiff preferential treatment prelimi preliminary injunction proposed layoffs racial quotas reductions in rank reinstatement respondents retroactive seniority ruling S.Ct Senator seniority policy Stotts decision Supreme Court Teamsters tion Title VII trial union victim of discrimination violation white employees
Popular passages
Page 57 - If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible...
Page 57 - No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 704(a).
Page 47 - No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.
Page 31 - The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.
Page 44 - ... the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . ., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate,
Page 57 - Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial 'quota' or to achieve a certain racial balance.
Page 3 - Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work In different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate...
Page 47 - That policy, which is to provide make-whole relief only to those who have been actual victims of illegal discrimination, was repeatedly expressed by the sponsors of the Act during the congressional debates.
Page 21 - Thus the decree itself cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve. For these reasons, the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.