If the evidence of Meyers, when taken to be true, would justify the belief that it would affect the result upon another trial the judgment would have to be reversed. We are of the opinion, however, that, taking everything he said to be absolutely true, it could not affect the result. He merely contradicted the appellee as to the time of the injury and the fact that appellee had been at a certain place in the pit. He did not see the accident or know the cause of it or anything about it, or whether it was due to the negligence of appellant, appellee or any one else. If the jury had believed him as to both these matters he testified about it would not have affected the verdict. The attorneys for appellant presented to the court fortyseven instructions, of which the court gave to the jury twenty-three and the rest were refused. It would be impossible to formulate forty-seven different propositions of law relating to the issues in this case, and the instructions were necessarily mere repetitions of the same principles, so far as they stated the law and were applicable to the case. The court gave several instructions on each of the material propositions and would have been justified in refusing many that were given. While attorneys have a right to present to the court as many instructions as they deem necessary, they must, of course, expect that if they present such a number as were offered in this case they will, of necessity, receive but hasty and scant attention. Useless burdens were imposed upon the trial court in the examination of the volume of instructions offered, and in such a case a court of review would be very loath to reverse a judgment if some slight error had been committed by the court. The first refused instruction which is the subject of argument is the twenty-fifth, and it is said that the substance of this instruction was not embodied in any of those given. That is a clear mistake, since every principle stated in it was included, with others, in the very first instruction given. By that instruction the jury were advised that they must find a verdict for the appellant unless appellee had proved, by at least a preponderance of the evidence, various things, among which were, that his injuries were not the result of his own carelessness or negligence and that the injury was not the result of the negligence of a fellow-servant, as defined in the instructions. The twenty-fifth instruction, which was refused, stated that if the injury to the appellee was occasioned by his own negligence, carelessness or want of skill, or that of his fellow-servant engaged in the same line of service, the jury should find the defendant not guilty. In fact, most of the complaints made are that the court did not repeat the same things in different instructions. The next complaint is, that the court refused the twentyninth instruction, and as to that counsel say: "It may be contended that all the elements entering into this instruction were given by the court to the jury in other instructions, but it seems to us that the instruction embodies a statement of the law in more apt language than the other instructions, and that it should have been given." It is true that every principle contended for in the instruction was given in other instructions, and if counsel thought the language in this instruction more apt than in the others they should have offered this one and retained the others. We find no error in the record except the improper admission of evidence as to the conviction of Meyers, and that would not justify a reversal. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. FARMER and VICKERS, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case. THE PEOPLE ex rel. John R. Thompson, County Collector, Appellee, vs. THE FIRST CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH OF OAK PARK, Appellant. Opinion filed December 17, 1907-Rehearing denied Feb. 7, 1908. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-legislature cannot exempt from taxation church property not used for religious purposes. Section 3 of article 9 of the constitution, which exempts from taxation property used exclusively for religious purposes, precludes the legislature from exempting from taxation church property devoted to a purpose which is not, in fact, a religious purpose. 2. SAME act of 1905, exempting parsonages from taxation, is unconstitutional. The provision of section 2 of the Revenue act as amended in 1905, (Laws of 1905, p. 357,) exempting from taxation all parsonages or residences actually and exclusively used by persons devoting their whole time to church work, is unconstitutional, since a building used primarily as a residence is used for a secular and not for a religious purpose. (Monticello Female Seminary v. People, 106 Ill. 398, distinguished.) FARMER, VICKERS and CARTER, JJ., dissenting. APPEAL from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN B. VAUGHN, Judge, presiding. On July 8, 1907, the county collector of Cook county made application to the county court of that county for a judgment against certain real estate located in said county, owned by the First Congregational Church of Oak Park, for unpaid taxes for the year 1906. Objections filed to the application by the church, based on the theory that the property was exempt from taxation, were overruled and judgment was entered for the amount of taxes claimed. From that judgment the objector has brought the record to this court for review by appeal. It was agreed by the counsel for the respective parties that on April 1, 1906, the property in question was improved by a two-story frame house of ten rooms and a barn, and that the lot on which the buildings were situated was of ordinary size used for residence purposes in Oak Park and of a reasonable size for the location of the buildings thereon; that the premises are, and were on April 1, 1906, owned by the First Congregational Church of Oak Park, and are not, and were not at that time, used for pecuniary profit, and that no rent or revenue of any kind is, or was on April 1, 1906, derived from them; that the said premises are now, and were on that date, actually and exclusively used by the pastor of the said church and his immediate family for residence purposes, and that the pastor devotes, and did on April 1, 1906, devote, his whole time to the work of said church. Appellee's prima facie proof and the agreement above referred to were substantially all the evidence offered. Appellant contends that the court erred in not holding the property exempt from taxation. PEARSON & HERRICK, for appellant: The provision of the act of 1905 exempting certain parsonages from taxation is constitutional. Hurd's Stat. 1905, chap. 120, sec. 2, par. 2; Const. art. 9, sec. 3. The legislature has plenary power, except as restricted by constitutional limitations. Kyle v. People, 226 Ill. 619. Limitations on legislative power in State constitutions are strictly construed. Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th ed.) II; Sutherland on Stat. Const. (Lewis' ed.) secs. 81, 82. The enumeration, in the constitution, of classes of property which the legislature may exempt from taxation is an implied exclusion of all other subjects of exemption. Supreme Lodge v. Board of Review, 223 Ill. 54. Courts will not declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless its unconstitutionality is perfectly clear. Wulff v. Aldrich, 124 Ill. 591; Gaines v. Williams, 146 id. 454; Kyle v. People, 226 id. 619; Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th ed.) 227, et seq., 252, et seq. A parsonage used exclusively by a pastor who devotes his entire time to church work is used exclusively for religious purposes. Female Seminary v. People, 106 id. 398; Trustees v. Wilbraham, 99 Mass. 599; Trustees v. Iowa, 46 Iowa, 275; Cook v. Hutchins, 46 id. 706. ing. LYMAN, LYMAN & O'CONNOR, for appellant on rehear HARRY A. LEWIS, and WILLIAM F. STRUCKMANN, for appellee: The building used by a minister of the gospel as a residence for himself and family is used for pecuniary profit. First M. E. Church v. Chicago, 26 Ill. 482; In the Matter of Swigert, 123 id. 267. All laws, constitutional as well as statutory, exempting property from taxation, must be strictly construed against the exemptions claimed. The amendment of May 18, 1905, to the second clause of section 2 of the Revenue act of 1872 is unconstitutional. Bill of Rights, sec. 3; Const. art. 8, sec. 3, and art. 9, secs. 1, 3, 6; People v. Theological Seminary, 174 Ill. 177; Sanitary District v. Martin, 173 id. 243; County of Ramsey v. Church of Good Shepherd, 45 Minn. 229; Memphis v. Bank, 91 Tenn. 574; 164 U. S. 134. The term "church work" must be construed to mean the same as the term "used exclusively for religious worship," as that term is used in section 3 of article 9 of the constitution. A parsonage is not used "exclusively for religious purposes" but is used for secular purposes, and is not exempt. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 119 Ky. 208. Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the court: Section 1 of article 9 of our constitution requires that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property. Section 3 of the same article provides that "the property of the State, counties, and other municipal corporations, both real and per |