If an appropriation should be applied to objects not authorized, vouchers therefor could not be allowed. (3 Op., 17, 18.) The authority to make expenditures under discretionary power is very different from that exercised in the approval or allowance of expenditures made by other officers, or of claims or accounts in favor of parties against the United States. These are generally subject to reexamination by accounting officers. (1 Lawrence, Comptroller's Decisions, Appendix, ch. xii; Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall., 188.) The expenditures now in question are unlike those under appropriations for contingent expenses. There is nothing in this case for the application of any of the principles last above stated. The joint resolution of February 18, 1881, by its language, its purpose, and the extraordinary character of the expenditures to be made, gave to the Secretary of State a discretionary authority in selecting the objects on which he would expend the appropriation therein made. His discretion cannot lawfully be, and will not be, interfered with. The objects to which he applied the appropriation were clearly within his discretion, and he was the appropriate judge thereof. Effect will be given to his approval of the expenditure. 2. The same principles which apply to the objects of expenditure may sometimes apply to prices paid when the statute clearly and unequivocally shows such intention. An officer having clear, explicit, absolute discretionary authority to make purchases or pay expenses, may regulate the price to be paid either by contract in advance or by paying a quantum valebant or a quantum meruit. In such case his judgment will not be disturbed, but will be accepted as correct, unless for reasons similar to those already stated as to the objects of an appropriation. The prices paid in cases of expenditure now in question do not call for any revision. Judgment has been properly exercised as to these, and there is no reason for calling in question its prudence. The vouchers are all approved, the account of disbursements is correct, and will be settled accordingly. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, First Comptroller's Office, April 5, 1882. IN THE MATTER OF THE RIGHT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO TO PRESCRIBE TERMS FOR THE SUPREME COURT THEREOF.-TERRITORIAL COURT CASE. 1. A territorial legislative assembly is invested with general legislative authority over "all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States;" it has, therefore, power to fix the times when, and the places where, the supreme court of the Territory shall be held, unless some act of Congress has in terms, or by clear implication, prohibited the exercise of such power. 2. A provision in the act of Congress which declares that "the supreme court [of such Territory] shall hold a term annually at the seat of government of the Territory," does not take from the legislative assembly the power to require other terms of such court to be held at such times and places as the legislative assembly may by law prescribe. 3. When a plenary authority is given in general terms by statute, other provisions of the same act are not to be deemed as a modification of such authority or as creating an exception thereto, unless such purpose appear by the necessary import of the provisions on by clear inference. 4. When two affirmative provisions in a statute may reasonably be construed as consistent with each other, and so that both may stand together and have full effect, the one should not be deemed a modification of the other. 5. Courts created in the Territories by act of Congress are "United States courts" within the meaning of the acts making appropriations for such courts, though not "in the sense of the Constitution." March 11, 1882, the chief justice of the supreme court of the Territory of New Mexico addressed a letter to the Hon. Benjamin Harris Brewster, Attorney-General of the United States, stating that the regular annual sessions of said court have been held commencing in January each year, and that the legislature of the Territory, at the session just ended, passed an act providing for an additional (semi-annual) session of the supreme court of the Territory. He asks whether in case the judges should agree to meet at the time so fixed for this semi-annual session the expenses thereof would be paid by the Government. March 18, 1882, the Hon. Attorney-General addressed a letter to the First Comptroller, referring to him the question so submitted by the chief justice, and asking to be informed of the Comptroller's view of the matter. OPINION OF WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller : The Revised Statutes contain these provisions: "SEC. 1850. All laws passed by the legislative assembly and governor of any Territory except in [the] any Territories of Colorado, Dakota, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, shall be submitted to Congress, and, if disapproved, shall be null and of no effect. "SEC. 1851. The legislative power of every Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. * * * “* "SEC. 