2. The statute has prescribed the cases in which a bond may be paid in full on the presentation of a part thereof. When any coupon or registered Cooper, 11 M. & W., 793; Van Amringe r. Morton, 4 Whart., 382; and see cases collected 2 Parsons, Cont., 6th ed., 723, note.)

Others, in principle, hold a different view (Hibblewhite r. McMorine, 6 M. & W. Exch., 200: Enthoven v. Hoyle, 13 C. B., 373; Boyd r. Boyd, 2 N. & M., 125; Gilbert v. Anthony, 1 Yerg., 69; Byers v. McClanahan, 6 Gill. & I., 250; Ayres r. Harness, 1 Ohio, 368; McKee r. Hicks, 2 Dev., 379; Harrison r. Tiernans, 4 Rand., 177.) Some of these cases relate to deeds, and deny the validity of such an instrument if executed in blank and afterwards filled in. This rests on the principle that a sealed instrument requires a sealed authority to make or change it. But many cases hold that the character of municipal and corporate bonds is not affected by the addition of a seal. (Jones, Railroad Securities, 198, note; Whiter. Vt. & Mass. R. R. Co., 21 How., 575.)

The result would, on principle, seem to be that the legal title of corporate or municipal bonds originally made to a blank payee passes to the party whose name is filled therein; but that the legal title of registered bonds transferable only on designated books, and corporate certificates of stock transferable in the same manner, can only pass in the prescribed mode. But equitable interests may pass by any mode indicating such to be the intent of the parties to the transaction, as by a blank assignment and delivery upon a sufficient consideration. (Combs v. Hodge, 21 How., 400; citing Turton r. Benson. 1 P. Wms,, 496; s. c.. 2 Vernon, 764; Davies r. Austen, 1 Ves., jr., 247; and see the cases collected in the note [Perkins ed.], 1 Bro. Ch., 434; Cator r. Burke, and 3 Bro. Ch., 179; Scott r. Shreeve, 12 Wheat., 605; Judson r. Corcoran, 17 How., 612.) In the latter case the accounting officers of the Treasury Department would generally require adverse claimants to settle their rights by decree of a court of equity. (Gibson's Case, post.) A blank assignment may in some cases operate by way of estoppel. (Swain r. Seamans, 9 Wall., 273; Stower. Unted States, 19 Wall., 16; Herman, Estoppel, 330; Gibson's Case, post.)

A question may arise as to the validity at law of blank assignments under what is said in the regulations. In proper cases "regulations" have the force of law. The loan acts require registered bonds to be "transferred on the books of the Treasury under such regulations as may be established by the Secretary of the Treasury." (Loan Acts of June 22, 1860, sec. 2, 12 Stats, 79; February 8, 1861, sec. 2, Id., 129; March 2, 1861, sec. 2, Id., 178; July 17, 1861, secs. 3 and 5, Id., 259; July 14, 1870, 16 Stats., 272; January 20, 1871. Id., 399.) The proper assignment by the payee, on the bond or on a separate paper, with the requisite certificate of acknowledgment of assignment, of the proof of facts which make an assignment by operation of law in certain cases, is the authority to make a transfer "on the books of the Treasury" Department.

"The directions printed on the backs of the bonds," mentioned in the "regulations," are shown by the following specimen:

"FOUR PER CENT CONSOLS.
"1877-1907.

"For value received assign to the within registered bond of the United States, and hereby authorize the transfer thereof on the books of the Treasury Department.

"Dated, 18-.

- "STATE OF —, "Town of

County of

"Personally appeared before me the above-named assignor, known or proved to me to be the payee of the within bond, and signed the above transfer, acknowledging the same to be his free act or deed.

"Witness my hand, official designation, and seal.

[SEAL.]

"NOTE. The execution and acknowledgment of the above assignment, when not made at the Treasury Department, must be before a U. S. judge, U. S. district at

bond has been destroyed wholly, or in part, it may, on proper evidence, be paid; so a lost registered bond may be paid on proper evidence. Upon

torney, clerk of a U. S. court, collector of customs, collector or assessor of internal revenue, U. S. Treasurer or assistant treasurer, or the president or cashier of a national bank, or if in a foreign country, before a U. S. minister or consul. In all cases the officer must add his official designation, residence and seal if he has one. When the assignment is made by a corporation, it must be named as the assignor, when by a guardian, trustee executor, administrator, an officer of a corporation or any one in a representative capacity, proof of his authority to act must be produced to the officer before whom the assignment is made, and must accompany the bond. Assignors must be identified as known and responsible persons to the satisfaction of the officer."

