with whom the account is kept shall furnish the officer with a monthly statement of his deposit account.

No allowance will be made to any disbursing officer for expenses charged for collecting money on checks.

In case of the death, resignation, or removal of any disbursing officer, checks previously drawn by him will be paid from the funds to his credit, unless such checks have been drawn more than four months before their presentation, or reasons exist for suspecting fraud.

Every disbursing officer when opening his first account, before issuing any checks, will furnish the depositary on whom the checks are drawn, with his official signature duly verified by some officer whose signature is known to the depositary.

For every deposit made by a disbursing officer, to his official credit, a receipt in form as below shall be given, setting forth, besides its serial number and the place and date of issue, the character of the funds, i. e., whether coin or currency; and if the credit is made by a disbursing officer's check transferring funds to another disbursing officer, the essential items of the check shall be enumerated; if by a Treasury draft, like items shall be given, including the warrant number; the title of each officer shall be expressed, and the title of the disbursing account shall also show for what branch of the public service the account is kept, as it is essential for the proper transaction of departmental business that accounts of moneys advanced from different bureaus to a disbursing officer serving in two or more distinct capacities, be kept separate and distinct from each other, and be so reported to the department both by the officer and the depositary-the receipt to be retained by the officer in whose favor it is issued

No. -.

Received of

$

OFFICE OF THE U. S. (Assistant Treasurer or Depositary,) 一, —, 18-. -T디어 dollars, consisting of, to be placed to his credit and subject only to his check in that official capacity. -, U. S. (Assistant Treasurer or Depositary.) These regulations are intended to supersede those of January 2, 1872.

一,

In January, 1881, a warrant of arrest on criminal charge was issued at Sevierville, in the eastern district of Tennessee, by a commissioner of the circuit court of the United States (Rev. Stats., 627, 727, 1014), and there delivered to a deputy marshal, who served it by arresting the accused at a point eighty-three miles distant; and, to save expense, the defendant was taken for examination before the nearest commissioner, at Blackwater, only four miles from the place of arrest. The marshal has charged mileage for the eighty-three miles traveled in going to make the arrest. It sufficiently appears that the travel was actually and necessarily performed. It has long been a disputed question, which is now submitted to the First Comptroller for decision, whether, in such case, the marshal is entitled to mileage for the distance actually and necessarily traveled, or only from the place where the process is served to the office of the commissioner before whom the accused is taken for examination. By the former rule, in this case the mileage would be for eighty-three miles; by the latter, only four. The courts for this district are held at Knoxville.

DECISION BY WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller :

The original act of Congress prescribing mileage for a marshal was that of May 8, 1792, section 3 (1 Stats., 276), which gave him "for his travel out in serving each writ, warrant, attachment, or process aforesaid [in chancery], five cents per mile, to be computed from the place of service to the court where the writ or process shall be returned; and if more persons than one are named therein, the travel shall be computed from the court to the place of service which is most remote, adding thereto the extra travel necessary to serve it on the other." All process was then, and generally ever since, made returnable to the court from which it issued. (Act March 2, 1793, 1 Stats., 335, sec. 7; Conkling's Treatise, 302, 336; Rev. Stats., 917,918). Under the original act the place "where the writ or process shall be returned," being the same place where it was issued, the word "returned" had precisely the same legal effect as the word "issued."

Criminal jurisdiction in respect to arresting, imprisoning, or bailing persons for any crime or offense against the United States, with authority in such case to issue process to marshals, was first given to circuit court commissioners, by the act of August 22, 1842, section 1 (5 Stats., 516; Rev. Stats., 627, 727, 1014, 1983.-See, in respect to their civil jurisdiction, the acts of September 24, 1789, section 33; 1 Stats., 91; March 2, 1793, section 4; 1 Stats., 334; February 20, 1812, section 1; 2 Stats., 679; and March 1, 1817, 3 Stats., 350.) The act of September 24, 1789, section 27 (1 Stat., 87; Rev. Stats., 787), having made it the duty of the marshal "to execute throughout the district all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United States," it became his duty, by force of this statute, and of the act of 1842, to execute warrants issued by commissioners. It is well settled in princi

ple, that the duty to execute the new process attached by force of this legislation.

The provision in the act of May 8, 1792, regulating the fees of marshals for executing writs, &c., remains substantially as originally enacted. The act of February 26, 1853 (10 Stats., 164), which has been carried into the Revised Statutes, Title XIII, Chapter Sixteen, prescribes the compensation of marshals

"For travel in going only to serve any process, warrant, attachment, or other writ, including writs of subpœna in civil and criminal cases, six cents per mile, to be computed from the place of service, to the court or. place where the writ or process is returned; and if more than one person is served therewith, the travel shall be computed from the court to the place of service which shall be the most remote, adding thereto the extra travel, which is necessary to serve it on the others." (Rev. Stats., 829.)

