ber, when he removed his family and became domiciled there. The court held that the voter remained an inhabitant of Roxbury until the day of his removal with his family. This case is quoted with approval by McCrary on Elections, (4th ed. par. 88,) and has also been referred to with approval by this court in Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz, supra, on page 636. An intention to change the domicile without actually removing with the intention of remaining does not cause a loss of domicile; (State v. Hallett, 8 Ala. 159;) and the mere intention to acquire a new domicile without any act of removal avails nothing. (Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81.) In State v. McGeary, 38 Atl. Rep. (Vt.) 165, McGeary had been a resident of ward 4, occupying a suite of rooms with his wife, paying rent and both sleeping there until January 6. During the latter part of his stay he had purchased a lot in ward 6, erected a house thereon and fitted it with things necessary for a home, taken from his rooms in ward 4 and elsewhere. On January 6 he and his wife actually left the old rooms and took up their abode in the new house, where he was living March 2 when elected alderman from ward 6. The court decided that his residence must be reckoned from January 6, the time he actually moved into the new house. In Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148, it was stated that it could hardly be doubted that a man livng in Evansville was a resident of that city, although he may intend to remove to Indianapolis either at a fixed time or at an indefinite period in the future. The fact that Hackett's wife remained at the new place would not be decisive. The domicile of the husband usually fixes that of the wife. (Dorsey v. Brigham, supra.) It is clear from the evidence that Hackett intended in good faith to keep his voting residence in the First ward until after election. He was therefore entitled to vote.

The right of F. A. Seeley to vote is also contested. The evidence shows that he was a man of standing, having been in business in the city for years prior to the election;

that he had been living in the north district of the Fourth ward, but in February, 1907, rented a house in the south district of that ward, apparently paying rent from the time he signed the lease. There is testimony tending to show that while he moved in some of his furniture the last of February or in March, he did not begin to live or sleep there until less than thirty days before the election. He testified that he moved some of his furniture, including a bed, the last of February, and that he and his wife slept there several nights in that month; that he occupied the house the last two weeks of February; that he had fruit jars and some bedding over at the other house, but that he moved them to his new residence in March. One witness called by appellant testified that he was all through the new residence the last days of February and he saw no bed there. As we have stated, this question of residence is a difficult one. A man cannot have two residences at the same time. Where the circumstances are such that a man may claim a domicile at either one of two places, the place he regards as his domicile or home will be his residence for the purpose of voting. (Behrensmeyer v. Kreitz, supra.) The decision of this question is complicated by the fact that Mr. Seeley on election day attempted to vote in the district of his old residence, the north district of the Fourth ward, and when he was challenged there he went at once to the south district of the Fourth ward and was challenged and swore in his vote at that place. If it were not for this fact we should have little hesitation, on this record, in holding that he was entitled to vote in the south district of the Fourth ward. While the question is close, the fact that he attempted to vote in the wrong district is not necessarily decisive. While it may have some weight as to his intention, it is well known that the ordinary citizen frequently makes a mistake as to where the law will permit him to vote, and the fact that he made such a mistake would not, in itself, preclude him from voting in the right place. We

have held that where a man voted without right in another State he did not thereby lose his residence and right to vote in this State. (O'Hair v. Wilson, 124 Ill. 351; Imhoff v. Lipe, 162 id. 282; Collier v. Anlicker, supra.) We are inclined to think, on the facts shown, that Mr. Seeley was not entitled to vote in the district to which he had moved.

It is admitted that Theodore L. Haas, as shown by this record, was not entitled to vote. He swore that he voted for appellee for mayor. His evidence is contradicted on some points by other witnesses and we do not think is entirely worthy of credence, but considering all the facts we conclude that his vote, on this record, should not have been counted for the appellee.

Clyde Hainline voted, and there is some evidence tending to show that he voted for appellee. The evidence shows quite clearly that he had not resided in the State for one year, and his vote should therefore not be counted for the appellee.