The loan acts authorize two classes of bonds: coupon, payable by delivery to bearer, and registered, in which the obligation of the United States is to pay the party therein named "or assigns." (Salln's Case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 215, 218.) An assignment in blank does not name a party as assignee; and, if the blank assignment could authorize the first purchaser under it to insert his name as assignee, the question remains whether it could authorize another and subsequent purchaser to insert his name, or whether this is against the letter or policy of the statutes. Such purchaser might be the equitable owner. (Baldwin v. Ely, 9 How., 601; Williamson r. Thomson, 16 Ves., 443; Burroughs, Public Securities, 252; Angell & Ames, Corp., §§ 564, 565, 566; Field r. Pierce, 102 Mass., 261; Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wall., 377.) If the last of several successive holders of a bond thus assigned in blank should have procured it without right thereto, and should fill in his name. without the knowledge of the Secretary of the Treasury, and then at maturity assign it to the Secretary for payment, all appearing regular, the payment thereof would, by way of estoppel, defeat the claim of any former holder against the government. (Johnson r. Lafliu, 5 Dillon, C. C. R. 76; s. c., 103 U. S., 800; Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S., 70; 3 De Gex & Smale, Ch., 310; Angell & Ames, Corp., 564, 565, 566, 576.) So an assignment made under similar circumstances before the maturity of a bond to a bonâ fide purchaser, and a transfer entered in the Register's office, would give him a title which no former holder could controvert. (Cavanaugh's Money Securities, 266; Burroughs, Public Securities, 138, 254; Imperial Land Company of Marseilles, L. R., 11 Eq., 478; Ex parte Colboone, L. R., 11 Eq., 490; Bank . Lanier, 11 Wall., 374; Baldwin v. Ely, 9 How., 600; De Voss v. City of Richmond, 18 Gratt., 338; Knox, Conors & Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How., 539; Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall., 772; Royal Brit. Bk. v. Turquand, 85 Eng. C. L., 248; Angell & Ames, Corp., § 576; Johnston v. Laflin, 103 U. S., 800; s. c., 5 Dillon, C. C. R., 65.) This results from the doctrine of estoppel that "a man shall not defeat his own act or deny its validity to the prejudice of another." This is well illustrated in the case of an invalid power of attorney, executed in blank. (Stowe v. United States, 19 Wall., 16; Herman, Law of Estoppel, sec. 212; Swain v. Seamans, 9 Wall., 273; Bronson's Extr. v. Chappell, 12 Wall., 681; New England Car-Spring Co. v. Union India-Rubber Co., 4 Blatchf. C. C., 1; Alvord v. United States, 8 Ct. Cls., 364.) It equally results from the principle, that where one of two innocent parties must suffer a loss, it shall fall on him through whose act it occurred. These principles apply where the payee in a bond executed a blank assignment for the purpose of making a sale. But a mere indorsement in blank, not designed to operate as a sale, and without the requisite certificate of acknowledgment of assignment required by "regulations," would not estop the payee from asserting his equities even in the hands of bonâ fide holders. (Combs v. Hodge, 21 How., 406; Bank r. Lanier, 11 Wall., 374; Gibson's Case, post; Angell & Ames, Corp., § 576; Marlborough Mfg. Co. r. Smith, 2 Conn., 579; Northrop v. Newtown, &c., T. Co., 3 Conn., 544; Fisher r. Essex Bank, 5 Gray, 373; Shipman v. Ætna Ins. Co., 29 Conn., 245.)

* The provisions will be found in sections 3702, 3703, 3704, 3705 of the Revised Statutes, and the regulations in relation thereto in 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., Appx., ch. xiii, p. 560.

the rule of construction already stated, the cases thus provided for must be deemed the only cases in which payment can be made by the Treasury Department of a bond on presentation of a part thereof. The claimant has not shown such a case.

3. In holding that executive accounting officers can only allow a credit to the Treasurer when he pays government bonds in the cases specified, and in the mode pointed out by the statute under which action is taken, it is not intended to say that there may not be a remedy in the Court of Claims in proper cases. That is a subject for judicial action. (Rev. Stats., 1059; 2 Daniel, Neg. Ins., 1695.)

