a "revision of [the] whole subject" embraced in section 1174, and so a repeal by implication of the whole section. The rule in such case has been thus stated: "Where two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act." (United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall., 92.) This repeal occurs when the subjects and objects of both statutes are the same. (United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S., 546.) Bishop, in his new and valuable work "On the Written Laws," says: "The just doctrine is, that, without exception, a statute in affirmative terms, with no intimation of an intent to repeal prior laws, does not repeal them, unless the new and the old are irreconcilably in conflict." (Sec. 160.) And he says no such repeal takes place "when the legislative body makes what on its face is a mere addition to the laws, employing no negative words and saying nothing of repeal." (Sec. 161.) In such cases of different statutes a repeal by implication takes place "only to the extent of the repugnance." (Bishop, Written Laws, 152; Elrod v. Gilliland, Howell & Co., 27 Ga., 467; Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wall., 657.) Upon these authorities and many others which may be cited, it is clear there is no total repeal of section 1174. If the act of April 29, 1878, stood alone, and section 1174 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia had not been enacted, keeping an "office or place of business for the sale of lotterytickets, or of any share or interest in lottery tickets" within the District of Columbia, would not constitute an offense against the laws of Congress relating to the District. Hence, not expressly repealing, being repugnant to, or embracing, that provision in said section 1174, which previously enacted, that "it shall not be lawful to keep within the District any office or place of business for the sale of lottery-tickets, or of any share or interest in lottery-tickets" it does not operate as a repeal thereof; so, not operating as a repeal of so much of said section 1174 as created this new offense, it does not repeal that portion of said section which prescribed a fine and penalty for such offense, "one-half of which shall go to the informer and the other half to the District." The inquiry then arises how shall the informer be paid? It is clear that, when an appropriation has been made by Congress for the purpose, he is to be paid by the Commissioners of the District on an itemized voucher approved by the Auditor of the District, with evidence, (1) that he was the informer, and (2) that a fine has been collected under this section and paid into the Treasury of the United States. The fine is a part of the revenues of the District. Section 1079 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District requires all fines imposed by the police court to be collected and paid over to the District. The act of March 3, 1879, requires that "all revenues of the District * * from taxes or otherwise," shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States. All the recent District appropriation acts contain this provision. The * act of June 11, 1878, and other acts cited, require all these revenues to be "disbursed for the expenses of said District, on itemized voucher, * * * approved by the Auditor of the District." It necessarily follows that the marshal of the District cannot, ont of a fine collected, pay the informer. The police court has no power to direct the payment, and it does not appear that it is charged with the duty of finding who the in. former is. In adopting this mode of payment, the prevailing usage is followed. The Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia provided: "Sec. 1080. The moneys collected upon the judgments of the police court, or so much thereof as may be necessary, shall be applied to the payment of the salaries of the judge and other officers of the court, For a time these salaries were paid by the marshal out of this fund without any appropriation act. (Bundy's Case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 184). This was done, either upon the theory that fines collected by the police court, not being money in the Treasury of the United States, might be applied in the manner stated, or upon the theory that this section was itself an appropriation act. The latter proposition cannot be maintained. (Canal Case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 141; Bundy's Case, Id., 184; Conger's Case, 2 Id., 2d ed., 36). The former proposition as to money of the United States is open to question. Fines imposed by the police court belong to the revenues of the District, but, by force of the statutes, are to be paid into the Treasury of the United States, and can only be paid out by authority of an appropriation act. Since the act of March 3, 1879, requiring "all revenues of the District" to be paid into the Treasury of the United States, and in connection with the act of June 11, 1878, requiring all revenues to "be disbursed for the expenses of said District, on itemized voucher, approved by the auditor of the District," the marshal has made no disbursement for salaries from fines so collected, and has no authority to do so. These acts have been regarded as modifying the effect of section 1080 above cited. This section is not inserted in Richardson's Supplement to the Revised Statutes as one "altered, affected, or repealed by legislation" since the revision, but it is modified as above stated. * * * An officer or employé in the public service with compensation fixed by law or regulations is not entitled to pay as an informer. (Revised Stat., 1765.) The marshal will be advised that he cannot make any payment to informers. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, First Comptroller's Office, August 24, 1882. IN THE MATTER OF THE PAYMENT OF CLAIMS WHEN THE STATUTE APPROPRIATING MONEY FOR THE PURPOSE CONTAINS A FALSE DE. SCRIPTION OF THE CLAIMS OR THE CLAIMANTS. ---FALSE-DESCRIPTION CASE. 1. When a claim or a claimant mentioned in an appropriation act is falsely described therein, or has a false description thereto appended, such description may be rejected; and, if there remain a sufficient description to identify the claim and the claimant, and a purpose in the act to make payment, it may lawfully be made. 2. The maxim, falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat, generally applies as well in the construction of statutes as in other cases. 