1864. The supreme court of every Territory shall consist of a chief justice and two associate justices, any two of whom shall constitute a quorum, and they shall hold their offices for four years, and until their successors are appointed and qualified. They shall hold a term annually at the seat of government of the Territory for which they are respectively appointed. "SEC. 1865. Every Territory shall be divided into three judicial districts; and a district court shall be held in each district of the Territory by one of the justices of the supreme court, at such time and place as may be prescribed by law; and each judge, after assignment, shall reside in the district to which he is assigned." "SEC. 1907. The judicial power in New Mexico, Utah, Washington, Colorado, Dakota, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, probate courts, and in justices of the peace." "SEC. 1913. The legislative assemblies of New Mexico, Utah, Washing. ton, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, and Wyoming Territories, respectively, may organize, alter, or modify, the several judicial districts thereof, in such manner as each legiative assembly deems proper and convenient." "SEC. 1915. The judges of the supreme court in each of the Territories of New Mexico and Arizona, or a majority of them, shall, when assembled at their respective seats of government, fix and appoint the several times and places of holding the courts in their respective districts, and limit the duration of the terms thereof; but such courts shall not be held at more than three places in any one Territory; and a judge holding court may adjourn the same, without day, at any time before the expiration of a term, whenever in his opinion the further continuance thereof is not necessary." "SEC. 1918. The legislative assemblies of New Mexico, Washington, Colorado, Dakota, Arizona, and Wyoming Territories may assign the judges appointed for such Territories, respectively, to the several judicial districts thereof, in such manner as each legislative assembly deems proper and convenient." "SEC. 1934. The supreme court of the Territory of Arizona may hold adjourned terms thereof at any time and place in the Territory agreed upon by a majority of the judges of the court at any regular term there *" The act of Congress of June 3, 1874 (18 Stats., 253, sec. 3), "in relation to courts and judicial officers in the Territory of Utah" provides: "That there shall be held in each year two terms of the supreme court of said Territory, and four terms of each district court at such times as the governor of the Territory may by proclamation fix." In Montana two terms of the supreme court are held in each year, in conformity to an act of the legislative assembly approved (by the governor) December 30, 1871. Congress has given to the legislative assembly of New Mexico authority over "all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States," subject to the power of Congress to annul any act which may be passed. The matter of pre scribing the times when, and the places where the supreme court shall be held, and of fixing the number of terms thereof in each year, is a "rightful subject of legislation." (4 Op. Att. Gen., 528; Cooley, Const. Lim., [87], 106; Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall., 443.) The only inquiry which arises, therefore, is whether the act of the legislative assembly requiring a session each year in addition to that required by the statute (Rev. Stats. 1864), is "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." court * * * The Territorial act is not inconsistent with the Constitution nor with any law of Congress, unless it be the act which declares that "the supreme shall hold a term annually at the seat of government of the Territory." If by this Congress intended there should be no more than one term of the court in each year, the Territorial act is inconsistent therewith and void. If the purpose of Congress was only to impose an absolute obligation on the supreme court to hold at least one term in each year, and that at the seat of government, leaving to the legislative assembly a discretionary authority to require an additional term or terms to be holden either there or elsewhere, then the Territorial act in question is valid. Congress having in general terms given to the legislative assembly general legislative powers, any exception thereto must be made to appear with reasonable certainty. General words are to have a general application, and their effect cannot be taken away by words which create, by mere inference or doubtful construction, an exception. (Broom, Leg. Max., 647; Potter's Dwarris, Stat., 219; 2 Inst., 395; Rex v. Allen, 15 East, 340; Rex v. Inhabitants of Cumberland, 6 T. R., 194; 3 B. & P., 354.) It is generally to be taken that the legislature only meant to modify or repeal the provision of any former statute in those cases only where such objects are expressly declared. It is always to be presumed that when the legislature entertains an intention it will express it; and that, too, in clear and explicit terms. (Potter's Dwarris, Stat., 