John Bood, an old man, came from the county almshouse, a few days before election, to the city for the purpose of voting. A party does not forfeit his residence in a precinct in which he was a voter merely by becoming a county charge. (Dale v. Irwin, supra.) It is admitted that he had a right to vote, but it is contended that he voted in the wrong precinct. He had been a resident of the city for forty-five years or more. He left Mrs. Banks' boarding house, in the precinct in which he voted, about a month before he went to the almshouse, moved into another precinct and stopped at another boarding place, which latter place he left for the almshouse late in 1906. The evidence of Mrs. Marshall, another boarding house keeper, tends to show that he came back from the almshouse in January or February, 1907, and stayed at her place for several weeks. It is admitted in the record that Mrs. Marshall's boarding house is in the precinct where Bood voted.

On election day he went to the voting place in this precinct and swore in his vote when he was challenged, and stated in his affidavit that his residence was at Mrs. Banks' lodging house. When an elector is permitted to vote, the presumption is in favor of the legality of the vote, and the burden is on the attacking party to show lack of qualification or the forfeiture of the right. (15 Cyc. 416, and cases there cited.) The mere fact that Bood, apparently enfeebled by age, stated the wrong lodging house in the proper precinct is not sufficient to justify the rejection of his vote, and it was properly counted.

Henry Johnson's vote is also questioned on the ground that he voted in the wrong precinct. It appears that his house is located near the boundary line between two precincts. The appellant attempted to show that the precinct boundary was the north line of Grove street produced, but the record discloses that Grove street runs east and west and is interrupted, ending at Broad street, one block east of Johnson's residence, and commencing again at Maple avenue, three blocks west of his residence, and that the measurements taken by the engineer were at Maple avenue while no measurements were taken at Broad street. We do not think there is any legal evidence in the record establishing the boundary line as to these precincts with reference to Mr. Johnson's residence. Some of the testimony of the engineer tended to show that the line ran through the house, as we understand the record. If this be so it would be necessary to have the exact line, and even then it would be difficult to decide which precinct should be considered his residence. (See Abington v. North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. -40 Mass.-170.) On the record before us, the presumption being that Mr. Johnson was a legal voter, there is no evidence of a character to justify the rejection of his vote.

John Stukenburg voted, and it is admitted that he was. an alien and therefore not entitled to vote. It is not absolutely clear from the record for whom he voted. The

judges went into the booth with him, as he could not read and write, and helped him mark his ballot. Their testimony could not be taken as to how he voted. (Gill v. Shurtleff, 183 Ill. 440.) This question could better be determined by the trial court than by the court of review, as could also the legality of several other votes that are questioned. In deciding the case it appears that the trial judge said he did not find it necessary to discuss the various votes; that, considering the evidence in the most favorable light for appellant, enough votes could not be rejected to give him the majority. From the reading of the record before us we are inclined to think that Stukenburg's vote should be taken from the number counted for appellee.

While John Buffington is admitted to be a legal voter in the city, it is claimed that he voted in the wrong precinct, having moved from Mrs. Banks' lodging house in March before election. There is some testimony tending to show that in March he moved, or partly moved, from Mrs. Banks' house to some property of his near a racetrack, but there is no evidence as to what precinct this property was situated in. He swore in his vote, and in his affidavit gave his residence as Mrs. Banks' lodging house. The record is not very clear as to whom he voted for. He was not called as a witness, and one Jordan, a police officer, testified that Buffington told him some ten days before the election that he would not vote for appellant. It is very frequently difficult to prove for whom a voter cast his ballot. If it is not shown that the vote was illegal he himself cannot be compelled to answer how he voted. Circumstantial evidence may be offered on this subject. (Rexroth v. Schein, 206 Ill. 80.) From an examination of the testimony we do not think it overcomes the presumption that the vote cast by Buffington was legal. Hope v. Flentge, 140 Mo. 390.

Appellant, in the statement of the case in his original brief, claims that there were some thirty votes for appellee