3. The maxim applied, and payment authorized: I. In the case of an appropriation "to refund to the sureties of C. H. Davis, late postmaster at Vernon Springs, Alabama," there being no such place as "Vernon Springs," but said Davis being sufficiently identified as late postmaster in Alabama. II. In the case of an appropriation to pay (1) John W. Spencer, (2) certified claim, No. 3705, (3) for horse lost in the military service (4) the sum of $150 (5) allowed by the Fourth Auditor and Second Comptroller, when, in fact, (1) Spencer had no claim, and (2) the Fourth Anditor had no jurisdiction of such claims, but in other respects the claim was correctly described, and the certificate numbered 3705 in the Treasury Department showed $150 due Kate R. Bowdish. The following is taken from the act of Congress of August 5, 1882 (22 Stat., 257, 261, 281, 282, 283): AN ACT making appropriations to supply deficiencies in the appropriations for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, and for prior years, and for those certified as due by the accounting officers of the Treasury in accordance with section four of the act of June fourteenth, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, heretofore paid from permanent appropriations, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums be, and the same are hereby, appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the objects hereinafter stated, To enable the Secretary of the Treasury to refund to the sureties of C. H. Davis, late postmaster at Vernon Springs, Alabama, the amount collected upon a judgment of court in excess of the actual amount due the United States from said postmaster, as appears of record in the office of the Auditor of the Treasury for the Post-Office Department, seven hundred and thirty-one dollars and seven cents. SEC. 3. That for the payment of the following supplemental list of claims, which are fully set forth in House Executive Document Number Two hundred and two, Forty-seventh Congress, first session, and are allowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury under the fourth section of the act of June fourteenth, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, since January fourteenth, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, transmitted by letter of Secretary of the Treasury of May fifteenth, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, there be appropriated as follows: For horses and other property lost in the military service, for same period, fifteen thousand four hundred and eighty-two dollars and sixtynine cents. The House executive document referred to in the foregoing section, contains a schedule of claims allowed under the caption, with descriptions of claims shown, as follows: Amounts allowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department. ALLOWED BY THE FOURTH AUDITOR AND SECOND COMPTROLLER, UNDER SECTION 4, ACT OF JUNE 14, 1878. Claims "for horses and other property lost in the military service" are allowed by the Third Auditor and Second Comptroller. Among the claims so allowed was one in favor of Kate R. Bowdish, the balance due as certified by certificate No. 3705 being $150, for a horse "lost in the military service." The certificate No. 3705 appears in the schedule above under the caption of claims "allowed by the Fourth Auditor and Second Comptroller," when it should have been under the caption of claims allowed by the Third Auditor and Second Comptroller, and the name of the claimant is not in the schedule, but is indicated by a "do." under the name of "John W. Spencer." August 17, 1882, the Secretary of War made a requisition on the Secretary of the Treasury, asking that he will "cause a warrant for $150 to be issued in favor of Kate R. Bowdish due on settlement as per certificate of Second Comptroller No. 3705, to be charged to" appropria tions for "horses and other property lost in the military service prior to July 1, 1879." There is a memorandum thereon as follows: "This case is reported on page 29 of House Ex. Doc. No. 202, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., as 'do.' under the name of John W. Spencer." In relation to the claim first above mentioned in the appropriation act in favor of "C. H. Davis, late postmaster at Vernon Springs, Alabama," it is to be observed, there is no such post-office as "Vernon Springs" in Alabama, but there is a post-office at Union Springs, Ala., at which place C. H. Davis, whose sureties are the claimants, was postmaster, and there has been no other person by the name of C. H. Davis as postmaster in Alabama. The First Comptroller is asked to decide, whether warrants can lawfully issue for the payment of these claims. OPINION BY WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller. The questions presented relate to two claims. The act of August 5, 1882, appropriated $731.07 in favor of "the sureties of C. H. Davis, late postmaster at Vernon Springs, Alabama." If it is competent to admit evidence to show that there is no such postoffice as "Vernon Springs" in Alabama, and that C. H. Davis was postmaster at Union Springs. Ala., and not elsewhere, and then, upon this evidence, to reject the false description in the statute "at Vernon Springs," and then give effect to the remaining words of the statute, payment can lawfully be made to the sureties named. So, as to the claim of Kate R. Bowdish; if it is competent to show - (1) that the Second Comptroller's certificate No. 3705 was in her favor, and thus contradict the effect of the abbreviation "do." under the name of "John W. Spencer" as payee, and (2) that her claim was allowed by the Third Auditor and thus locate it under the proper caption in the schedule correcting the false description in the caption-and then give effect to the appropriation act and schedule as each are thus corrected, the claimant can be paid. The law as to each case is this: It is competent to show the errors mentioned, not for the purpose of thus giving effect, either to the statute or the schedule as corrected, but simply for the purpose of rejecting the false descriptions. If, when the false descriptions are thus rejected, a sufficient description remains to identify the clainis and claimants, and to clearly indicate a purpose on the part of Congress to make appropriations for their payment, they may be paid. Thus Greenleaf, Evidence, Vol. 1, sec. 301, in discussing the admissibility of parol evidence to explain a written instrument, so as to correct a false demonstration or description, and apply such instrument to its proper subject, says: * * * There is another class of cases, *, namely, those in which, upon applying the instrument to its subject-matter, it appears that in relation to the subject, whether person or thing, the description in it is |