219.) "Plenary power in the legislature for all purposes is the rule. A prohibition to exercise a particular power is an exception. In inquiring, therefore, whether a given statute is constitutional [authorized] it is for those who question its validity to show that it is forbidden." (People v. Draper, 15 New York, 543.) The statute (Rev. Stats., 1851) does not merely give the legislative assembly power over "a particular subject only." If it did so, the power, though given in general terms, would apply only to matters ejusdem generis, and be "confined to that subject." (Broom, Leg. Max., 647; Chegary v. Mayor, 13 N. Y., 220.) The power is given in general terms, comprehending, by the import of the terms used, all subjects, and the act giving the power is to be construed accordingly, except in so far as there may clearly appear a modification or exception to them. It is not permitted "by conjecture to take out of the effect of general words" authority "which those words are always considered as comprehending." (Broom, Leg. Max., 649; Church v. Mundy, 15 Ves., 396; Doe d. Howell v. Thomas, 1 Scott, N. R., 371; Moore v. Magrath, 1 Cowp., 12; Shep. Touch. Atherly-79 п.) Another material consideration to be regarded is, that the statute which gives the legislative assembly its power, and that which requires the supreme court to "hold a term annually at the seat of government", are both affirmative in their terms. It is a general rule that "an affirmative statute does not repeal a precedent affirmative statute, and if the substance of both may stand together they should both be enforced." (Sedgwick, Stat. and Const. L., 2d ed., 32; Dwarris, Stat., 475; Potter's Dwarris, 74; Foster's Case, 11 Rep., 63; Wallace v. Holmes, 9 Blatch.. C. C., 65; Uncas National Bank v. Rith, 33 Wisc., 339; Brown v. Bugan, 24 Ind., 194; State v. McCullough, 3 Nev., 202; Leake v. Blasdell, 6 Nev., 40; Com. v. Cancannon, 3 Brewst., 344; People v. Ingham Co., 20 Mich., 103.) There are cases for the application of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, in which an affirmative statute may, by implication, negative that which has been given in another affirmative statute. (Sedgwick, Stat. and Const. L., 30; Foster's Case, 11 Rep., 64; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Clarke, Iowa, 262; New Haven v. Whitney, 36 Conn., 373; Childs v. Smith, 55 Barb., 45; Smith v. Stevens, 10 Wall., 321; Perkins v. Thornburg, 10 Cal., 189; Walkins v. Warsell, 20 Ark., 410; Pembroke v. Epsom, 44 New Hampshire, 113; State ข. Taylor, 15 Ohio St., 132.) But such result can only arise by a "necessary implication" which raises so strong a probability of intention that a contrary intention cannot be supposed. (People v. Draper, 15 New York, 558; 1 Ves. & B., 466.) But when, as in this case, two affirmative provisions are found in the same statute (act September 9, 1850, sections 7 and 10, 9 Stats., 449, now embraced in Rev. Stats., 1851, 1864), -one by which Congress gives to the Territorial assembly general legislative powers (sec. 7), and the other declaring that the Territorial supreme court "shall hold a term at the seat of government of the Territory annually" (sec. 10), -the latter provision is, upon clear authority, in no sense a limitation or modification of the legislative authority given by the former, except only to the extent that no Territorial statute can relieve the court of the duty to hold one term annually at the seat of government. The plain effect of the words employed in the statutes is, that there is but one exception or limitation on the general power of the legislative assembly as to the sessions of the supreme court, namely, that there must be, as required by Congress, one "term annually at the seat of government." In all other respects, as to the times when and places where said court shall hold sessions, the power of the legislative assembly is plenary and unlimited. The imposition of a single limitation on a general power leaves the latter operative in all respects except as to that limitation. Upon the language of the statutes cited, and the rules of construction stated, Congress has, in effect, said that "the legislative assembly may by virtue of its general legislative power fix the times when and the places where sessions of the supreme court may be held, subject to only one limitation on such power, namely, that the duty imposed on the court by Congress to hold at least one term each year at the seat of government cannot be abrogated." It is manifest that the purpose of Congress was to secure absolutely at least (1) one term of the supreme court annually, and (2) that term at the seat of government, leaving the requirement for other terms and places to the discretion of the legislative assembly. The act of March 3, 1881 (21 Stats., 454) makes an appropriation for "expenses of the United States courts." This includes Territorial courts. (5 Op., 678; 6 Op., 388; 7 Ор., 303, 610; 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 306; Cox v. United States, 14 C. Cls., 513.) No special appropriations have been made for the supreme and district courts in the Terri |