Criminal process issued by a circuit court commissioner is not returned to the court of the district, but copies thereof are to be returned into the office of the clerk of the proper court. It is clear from the words of the act referred to that in the case stated the marshal is entitled to mileage for eighty-three miles. When the act of May 8, 1792, was passed, and up to the act of August 22, 1842, all criminal process was issued by the clerk of the proper court at his office in the district where the court was held, and was returnable there. The marshal was entitled, as the act of 1792 said, "for his travel out in serving each writ," or, as the act of 1853 says, "for travel in going only to serve any process." The intention is plain that he shall have mileage for his actual and necessary travel in going to serve the writ. A marshal having sundry writs might make a circuitous but continuous route of travel to serve process on half a dozen different parties, reaching the most remote one last. To prevent the abuse of charging mileage by the circuitous route on the writ last served, the act of 1792 provided that the mileage should be computed "from the place of service to the court where the writ or process shall be returned"; and the latter was the place where it was issued and delivered to the marshal; or, as the act of 1853 says, "to be computed from the place of service to the court or place where the process is returned." In contemplation of the provisions of these acts, the place of return must always be considered to be the place where the writ was issued, otherwise the marshal might be deprived of compensation "for travel in going to serve the writ" in cases where the writ was made returnable elsewhere. Each clause of the statute had its purpose; the first fixes the right of the marshal to mileage "for his travel out"; the second directs the distance of the "travel out" to be computed by the shortest practicable route of return, whether he return by such route or a longer one. The word "returned" had the same meaning in the acts of 1792 and 1853. As to process issued now by the clerk of the court, and requiring actual travel from the office

*

of the clerk where the court is held, the same rule applies in computing mileage.

If the rule laid down in the act of 1853 for computing the mileage be applied literally to the case now under consideration, the marshal would be entitled only to mileage for four miles; but, on the other hand, it is clear that it would be improper to do this, for the marshal did not travel those four miles in going to serve the writ, and it is in "going only to serve" process that a marshal acquires any right to mileage. If this apparent conflict could raise a doubt in respect of the amount to be paid the marshal, it is to be reasonably resolved in favor of the officer. But there is no doubt he is clearly entitled to mileage for eighty-three miles. (United States vs. Morse, 3 Story, C. C., 91; Cross' Case, 8 Court Cl., 1; S. C., 14 Wall., 479; Sleigh's Case, 9 Court Cl., 369; Moore's Case, 4 Court Cl., 139.) The same result is reached by the rule of construction that effect should be given to the clear intention of the legislature, and not to defeat it by adhering too rigidly to the mere letter of the statute, or to technical rules of construction. (Oates vs. National Bank, 100 U. S., 244.) The intention was to give mileage for the distance actually and necessarily traveled. If necessary, the word "returned," in the expression "place where the process is returned," is to be construed as "issued." (Oates vs. National Bank, 100 U. S., 244; Holiday Case, 1 Lawrence, Comptroller's Decisions, 32.) This may be done under the rule that any construction which would lead to absurd consequences should be discarded. (United States vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 482.) Any doubt that may exist must be based on the idea that the second clause of the act of 1853, in respect of computation of mileage, has some force in giving the right to mileage. But clearly this clause is only intended to prevent an abuse or misconstruction of the first clause, which does give the right "for travel, in going only," the necessary distance traveled The word "only" clearly shows that no mileage is to be allowed for travel in returning. If the last clause is to be construed as having been intended to reduce the straight line of actually necessary travel in going, it would defeat the purpose of the first clause, and have a broader effect than its evident purpose. It is unreasonable to suppose that mileage should not be given for necessary travel in serving a commissioner's process, when it is clearly given for serving similar process when issued by the clerk of a court. It will be observed that the statute gives the marshal mileage "for travel in going only to serve any process," not for coming back to make return. If mileage for travel from the place where a writ is issued to the place where it is served be not allowed in this case, the marshal would not even be entitled to the four miles' travel from the place of arrest to the nearest commissioner. And if the writ were to be returned to a commissioner residing at the place of arrest, no mileage fees would be allowed, if literally it be only authorized "from the place where the process is returned to the place of service."

The proper practice now is to make warrants issued by commissioners returnable in accordance with the circular of the Attorney-General; and unless sufficient reasons be shown for making service or return otherwise, any mileage claimed, in excess of that which would accrue if the circular had been complied with, should be disallowed. *

When practicable, warrants for the arrest of persons charged with crime should be issued by the circuit court commissioner nearest to the place where the defendant may be found. It is with this view that the law authorizes the circuit court to appoint as commissioners "so many discreet persons in different parts of the district as such court shall deem necessary" "on account of the extent of such district." (Act Feb. 20, 1812, 2 Stats., 678; Rev. Stat., 627, 1983.) When complaint is made before a circuit court commissioner that a crime or offense has been committed at a distant point, and there is another commissioner nearer to said point, the affidavit of the complainant should, generally, be sent to the latter commissioner; by whom the warrant of arrest should be issued. (Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 75; Rev. Stats., 1984.)

Mileage will be allowed for eighty-three miles.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, February 16, 1882.