The application for payment should be refused.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, July 15, 1882.

5. Such a payment by the Secretary of the Treasury to the employé is not a voluntary payment, in contemplation of law, and an action will lie for the recovery of the money from the employé.

6. In such case the employé is estopped from denying that the money illegally collected by the government belongs to it.

7. The title to money collected by the government under color of law, though illegally collected and paid into the Treasury, vests in the United States, and it cannot be divested without legal proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction.

8. The Treasury Department practice stated, by which a set-off is enforced under the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stats., 481).

9. When a public officer has, without lawful authority, paid money of the United States to a person under color of legal claim but without legal authority to receive it, it may be recovered from such person. The doctrine of estoppel has no application in such case.

General John E. Wool, residing in the fifteenth New York inter nal revenue collection district, died in 1869, leaving a will, by which' after the death of his wife, sundry legacies were to be paid to persons named. By law the taxes on legacies became due only when the legatee became entitled to the possession of the legacy. (See act June 30, 1864, secs. 124, 125, 13 Stats., 285, 286, as amended by the act of July 13, 1866, sec. 9, 14 Stats., 140; Mason v. Sargent, 104 U. S., 689.) Mrs. Wool, his widow, died May 8, 1873.

October 30, 1872, a contract was made between the Secretary of the Treasury and John D. Sanborn, under the act of May S, 1872 (17 Stats., 68, 69; see House Ex. Doc. No. 132, first session, Forty-third Congress, pp. 16, 19, 21, 75, 151, 275), by which said Sanborn agreed, for a consideration of one-half the sum to be recovered, to proceed to collect, among others, the tax on said legacies. This contract was entered into under the construction then given to the law that the legacy tax was due and pay able before the death of Mrs. Wool. The contract recites an affidavit previously made by Sanborn and filed with the Secretary, stating that this legacy tax was then due and unpaid.

In June or July, 1873, soon after the death of Mrs. Wool, the proper internal-revenue collector demanded of the executor of Wool a return for assessment of the legacy tax, and was proceeding to take steps to collect the tax, without the knowledge of any payment to Sanborn. August 2, 1873, the executor informed the collector that he had paid the taxes [by his check to the order of the Secretary of the Treasury].

August 3, 1873, Sanborn reported to the Secretary of the Treasury that the executor of Wool had paid to him [by check, as aforesaid] the legacy tax, $14,668 [after the death of Mrs. Wool], which he remitted to the Secretary with a request that one-half the amount be paid to him. The tax was paid by draft August 1, 1873, of Asher R. Morgan, execntor, on the United States Trust Company, New York, for $14,668, transmitted by the Secretary August 9, 1873, to the Treasurer of the United States for "deposit to the special credit" of the Secretary. (House Ex. Doc. No. 132, 1st sess., 43d Congress, 151.)*

* The legacy tax was levied by the act of Juhe 30, 1834 (13 Stats., 285), as amended by the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stats., 140), and the tax on legacies was repealed by

May 24, 1882, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue addressed a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, stating that said Sanborn is a claimant for rewards as informer in several internal-revenue cases under the circular of July 31, 1873. Some of these claims have been allowed by the Commissioner and approved by the Secretary under section 3463 of the Revised Statutes; and an account for the payment of the same has been settled by the Fifth Auditor, and the balance found due by the Auditor will be certified by the First Comptroller. One of them is a claim, in which the "amount due" is to be reported, under the provisions of the act of June 14, 1878 (20 Stats., 130), "to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall lay the same before Congress for consideration." The Commissioner states that there is reason to believe that Sanborn is justly indebted to the United States in the sum of $7,334 improperly paid to him; and he suggests that payment of all moneys due Sanborn, or "an amount * * equal to the debt thus due to the United States," be withheld by the Secretary pursuant to the provisions of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stats., 481). It is suggested that, as the legacy tax was not due and payable until after the death of Mrs. Wool, the contract with Sanborn in respect to the case of the Wool estate was void, for the reason that it was made before the tax was due. May 27, 1882, the Secretary approved the Commissioner's recommendation, and referred the letter to the First Comptroller, "with a request that there

*